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Abstract 
This thesis contributes to the current debate on how to balance conservation and development 
objectives. The extent of land under protection globally has increased enormously over the last 
30 years, and there are still plans to expand the current protected areas (PAs) and create new 
ones. Their establishment is associated with impacts on local communities who live in the 
proximity of such areas. Different actors have proposed local participation and benefit sharing 
for people affected by these conservation initiatives. Despite their implementation over three 
decades, the social, economic, and political impacts of establishing and maintaining PAs remain 
debatable. It is in this context that this study was conducted in the Enduimet Wildlife 
Management Area (WMA), the Kilimanjaro National Park, and the West Kilimanjaro Forest 
Plantation in Tanzania. 
 
The specific research questions of the study are: 
i. What are the social and economic impacts of the expansion and establishment of 
conservation areas on local people in West Kilimanjaro; and how are the impacts distributed 
along gender lines? 
ii. How are the conservation benefits shared with local communities in West Kilimanjaro? 
iii. How do the conservation benefits and costs affect local peoples‟ attitudes towards and 
perceptions of conservation? 
iv. What are the factors that drive human-wildlife conflicts?   
 
Data were collected using qualitative methods through the combination of in-depth interviews, 
focus group discussions, informal interviews, and participant observation. Secondary data in the 
form of written sources on the study area were used in addition to the primary data gathered. The 
research results are presented in four separate but interrelated papers. 
 
Paper I investigates the gendered impacts of the creation of the Enduimet WMA and expansion 
of the Kilimanjaro National Park during recent years. The results of Paper I indicate that the 
establishment of these PAs has caused local people to lose rights to land and resources, 
harassment by PA staff, and increased conservation costs. The costs were found to be distributed 
along gender lines. However, women are affected more than men, due to inequality in the 
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division of labour and resources at household level. Furthermore, relatively wealthy men and 
women suffer less compared to their poor counterparts because they are capable of buying 
natural resources such as fodder and firewood, an option which is less available to the poor. 
Furthermore, women in female-headed households suffer more, compared to women in male-
headed households, because they lack sufficient labour power for collecting natural resources 
and thus spend more time and energy in doing so. In addition, some are poor – hence they lack 
the money to purchase these resources, while others are of old age and do not have relatives 
willing to help. Collecting natural resources forces poor women to spend more time and labour, 
which affects their health and restricts their time for participating in economic activities. 
 
Paper II explores the local benefits and transparency concerning the collection and distribution of 
tourism revenues from the Enduimet WMA. The results of Paper II show that the benefits 
channelled to local people who bear the costs of conservation are modest, and the system lacks 
transparency. The Enduimet Community-Based Organisation is entitled to receive 65 % of non-
consumptive tourism revenues accrued from the WMA. In practice, it receives less than 65 % 
after the revenues collected have passed through the non-transparent central government system. 
In 2011 each village received about 3.6 % of the tourism fees, and altogether the member 
villages received 32.5 %. When taking into account the uncompensated costs that some villagers 
bear in terms of increased crop damage, livestock loss, and loss of human life caused by 
increasing wildlife populations, the practice does not match the „win-win‟ discourse, that the 
Enduimet WMA will secure a sustainable source of income for local communities.  
 
Paper III compares the Kilimanjaro National Park and the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation in 
terms of local participation and benefit sharing, and how these affect relations between local 
communities and the two areas. The results of Paper III show that the Kilimanjaro National Park 
earns about 17 million USD per year, but from the inception of the park outreach programme in 
1994 to 2011 (17 years), the park has spent only about 1.6 million USD to support 39 out of 90 
neighbouring villages. Only one village among the three studied was supported by the park in 
2002/03, in the form of the construction of a water intake and storage tank worth 13,571 USD. 
The headquarters claim that they offer 7.5 % of the park‟s operational budget to neighbouring 
villages, but in practice, it is much less. Revenue sharing in the park is affected by bureaucratic 
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procedures hampering applications for community projects, political influence, lack of 
transparency, mismanagement, and misuse of funds by national parks headquarters. It was found 
that some income was used to support parks that generate insufficient income. In addition, there 
is generally a lack of communication between the park and villagers. Villagers feel resentment 
towards the park that leads them to withdraw park resources illegally. They referred to the park 
staff as „enemies‟ who do not care about their livelihoods. On the contrary, the West Kilimanjaro 
Forest Plantation has had a positive impact on neighbouring villages. Local communities benefit 
through the legal collection of forest products, farming opportunities, logging businesses for 
registered customers, and casual labour opportunities. Income from casual labour and agriculture 
serves as a source of income for them and their families. Nevertheless, casual labourers are paid 
too little (2.5 USD/day) and the process of allocating farming plots is affected by favouritism. 
The differences observed between the two areas are related to sectoral legal reforms in the 1990s 
to accommodate locally-based and decentralised approaches to natural resources management 
following the economic crisis of the late 1970s to the early 1980s, and the resulting declining 
capacity of government agencies.  
 
Based on inspiration drawn from the field of political ecology, Paper IV applies „webs of 
relation‟ approach to unwind inter-related factors behind cases of elephant killings in West 
Kilimanjaro. In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in elephant killings in Africa, 
for ivory. However, the ivory market is not the only reason why elephants are killed illegally. 
The results of Paper IV show that resistance to conservation is a reason behind elephant killings 
in this case, following appropriations of large tracts of land for conservation by external actors 
without the participation of local people. Local people suffer costs such as crop raiding, property 
damage, livestock deaths, and a threat to their own lives as they try to sustain a living on the 
remaining land that lies between conservation areas. In addition, they lack government support in 
chasing wildlife away from their fields, and they are not compensated for wildlife damages. They 
are denied access to natural resources in the PAs, they are ill treated when found in the PAs, and 
they receive little or no benefits from conservation. Moreover, they lack land security, as there 
are more proposals from conservationists to create new conservation areas. This leaves people 
with an increased feeling of being marginalised and disempowered, with limited possibilities of 
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influencing the situation through democratic means. Thus, local people resist conservation by 
killing wildlife.  
 
All areas studied (Enduimet WMA, Kilimanjaro National Park, and West Kilimanjaro Forest 
Plantation) share a centralised structure in terms of decision making on the management of 
natural resources and benefit sharing. Local people are not able to participate in decision making 
in the management of the areas, and it is difficult for communities to influence or challenge the 
way the structure operates. In Enduimet, the WMA was proposed as community-run 
conservation area. In practice, the communities do not have the power to collect revenues, decide 
on shares, or to verify whether they receive the income they are entitled to receive. The central 
government collects the revenues and channels the percentage to local people. The Kilimanjaro 
National Park was found to involve local people only when there is a fire outbreak; thus local 
people claimed to be used as „tools‟. The park management system does not allow space for local 
people‟s opinions. Most of the collected revenues are retained by the national parks headquarters 
and local people do not have any power or influence over the revenues. In practice, the park 
operates under a strict „fences and fines‟ or „fortress conservation‟ strategy. In the West 
Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation, local people do not have any power or share of the revenues 
collected from the sale of logs and poles, apart from payment received from casual labour. The 
income from logs sold is remitted to the central government. In all three areas, participation is 
used as „means‟ to improve environmental conservation and a way to accrue more revenue for 
the government.    
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Sammendrag 
Denne avhandlingen er et bidrag i den pågående debatten om naturvern- og utvikling. Omfanget 
av vernede arealer på verdensbasis har økt enormt de siste tretti år, og fortsatt planlegges det å 
utvide de nåværende verneområder og opprette nye. Etableringen av slike områder får følger for 
omliggende lokalsamfunn. Forskjellige aktører har foreslått lokal deltakelse og gevinstdeling for 
mennesker påvirket av disse naturverntiltakene. Til tross for at innføringen av verneområder har 
foregått i over tre tiår, er de sosiale, økonomiske og politiske følgene av etableringen og 
videreføringen fortsatt omstridte. Det er i denne sammenhengen at denne studien ble utført i 
Enduimet Wildlife Management Area (WMA), Kilimanjaro Nasjonalpark, og i Vest-Kilimanjaro 
Skogplantasje i Tanzania. 
 
De konkrete forskningsspørsmålene i denne studien er: 
i. Hva er de sosiale og økonomiske konsekvensene for lokalbefolkningen i Vest-
Kilimanjaro av utvidelsen og etableringen av verneområder; og hvordan fordeler disse 
følgene seg i forhold til kjønn? 
ii. Hvordan blir naturverngevinstene delt med lokalsamfunn i Vest-Kilimanjaro? 
iii. Hvordan påvirker naturverngevinster og tap lokalbefolkningens holdning til og 
oppfatning av naturvern? 
iv. Hvilke forhold forårsaker konflikter mellom mennesker og ville dyr?  
 
Det ble brukt kvalitative metoder i datainnsamlingen med en kombinasjon av dybdeintervjuer, 
fokusgruppediskusjoner, uformelle intervjuer og deltakende observasjon. Sekundærdata i form 
av skriftlige kilder om studieområdet ble brukt i tillegg til de innsamlede primærdata. 
Forskningsresultatene blir presentert i fire separate, men tematisk sammenkoplete vitenskapelige 
artikler.  
 
Artikkel 1 undersøker de kjønnsmessige konsekvensene av etableringen av Enduimet WMA og 
utvidelsen av Kilimanjaro Nasjonalpark de siste årene. Resultatene i artikkel 1 tyder på at 
etableringen av disse verneområdene har ført til tapte rettigheter til jord og ressurser for 
lokalbefolkningen, trakassering fra ansatte i nasjonalparken og økte vernekostnader. Det ble 
funnet at kostnadene kjønnsmessig fordeler seg likt. Men kvinner blir mer påvirket enn menn på 
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grunn av ujevn fordeling av arbeid og ressurser på husholdningsnivå. I tillegg blir forholdsvis 
rike menn og kvinner mindre skadelidende enn fattige, fordi de har mulighet til å kjøpe 
naturressurser slik som tørrfôr og ved; en mulighet de fattige i mindre grad har. Dessuten lider 
kvinner i husholdninger med kvinnelige overhoder mer enn kvinner i husholdninger med 
mannlige overhoder, fordi de mangler tilstrekkelig arbeidskraft til å sanke ressurser fra naturen 
og dermed bruker de mer tid og energi på dette. Noen av disse er i tillegg fattige og mangler 
derfor penger til å kjøpe disse ressursene, mens andre er gamle, uten slektninger som er villige til 
å hjelpe. Innsamling av naturressurser tvinger fattige kvinner til mer bruk av tid og arbeidskraft, 
noe som påvirker helsen deres og begrenser tiden de kan bruke til andre økonomiske aktiviteter. 
 
Artikkel 2 utforsker de lokale gevinstene og gjennomsiktigheten i forbindelse med innkreving og 
fordeling av turistinntekter fra Eduimet WMA. Resultatene fra artikkel 2 viser at gevinstene 
kanalisert til den lokalbefolkningen som må bære tapene fra naturvern er liten, og ordningen 
mangler gjennomsiktighet. Enduimet Community-Based Organisation har retten til 65% av 
statens innsamlede turistinntekter. I virkeligheten mottar de mindre enn 65% etter at de 
innkrevde avgiftene har passert gjennom statsapparatet. I 2011 mottok hver landsby omtrent 
3.6% av turistavgiftene, og totalt mottok medlemslandsbyene 32.5%. Tatt i betraktning av de 
udekkede tapene som noen landsbyboere opplever i form av større avlingsskader og tap av 
buskap og menneskeliv på grunn av den økende villdyrbestanden, passer ikke praksisen inn i 
vinn-vinn-diskursen om at Enduimet WMA skal være en bærekraftig inntektskilde for 
lokalsamfunn.  
 
Artikkel 3 sammenligner Kilimanjaro Nasjonalpark og Vest-Kilimanjaro Skogplantasje på 
områdene lokal deltakelse og gevinstdeling, og hvordan disse påvirker forholdene mellom 
lokalsamfunnene og de to områdene. Resultatene fra artikkel 3 viser at Kilimanjaro Nasjonalpark 
har en inntjening på cirka 17 millioner USD per år, men fra starten av parkens støtteprogram i 
1994 til 2011 (17 år) har parken kun brukt cirka 1.6 millioner USD til støtte for 39 av 90 
omliggende landsbyer. Kun en landsby blant de tre i studien ble støttet av parken i 2002/03, i 
form av byggingen av et vanninntak og en samletank verdt 13,571 USD. Parkledelsen påstår at 
de tilbyr 7.5% av parkens driftsbudsjett til omliggende landsbyer, men i virkeligheten er det mye 
mindre. Overskuddsfordelingen i parken påvirkes av byråkratiske prosedyrer som hindrer 
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søknader til lokale prosjekter og lokal politisk innflytelse, og bidrar til mangel på 
gjennomsiktighet og vanskjøtsel og muliggjør parkledelsens misbruk av midler. I tillegg er det en 
generell mangel på kommunikasjon mellom parken og landsbyboerne. Landsbyboerne er sinte på 
parken, og dermed bruker de parkens ressurser ulovlig. De omtaler parkansatte som «fiender» 
som ikke bryr seg om levebrødet deres. Vest-Kilimanjaro Skogplantasje har derimot hatt en 
positiv innvirkning på sine omliggende landsbyer. Lokalsamfunn tjener på lovlig innhøsting av 
skogprodukter, nye landbruksmuligheter, og midlertidige jobber. Inntekt fra midlertidige jobber 
og jordbruk er en inntektskilde for dem og deres familier. Men de midlertidige tilsatte er 
underbetalt (2.5 USD/dag), og prosessen med tildeling av jordbruksområder er preget av 
favorisering. Forskjellene man ser mellom de to områdene har sammenheng med sektorielle 
lovreformer på 1990-tallet, som skulle understøtte lokale og desentraliserte tilnærminger til 
naturressursforvaltning etter den økonomiske krisen sent på 1970-tallet og tidlig 1980-tallet, og 
den påfølgende svekkelsen av kompetanse i statlige etater.  
 
Med inspirasjon fra fagfeltet politisk økologi brukes det i artikkel 4 en tilnærming som fokuserer 
på nettverk av årsaker for å nøste opp sammenhengende faktorer bak tilfeller av elefantdrap i 
Vest-Kilimanjaro. De siste årene har det vært en betydelig økning i elefantdrap for elfenben i 
Afrika. Men elfenbensmarkedet er ikke den eneste grunnen til at elefanter blir ulovlig drept. 
Resultatene i artikkel 4 viser at motstand mot naturvern er en av grunnene til elefantdrapene i 
Vest-Kilimanjaro, etter at store arealer har blitt reservert for naturvern og nå kontrolleres av 
eksterne aktører uten medvirkning fra lokalbefolkningen. Folk lokalt sliter med tap som for 
eksempel ødelagte avlinger, skader på eiendom, tap av husdyr, og trusler mot egne liv når de 
prøver å skaffe seg et livsgrunnlag på de gjenværende arealene mellom naturvernområdene. I 
tillegg får de ingen støtte fra regjeringen til å jage ville dyr vekk fra åkrene, og de får ingen 
økonomisk erstatning for skader ville dyr medfører. De blir nektet adgang til naturressursene i 
verneområdene, de blir dårlig behandlet når de blir oppdaget inni verneområdene, og de nyter få 
eller ingen gevinster fra naturvern. I tillegg har de ingen eiendomstrygghet da det foreligger flere 
forslag fra naturvernere om opprettelse av nye verneområder. Dette gir folk en økende følelse av 
å være utstøtt og maktesløse, med få muligheter til å påvirke situasjonen gjennom demokratiske 
virkemidler. Derfor kjemper lokalbefolkningen mot naturvern ved å drepe ville dyr som 
elefanter. 
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Alle de studerte områdene (Enduimet WMA, Kilimanjaro nasjonalpark og Vest-Kilimanjaro 
Skogplantasje) har den samme sentraliserte organisasjonen når det gjelder 
forvaltningsavgjørelser for naturressurser og deling av gevinster. Lokalbefolkningen har ingen 
medvirkningsmulighet i forvaltningsavgjørelser for områdene, og det er vanskelig for 
lokalsamfunnene å påvirke eller utfordre måten det er organisert på. Enduimet ble foreslått som 
et naturvernområde drevet av lokalsamfunnet. I realiteten har ikke lokalsamfunnene rett til å 
kreve inn inntekter, ta avgjørelser angående andeler, eller verifisere at de får den inntekten de har 
rett på. Den sentrale regjeringen samler inn inntektene og formidler prosentandelen til 
lokalbefolkningen. I Kilimanjaro Nasjonalpark så man at lokalbefolkningen kun ble involvert 
ved brannutbrudd, og derfor påsto lokalbefolkningen at de ble brukt som «redskaper». 
Mesteparten av inntektene beholdes av nasjonalparkens hovedkvarter, og lokalbefolkningen har 
ingen makt eller innflytelse over inntektene. I realiteten utøver parken en streng strategi med 
«gjerder og bøter» eller «festningsnaturvern». I Vest-Kilimanjaro Skogplantasje har 
lokalbefolkningen ingen makt og får ingen andel av inntektene fra salget av tømmer og stolper 
utover betalingen de får for midlertidige jobber. Inntekten fra salg av tømmer overføres til den 
sentrale regjeringen. I alle tre områdene blir medvirkning benyttet som et «middel» til å forbedre 
effektiviteten i produksjonen og/eller naturvernet.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1  Background to the thesis 
The contemporary system of protecting nature began formally in the 19
th
 century when 
Yellowstone National Park was created in the United States of America in 1872. Following the 
United States conservation exemplary, protected areas (PAs) became a worldwide phenomenon 
(Adams and Hutton, 2007). Ninety years later, in 1962, the first International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Parks Congress marked the start of the PAs movement. It 
prepared initial assessments, definitions and requirements for PAs and recommended the United 
Nations (UN) list of PAs and the category system (Borgerhoff Mulder and Coppolillo, 2005). In 
1972, the Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human-Environment endorsed 
the conservation of representative samples of all core ecosystems as a basic requirement of 
national biodiversity conservation programmes. Since then, conservation has been encouraged by 
UN resolutions, such as the World Charter for Nature (1982), the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (1992), the Millennium Declaration (2000), and the 
Johannesburg Declaration on sustainable development (2002). PAs have become a main 
indicator of international commitment to environmental conservation, in documents such as 
chapter IV of the Millennium Declaration and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity.  
 
From less than 1,000 PAs in 1940 (Veit and Benson, 2004), the network expanded immensely to 
more than 161,000 by 2010, representing about 13 % of the world‟s terrestrial surface area (UN 
MDG, 2010). The Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
signed by over 190 parties in 2010, set a target that a minimum 17 % of „terrestrial and inland 
water‟ and 10 % of „coastal and marine‟ areas should be „conserved effectively and equitably 
managed‟ by 2020 (CBD, 2012). Information from the World Database on Protected Areas 
indicates that 49 parties had 17 % or more of their land protected as of 2010. Furthermore, over 
40 parties have almost attained Target11, with between 10 % and 17 % of their terrestrial surface 
area being protected (CBD, 2012).   
 
The growth of PAs has been particularly pronounced in third world countries where biodiversity 
is the greatest (Naughton-Treves et al., 2005). PAs have been identified as an important tool to 
counteract biodiversity loss (Adams and Hutton, 2007). Neo-Malthusian narratives of 
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environmental degradation go hand in hand with proposals for more PAs (Adams and Hutton, 
2007). There is still much pressure from international conservation non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), donors, governments, and other external actors to conserve more areas, 
including land used by small-scale farmers, pastoralists, and indigenous people. In 1994, the 
IUCN published six categories of PAs, ranging from the strictest – with a primary objective of 
biodiversity conservation − to PAs which allow some aspects of resource utilisation. Most of 
PAs under the strictest IUCN categories (categories I and II) are found in developing countries 
(Naughton-Treves et al., 2005). The IUCN defines a PA as „a clearly defined geographical space, 
recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-
term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values‟ (Dudley, 
2008, p. 8).  
 
The establishment of PAs has been associated with a philosophy of protectionism (a „fortress‟ or 
„fences and fines‟ approach) (Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau, 2004; Chatty and Colchester, 
2002). This strategy tends to displace communities forcefully from their land, change land-use 
rights (most notably denial of natural resources access previously held), and impose punishments 
for breaking PA-based laws (Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau, 2004). Chape et al. (2008) 
indicate that about 72 % of PAs worldwide, representing more than 58 % of the PA network, 
implement restrictive and exclusionary management regimes. 
 
Since the 1970s, the top-down exclusionary conservation model has been increasingly 
questioned on ethical and practical grounds (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004; Swiderska et al., 
2008; Wilshusen et al., 2002). The recognition of high administrative and social costs, concerns 
about long-term success of conservation, as well as an emphasis on participatory development 
approaches and decentralisation, have brought a shift towards more decentralised and inclusive 
forms of natural resources management (Adams and Hulme, 2001; Adams et al., 2004).  
 
Participatory approaches can be viewed as a better way to solve conflicts between local 
communities and PAs, to conserve wider wildlife areas outside core PAs (Newmark and Hough, 
2000), and to merge conservation and development activities (WCED, 1987). Various 
international development institutions, NGOs, private tourism investors, and government 
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agencies have gradually incorporated local people into their conservation programmes (Levine, 
2004). The role and importance of PAs in sustainable development have been emphasised in 
international policy instruments such as Convention on Biological Diversity and the Millennium 
Development Goals (Scherl et al., 2004). The Fifth IUCN World Parks Congress recommended 
that: „….PA establishment and management should contribute to poverty reduction at the local 
level, and at the very minimum must not contribute to or exacerbate poverty‟ (IUCN, 2003, p. 
210). 
 
So far, different types of participatory approaches have been developed. However, some studies 
have criticised these approaches for failing to attain the win-win outcomes of nature conservation 
and development (e.g. Barrett et al., 2001; Gillingham and Lee, 1999; Nelson, 2007; Newmark 
and Hough, 2000; Sachedina, 2008). Hostility and resentment towards biodiversity conservation 
and PAs staff are still prevalent in many cases (Gibson and Marks, 1995; Loibooki et al., 2002). 
 
Some arguments prefer the strict categories of PAs for effective nature conservation (e.g. 
Brandon, 1998; Bruner et al., 2001; Oates, 1999; Terborgh 1999). Proponents argue that the 
community-based conservation approach dilutes conservation initiatives in existing PAs, and 
undermines the creation of more strict PAs in the future that are essential for the effective 
conservation of biodiversity (Locke and Dearden, 2005). However, Sachs et al. (2009) argue that 
with escalating global challenges such as over-consumption of ecosystem services, human 
population growth, and climate change, there is a need to combine biodiversity conservation and 
community development agendas. There is an on-going debate on how the dual goals of 
biodiversity conservation and development may be reconciled (Adams et al., 2004; Brockington 
et al., 2006). The challenge is how to find the right equilibrium between the desire to live in 
harmony with nature, and the need to utilise natural resources for sustaining life and economic 
development (CBD, 2004).  
 
Although the win-win discourse has become increasingly popular over three decades as a 
conservation strategy, its success has been limited (Nelson, 2007; Sachedina, 2008). There is a 
mismatch between theory and practice. Thus it is important to engage in rigorous scientific 
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research in order to obtain scientific evidence so that informed decisions can be made. This is the 
context for this study in West Kilimanjaro, Tanzania.  
 
1.2   Study objectives and research questions 
The study aims to: 1) investigate the social and economic impacts of conservation on local 
people in West Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, and their distribution along gender lines; 2) investigate 
the theory and practice of the current win-win discourse advocated by external actors and 
employed in the study areas in West Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. The chapters and four papers in this 
thesis contribute to the biodiversity conservation/community development debate by elaborating 
on impacts of conservation on local communities, costs and benefits sharing, and the reaction of 
local communities towards conservation.  
 
In order to address the objectives, I investigated the following four interlinked research 
questions: 
1. What are the social and economic impacts of the establishment and expansion of 
conservation areas on local people in West Kilimanjaro; and how are these impacts 
distributed along gender lines? 
2. How are conservation benefits shared with local communities in West Kilimanjaro? 
3. How do the conservation benefits and costs affect local people‟s attitudes towards and 
perceptions of conservation? 
4. What factors contribute to human-wildlife conflicts?    
 
1.3   Organisation of the thesis 
The first part of the thesis is an introduction that includes the background to the problem, and 
provides an overview of conservation in sub-Saharan Africa and contemporary conservation 
issues. It presents the political ecology approach, introduces the study area, and gives a detailed 
account of the research methods applied for data collection and analysis (further details of the 
study methodology are provided in each individual paper). In addition, it gives a brief summary 
and synthesis of the main findings from the four individual but interrelated studies that are 
presented in the second part of this thesis. Finally, it draws conclusions and provides some policy 
recommendations.  
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The second part of the study constitutes the four individual but interrelated papers, which are 
referred to in the text by the roman numerals (I – IV). 
 
2.  A brief background of wildlife conservation in sub-Saharan Africa 
2.1   Conservation in pre-colonial societies 
Evidence suggests that ancient people used to set aside certain areas for social purposes such as 
hunting and religion (Furze et al., 1997; Shafer, 1999). The sacred groves established in various 
areas on the globe could be regarded as the oldest method of nature conservation and habitat 
protection (Bhagwat and Rutte, 2006; Laird, 1999, 2001).  
 
Although pre-colonial societies in Africa did not employ contemporary concepts such as 
maximum sustained yields, carrying capacity, wildlife census and indices to assist them, for 
instance, in setting harvest quotas, these societies used several management strategies 
(DeGeorges and Reilly, 2009). A strict social hierarchy through clans and families was employed 
to control access to natural resources such as wildlife, fish, grazing and agricultural land, and tree 
products; mostly such control was under the authority of religious leaders, chiefs or elders (Hinz, 
2003). Other means that were used to control access to natural resources include taboos/totems 
against the hunting and eating of certain species of animals, territoriality, royal game areas, 
harvest regulations and seasons, and habitat manipulation (Boone, 2003; Hinz, 2003; 
Kideghesho, 2006; Kjekshus, 1996). This led to control over access to natural resources, and thus 
sustainable exploitation. Although rules and regulations concerning access to natural resources 
were not written down, they were precise and organised (DeGeorges and Reilly, 2009).  
 
2.2   Protectionism  
In the 19
th 
century, the PAs movement began with the establishment of early national parks in the 
USA (Neumann, 2002). These parks were protected by public law that prohibited the settlement 
of Native American populations and denied access to resources within the PAs (Adams and 
Hulme, 2001; Goldstein, 2005; Nash, 1967). People were perceived to be a threat to the 
environment; thus, the separation of humans and nature was regarded as a solution (Robbins, 
2004). This hegemonic conservation model, with criteria on what „nature‟ ought to look like, was 
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copied worldwide and later imposed on third world countries during colonial times (Adams, 
2003; Adams and Hutton, 2007; Hutton et al., 2005; Neumann, 1998). 
 
This conservation model was based on a myth of nature/wilderness that was perceived to be 
pristine, untouched, and free of human influence (Murombedzi, 2003). The model operated by 
fencing an area off from local people, either physically or by legal and/or economic regulations, 
using a militaristic law enforcement strategy. Those who trespassed were fined, or in extreme 
situations, were killed; hence, the terms „fences and fines‟ or a „fortress conservation‟ approach. 
This conservation model was employed for almost all of the twentieth century (Hutton et al., 
2005). However, archaeological evidence proves that many areas claimed as „wilderness‟ are 
actually cultural landscapes that have a long history of human habitation (Woodroffe et al., 
2005). Some studies have challenged the „wilderness‟ concept by tracing its origins and debating 
the constructed character of the concept (Neumann, 1998; Robbins, 2004).  
 
At the time of the World Parks Congress (1962), there were around 1,000 official PAs 
worldwide, covering a land surface area of approximately 1 million km
2
 (Borgerhoff Mulder and 
Coppolillo, 2005; Veit and Benson, 2004). After that point in time, African postcolonial 
governments, following the Anglo-American „wilderness‟ model, established and expanded the 
number of „wilderness‟ areas very quickly (Bonner, 1993; Neumann, 2002). A partial driver for 
establishing PAs was a realisation of the economic potential of wildlife tourism; the expansion 
was also partly due to active encouragement by foreign NGOs and development agencies 
(Bonner, 1993; Chapin, 2004; Levine, 2002). In some places, this conservation regime was 
strengthened and intensified (Nelson et al., 2007). Many existing reserves were upgraded to 
game reserves and national parks; this meant that all forms of local community consumptive 
activities were banned, and the emphasis was placed on law enforcement to curb illegal 
activities.  
 
Local communities became marginalised and alienated from ancestral land, and restricted in their 
use of natural resources (Neumann, 1998). The protected areas were created without local 
people‟s consent or consideration of local land use practices, and in most cases led to forced 
evictions (Brockington and Igoe, 2006; Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington, 2007), uncompensated 
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resettlement, alienation, and other detrimental consequences for local people (Scheyvens, 2002). 
A study by Geisler and de Sousa (2001) suggests that there may be 14 to 24 million 
environmental refugees on the African continent alone, as a result of exclusionary conservation. 
 
In the 1970s, the fences and fines approach underwent a crisis, since conservation goals were not 
being achieved (Neumann, 1992; Wells and Brandon, 1992). Poaching increased and many 
wildlife species were close to extinction (Kideghesho, 2006). Conflict between PAs and local 
people reached a critical level. The seriousness of the crisis deepened when the costs of 
biodiversity conservation fuelled people‟s resentment towards biodiversity conservation laws 
(Neumann, 1992; Wells and Brandon, 1993; Western, 1984). Local people took revenge against 
conservation initiatives in the form of illegal activities in PAs, violence, and vandalism of 
resources, thus threatening the survival of wild animals (Kideghesho, 2006). 
 
2.3   Emergence of community conservation 
The community conservation approach was brought to prominence by the World Conservation 
Strategy (IUCN, 1980), the Third World Congress on National Parks in Bali in 1982 (McNeely 
and Miller, 1984), Our Common Future (WCED, 1987), Caring for the Earth 
(IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991), and the Rio Summit (UNCED, 1992). The shift from the fences and 
fines conservation approach to community-based and decentralised approaches was based on 
several arguments. First, there was increasing concern about wildlife extinction rates, global 
scale environmental issues, human impacts on the environment, and the notion that conservation 
must move beyond the borders of PAs. In addition, there was criticism about the high costs, poor 
results, and inefficiency of the protectionist paradigm of conservation (e.g. Adams, 2004; 
Fabricius et al., 2004; Western et al., 1994). Second, there were concerns about the economic 
impacts of PAs on local people, and the exacerbation of poverty resulting from biodiversity 
conservation (Sunderlin et al., 2005; Western et al., 1994). These concerns included the 
impoverishing impacts of PAs, inequitable sharing of costs and benefits of conservation at the 
local, national, regional and international levels (Ferraro, 2002), and human rights violations, 
especially forced evictions from PAs and the militaristic management strategy of PAs 
(Neumann, 2004). Lastly, there was increasing awareness of the ability of local people to 
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manage natural resources based on common-pool resource theories (Ostrom, 1990), the new 
international policy agenda, together with neoliberal economic theory (Virtanen, 2005). 
 
Thus the community conservation narrative emerged to address the crises in many PAs in third 
world countries. It was perceived as an ideological framework within which programmes should 
be designed to meet both conservation and development requirements by involving local 
communities, to a range of extents, in the process of natural resources conservation (Hulme and 
Murphee, 2001; Western et al., 1994). The participatory conservation paradigm became a 
mainstream approach in conservation in third world countries. It was promoted by conservation 
multinationals and development multinationals, as well as many national departments for 
international cooperation (Inamdar et al., 1996). This new paradigm in conservation recognises 
the involvement of local communities as the key focus for success of the conservation agenda, 
and the importance of biodiversity in serving both conservation and development goals. It also 
recognises the importance of establishing markets to provide incentives for conservation.  
 
The participatory approach entailed a shift of conservation focus from nature as protected 
through exclusive state-led, top-down, technocratic control, to nature as managed through 
inclusive, bottom-up, participatory endeavours (Brosius et al., 1998; Songorwa, 1999). This new 
paradigm was grounded on the argument that „if conservation and development could be 
simultaneously achieved, then the interests of both could be served‟ (Berkes 2003, p. 621). This 
amalgamation of conservation and development aims has often been termed a „win-win‟ 
solution, or „pro-poor‟ conservation (Adams et al., 2004). 
 
Many programmes and projects were developed to motivate local communities and enable them 
to support conservation objectives. New activities were targeted to create better relationships 
between communities and conservation authorities, facilitate the sustainable use of resources, 
and improve welfare conditions of people around the conservation area in compensation for not 
using the core area (Adams and Hulme, 2001). Projects and programmes under the community 
conservation label aimed to involve local people in decision making about natural resources 
(Adams and Hulme, 2001) and benefits sharing, and compensate them for the costs they suffered 
as a result of conservation initiatives (Wells and Brandon, 1992).  
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An example of such initiatives in the late 1970s to 1990s is the WINDFALL (Wildlife Industry 
New Development for All) project, a top-down programme for the distribution of the benefits of 
elephant culling, launched in Zimbabwe in 1978 (Kasere, 1996). Others include: the Communal 
Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe which 
started in 1986 as a follow-up to WINDFALL (Martin, 1986); the Luangwa Integrated Rural 
Development Project (LIRDP) and the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) wildlife 
utilisation programme in Zambia; the community-based conservation project in the Kunene 
Region in Namibia which evolved to ensure that the community benefits from wildlife resources; 
the Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in Tanzania; and the park outreach programmes in 
some national parks in Africa. 
 
Conversely, it has been reported that some community-based conservation programmes in 
southern Africa have resulted in local communities losing access to and control of land and 
resources due to restrictions being imposed that were not previously in place (Jones, 2003). For 
example, the Government of Botswana apportioned about 20 % of its land in an effort to 
combine conservation and development (Twyman, 2000). Elsewhere, programmes have aided 
states to further their authority over community land uses beyond the boundaries of PAs, where 
in some countries buffer zone management may extend up to 50 km beyond the park (Neumann, 
1997). All these cases indicate that many community-based conservation approaches may, in 
fact, have similarities to conventional approaches (Berkes, 2007).  
 
Despite widespread adoption of the participatory approach, many countries have not yet 
empowered communities through decentralisation and devolution of decision-making powers 
(Khadka and Nepal, 2010; Singh and Sharma, 2004). In fact, several examples of devolution 
indicate some instances of recentralisation taking place within a programme of decentralisation 
(e.g. Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Pulhin and Dressler, 2009). „Recentralising while decentralising‟ 
is a system where the devolution of power to local level institutions continues to serve and 
answer central interests (Ribot et al., 2006; Schafer and Bell, 2002).  
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Participation in conservation has been employed as a strategy rather than as a conservation 
principle (Vedeld, 2002), and community development is used simply as a method to facilitate 
conservation agendas (Barrett and Arcese, 1995). Community conservation programmes have 
sometimes been implemented as a way to buy favour in order to maintain the old, strict 
management approach (Kaltenborn et al., 2008). Often, livelihood alternatives and related social 
activities are designed to compensate for conservation costs, rather than to prevent them 
(Springer, 2009).  
 
Cooke and Kothari (2001) argue that facilitators of participatory approaches are able to ignore 
existing and legitimate local decision-making processes, and possibly „reinforce the interests of 
the already powerful‟ local actors, thus creating a „tyranny of method‟ (Cooke and Kothari 2001, 
p. 8). Similarly, Mohan and Stokke (2000) claim that such approaches not only tend to ignore 
existing inequalities and local power relations (by considering local communities as homogenous 
entities), but they also underplay the role of broader economic and political forces.  
 
2.4   Return to fortress conservation? 
The overriding premise of community-based conservation approaches is that when local people 
participate in conservation endeavours and perceive and/or receive benefits from the 
intervention, then they will support conservation. Although it appear to be promising, 
community-based approaches have faced criticism from conservationists, social scientists, and 
development economists alike. Several studies reveal that, after three decades of operation, 
community conservation has failed to meet either conservation or development goals effectively 
(e.g. Blaikie, 2006; McShane and Wells, 2004). The wildlife-related benefits are usually too 
small to offset costs (such as damage by wildlife), and economic development is often 
inadequately linked to conservation (Kiss, 1990; Lewis and Phiri, 1998; Wells and Brandon, 
1992). In addition, elite capture is a persistent problem and reinforces existing intra-community 
power structures instead of alleviating livelihood struggles of the poorest, who often have no 
alternative besides illegal resource extraction (Colchester, 2002). It turns out that the assumption 
that when local people obtain some direct benefit from conservation, they will be motivated to 
conserve protected areas, and will take steps to do so, is not always the case. There are, however, 
 11 
 
a few successful and convincing case studies which show a positive correlation between local 
people‟s livelihood improvement and conservation activities (Wells et al., 1999).  
 
Some studies argue that community conservation dilutes conservation initiatives in current PAs, 
and weakens the possibility of creating more strictly controlled PAs in the future, for purposes of 
biodiversity conservation (e.g. Bruner et al., 2001; Locke and Dearden, 2005). As a result, many 
conservation biologists have repeatedly called for a return to the protectionist approach (e.g. 
Brandon et al., 1998; Locke and Dearden, 2005; Oates, 1999; Terborgh, 1999). Proponents of 
this viewpoint argue for extreme measures of protection in order to meet the current tremendous 
threats to biodiversity conservation, and support a return to practices such as authoritarian law 
enforcement (Wilshusen et al., 2002). Such calls have been heeded to some extent by donors 
such as USAID (US Agency for International Development) and DFID (UK Department for 
International Development) that have significantly reduced their support for community-based 
conservation support over the last ten years (Hutton et al., 2005). 
 
These arguments indicate that the participatory approach has many weaknesses as a conservation 
instrument, particularly in its implementation and resulting impacts. However, McShane and 
Wells (2004) note that: „Linking PA management with the interests of local stakeholders remains 
one of the few widely applicable approaches to site-based biodiversity conservation that offers a 
realistic prospect of success‟ (p. 7).  
 
Bajracharya et al. (2006) and Spiteri and Nepal (2005) argue that although participatory 
approaches to biodiversity conservation are not always perfect, they offer the greatest hope for 
engendering community support for biodiversity conservation. Evidence and experience from 
several developing countries reveal that although difficult, reconciliation between biodiversity 
conservation and development is feasible, and community conservation remains a major viable 
conservation alternative (e.g. Adams and Hulme, 2001; Haque et al., 2009). 
 
2.5   Neoliberal conservation 
Neoliberalism, according to Harvey (2005), can be defined as a „theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
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entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade‟ (p. 2). Neoliberal conservation refers to „the 
decentralisation of environmental governance, or a shift in responsibility for formal resource 
management from state to local institutions and new forms of commodification and 
commercialisation of nature that emerge in these contexts in order to fund conservation efforts‟ 
(Brondo, 2013, p. 10). Since the 1980s, neoliberal economic policies have dominated the 
economic sphere in Africa and influenced conservation policy substantially (Brockington et al., 
2008; Büscher, 2010; Heynen et al., 2007; Igoe and Sullivan, 2009; Sullivan, 2006).  
 
The win-win neoliberal thinking about PAs evolved with an emphasis on how tourism markets 
could generate revenues for investment and conservation. Tourism markets are believed to bring 
about win-win outcomes from conservation interventions by adding value to PAs through 
ecotourism activities and ecosystem services. This added value can pay for conservation 
activities and generate benefits for local communities, encouraging them to support conservation 
(Büscher, 2008; Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Ecotourism is among the primary sources of 
money to support biodiversity conservation and development (Honey, 2008); it fits in well with 
neoliberal priorities of decentralisation and increased private sector involvement. The neoliberal 
view is that business people, NGOs, and communities should share responsibility for 
conservation with the state (Igoe and Brockington, 2007; Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
 
Neoliberal conservation requires biodiversity to become commodities, while local people 
provide labour (West, 2005). In such settings, local people may also become „commodities‟, 
since local culture is a selling point for marketing ecotourism and people-centred conservation 
initiatives (Igoe, 2004). Neoliberal conservation keeps pace with development demands and is 
beneficial mainly to national and transnational individuals and groups, but not necessarily to 
local people (Brockington et al., 2008; Büscher, 2010; Büscher and Whande, 2007; Igoe and 
Brockington, 2007). In such situations, conservation related investments have been favoured at 
the expense of the needs of local communities (Brondo and Brown, 2011). Furthermore, to be 
successful, this model does not seek to improve the livelihoods and economy of local 
communities, nor the relationships of communities with local resources; actually, it can and does 
thrive on the dislocation of local people (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). 
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One element of neoliberal approaches to biodiversity conservation that is of growing 
significance, is the increasing „privatisation of nature‟ in the management of PAs, thus „raising 
complex issues of rights, governance, and legitimacy‟ (Adams and Hutton, 2007, p. 169). The 
notion of parks being managed by corporate non-state actors, or private parks, is becoming 
increasingly noticeable in nature conservation (Langholz and Krug, 2004). The management of 
PAs has shifted from being mainly by the state (with substantial support from international 
NGOs and development funding) to more direct participation by international NGOs, local 
communities, and private-sector entities such as natural resource managers (Adams and Hutton, 
2007).  
 
Neoliberal development policies work to put peripheral state intervention in markets. The state‟s 
role in the neoliberal context is to „create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to 
such practices‟ (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). However, state actors tend to try and maintain their 
intermediate role between local people and international donors (Levine, 2007). This gives them 
access to international development funding and enables them to exert direct influence at local 
level. State actors are generally not willing to strengthen the capacity of local people to become 
independent and address conservation matters themselves; instead they work to perpetuate local 
people‟s dependence on the state (Levine, 2007). 
 
2.6   Conservation as ‘green grabbing’ 
Land grabbing or „green grabbing‟ (i.e. the appropriation of large tracts of land and 
environmental resources for environmental ends), is growing in significance across the world 
(Fairhead et al., 2012). Since 1990, the area of land under conservation worldwide has doubled 
(Dowie, 2010). The success of the global conservation movement has led to mass dislocation of 
indigenous peoples across the world who are increasingly expelled from their ancestral land, 
while others are threatened with dislocation to pave the way for environmental conservation 
(Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012; Dowie, 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Zoomers, 
2010). Through conservation and tourism, non-capitalist spaces and resources are opened up for 
accumulation, where local people are dispossessed of their land, and the places and resources are 
more valued than people (Corson, 2011; Harvey, 2003; Li, 2010).  
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The rush for large-scale land investments in developing countries for biodiversity conservation 
and tourism purposes is increasingly related to substantial negative impacts on „access to and 
control over natural resources, food security, human rights, and the environment‟ (Global 
Witness, 2012, p. 1). In some cases, it involves the wholesale alienation of land; while in other 
cases it involves restructuring of rules and authority in terms of the access, control, use, and 
management of resources (Fairhead et al., 2012). Land deals are frequently agreed in secret 
between governments and investors, without the consent or awareness of affected local 
communities, who in most cases are incapable of holding governments or investors accountable 
(Global Witness, 2012).   
 
2.7   Resistance to conservation  
There is a rich body of scholarly literature on different forms of resistance to what is perceived 
as illegitimate or non-democratic governance (e.g. Gupta, 2001; O‟Brien, 1996; Scott, 1985; 
Watts, 2001). People who are dispossessed and marginalised by conservation projects tend to 
resist governance in various ways (Holmes, 2007). Cavanagh and Benjaminsen (forthcoming) 
identify four different forms of such resistance: nonviolent, militant, discursive, and formal-
legal. Illegal wildlife killings is an example of the militant form of resistance. Other examples of 
resistance to conservation are given by Neumann (1992, 1998), Norgrove and Hulme (2006), 
Weladji and Tchamba (2003), and Western (1994).   
 
Some forms of resistance represent what Scott (1985) calls „everyday resistance‟, where 
relatively powerless peasants seek to avoid oppressive regulations by using techniques such as 
„foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, 
arson, sabotage, and so on‟ (Scott, 1985, xvi). These „weapons of the weak‟ (Scott, 1985) 
normally need little planning or coordination. People make use of implicit understandings and 
informal social networks and avoid any direct confrontation with elites or government 
authorities. Scott (1986) also notes that everyday forms of resistance are almost invisible, yet 
such resistance has been far more prevalent in history than overt rebellions.  
 
Local people use various overt and covert „resistance methods to challenge the hegemony of 
conservation imposed by protected areas authorities‟ (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006, p. 1100). In 
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addition to poaching and killing wildlife, these methods may include destroying government 
property, extracting resources illegally, spreading false information (Shafer, 1999), destroying 
resources (Harkness, 2000), and threatened or actual violence against conservation staff 
(Brockington, 2004; Neumann, 1998; Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Robbins et al., 2006). 
Methods may also take the form of illegally using land in a protected area (Li, 2007; Cavanagh 
and Benjaminsen, forthcoming), destroying protected area infrastructure (Meyerson, 1998), and 
collaborating with poachers (Western, 1994).  
 
Acts of resistance against conservation initiatives are usually carried out by marginalised people 
who suffer the costs of conservation and do not have the ability to circumvent the system through 
bribing officials or accessing political power (Holmes, 2007). Resistance to conservation in its 
various forms may also be seen as what Nixon (2011) calls „slow violence‟, which stands in 
contrast to spectacular and instantaneous violence. Slow violence is gradual and incremental, and 
leads to „delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is 
typically not viewed as violence at all‟ (Nixon, 2011: 2). The same author mentions 
dispossession caused by the establishment of areas for environmental protection as an example 
of slow violence. 
 
2.8   Participation in conservation 
The notion of participation in conservation and development has been widely discussed and 
debated (e.g. Cleaver, 2001; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2001; Matta et al., 2005), and 
there are a variety of definitions of the term. For example, Hoben et al. (1998) define 
participation as a process through which different groups in a community influence and share 
control over development initiatives, and the decisions and resources that affect them. According 
to Williams (2004) and Kapoor (2005), participation varies both spatial-temporally and socio-
politically, and comes with concomitant costs.  
 
Participation can be used as a means to ensure sustainable changes in management or as an end 
to enhance equity and empowerment (Mannigel, 2008). When participation is used as a means, 
people are involved in a way that seeks to acquire their support for development or conservation 
initiatives (Wells and Brandon, 1993). Several scholars (e.g. Arnstein, 1969; Borrini-Feyerabend, 
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1996; Jeffery and Bhaskar, 2001; Pimbert and Pretty, 1997; Pretty et al., 1995; Wilcox, 2003) 
have developed a „ladder of participation‟ which one can use to assess the extent of local 
people‟s participation. The scale indicates the increasing degree of participation, generally 
ranging from minimal/nominal to the transfer of power and responsibilities (Figure 1). 
 
 Participation as a means  
to increase efficiency  
 A B  C D E F G 
 
Institution  
 
minimal informing information 
seeking 
actively 
consulting 
negotiating  sharing 
authority 
transferring 
authority 
 
Local 
stakeholder 
nominal  passive informing giving 
opinions 
active 
functional  
interactive taking 
responsibility 
        
 Participation as an end for 
empowerment and equity 
 
Figure 1: Different types of participation (adopted from Mannigel, 2008) 
 
When taking into consideration the logic of acting together or taking part, the extremes 
„nominal‟, „passive‟, and „taking over management responsibility‟ are not considered to be 
particularly participatory. This is because at those levels, local people and institutions are only 
distantly involved in management and decision-making activities (Mannigel, 2008, p. 500). 
However, in rural development and in nature conservation studies, the activities on these three 
levels are commonly referred to as participatory (Mannigel, 2008). 
 
Participation in natural resources management is sometimes presented as a continuum of power 
sharing between the two parties (e.g. government and community) (Pimbert and Pretty, 1997; 
Barrow and Murphree, 2001). Participation can occur formally or informally, and can be top-
down (government driven), bottom-up (community-based), or a combination of both (co-
management regimes). In top-down participation, the powerful stakeholder (e.g. government) 
seeks to share responsibility, while in bottom-up participation stakeholders seek a greater role in 
management or to share responsibilities in the absence of an existing authority (Borrini-
Feyerabend, 1996). 
 
 17 
 
On this continuum of power sharing, a wide spectrum of conservation approaches can be 
identified, in both policy and practice. These approaches include: 
i. Fortress conservation: the state controls an area and fences it off from local communities 
either physically, or by legal and/or economic regulations. 
 
ii. PA outreach programme (conservation for the people) (Hulme and Murphree, 2001, p. 5): 
a government controls an area while addressing some livelihood and social needs of 
adjacent local populations, for instance sharing revenue from park fees, free visits to PAs, 
local employment, wildlife damage compensation, environmental education. The local 
people obtain some rights, but acknowledge the paramount authority, responsibility, and 
discretion of the government over the park and its resources. The main purpose is to 
enhance the biological integrity of national parks and reserves (Hulme and Murphree, 
2001), while enforcing good practice, maintaining „good neighbourliness‟, and providing 
benefits to local people in terms of sharing revenue from park fees. This type of 
programme has been the most prominent in Tanzania National Parks (Community 
Conservation Services) and in East Africa generally (Hulme and Murphree, 2001).  
iii. Collaborative natural resource management (conservation with the people) (Hulme and 
Murphree, 2001): local communities or resource user groups actively manage a PA 
together with the government or conservation authorities, under shared rights and 
responsibilities (see Borrini-Feyerabend, 1997). An example of such a scheme is the Joint 
Forest Management programme. 
iv. Community-based natural resources management (in Tanzania: community-based 
wildlife conservation and community-based forest management) (conservation by the 
people) (e.g. Hulme and Murphree, 2001; Western et al., 1994): aims at the conservation 
of „natural resources or biodiversity protection by, for and with the local people‟ 
(Murphree, 1994). The responsibility and benefits of biological resources rest with the 
local community, while the government gives advice and maintains an enabling policy 
framework (Hulme and Murphree, 2001; Western et al., 1994). The central idea in the 
community-based conservation approach is the devolution of control of natural resources 
to local communities, as distinct from protectionism and the segregation of people and 
nature (Western et al., 1994, p.8). 
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v. Cultural protection (Posey, 1999; Laird, 1999): conservation of natural resources or 
ecosystems based on indigenous people‟s beliefs and local culture, without state or 
government interference, e.g. sacred forests (Posey, 1999; Laird, 1999). UNESCO labels 
areas under cultural protection as „cultural landscapes‟. 
 
The park outreach, community-based conservation, and co-management regimes are commonly 
referred to as participatory management of natural resources. The assumption underlying 
participatory approaches in natural resources management is that, if local communities derive 
some benefits from conservation, they will be more likely to support the conservation of 
biodiversity (Wells and Brandon, 1992). 
 
2.9   Evolution of wildlife conservation in Tanzania 
The history of modern conservation in Tanzania can be dated back to the colonial era, when 
German colonists enacted the first laws in 1891 to regulate off take, hunting methods, and trade 
in wildlife, and to fully protect endangered species (URT, 2007). As a result, in 1904, Mount 
Kilimanjaro was protected under the Forest Conservation Ordinance (Kivumbi and Newmark, 
1991). In 1905, the first game reserves, which form part of current Selous Game Reserve, were 
established (URT, 2007). Selous was gazetted as the first game reserve by the British colonial 
government in 1922. In 1928, the Ngorongoro crater was gazetted, followed by the Serengeti 
Game Reserve one year later.  
 
Prior to World War II, hunting for subsistence was permitted in game reserves (Nelson et al., 
2007). Local people who originally lived inside the PAs retained their customary rights to the 
land and restricted user rights to wildlife (Nelson et al., 2007). After World War II, the situation 
gradually changed, a period in Africa which Neumann (2002, p. 22) calls „the conservation 
boom‟. Traditional African hunting was opposed and local people were not allowed to settle in 
PAs (Neumann, 2002). In 1951 the Serengeti National Park was gazetted, incorporating the 
Ngorongoro crater. Later in 1959, the Serengeti National Park was re-gazetted by the British 
colonial administration. The process was associated with evictions of Maasai people from the 
park (Nelson et al., 2007; Neumann, 2002). The Wildlife Conservation Ordinance was passed the 
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same year, withdrawing all customary rights for local people who had been living inside PAs 
(Goldstein, 2005; Nelson et al., 2007).  
 
According to Neumann (2002), the pressure came mainly from European conservationists who 
had been lobbying for PAs for a long time. In addition, the British colonial administration 
acknowledged the potential of PAs to modernise its colony, and the potential of associated 
tourism to increase its income (Neumann, 2002). With these interests in place, wildlife 
conservation laws became more and more unfriendly towards local people. 
 
After Tanzanian independence in 1961, the government continued to establish game reserves and 
national parks (URT, 1998). They attempted to reform many colonial laws and ordinances 
(Goldstein, 2005), but the influence of colonialism remained in many of the land laws and 
conservation policies (Nelson et al., 2009). This is reflected in the Wildlife Conservation Act 
(WCA) of 1974 that replaced the colonial Fauna Conservation Ordinance of 1951. Major aspects 
concerning local people in the WCA of 1974 focused on punishments and prohibitions 
(Goldstein, 2005); but user rights, which some hunter-gatherers used to enjoy, were not 
reinstated (Nelson et al., 2007; Siege, 2001).  
 
In the 1990s, local communities became more actively involved in tourism ventures. At the same 
time, there was increased pressure from international donors concerning the decentralisation of 
natural resources management to local communities (Benjaminsen et al., 2013). In 1998, the 
Tanzanian Government formulated a wildlife policy, which among other things, proposed the 
creation of community-based wildlife management areas (WMAs). WMAs were intended to be 
community-run conservation areas, where several villages would come together and set aside 
land for conservation. In return, these villages would receive a certain percentage of the tourism 
revenues from these areas. The policy stressed that, through safari tourism and sport hunting, 
WMAs could benefit local people and thus contribute to rural development (URT, 1998). 
Unfortunately, the WMAs have faced challenges such as continued state control over revenue 
collection, and heavy bureaucratic demands (Benjaminsen et al., 2013). In 2007, the wildlife 
policy was revised and its focus became state wildlife management, wetlands conservation and 
management, and the protection of wildlife corridors, including those on village lands; however, 
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there was little mention of participation, development and benefits for local communities (URT, 
2007).  
 
In 2009, new wildlife legislation was passed by the National Assembly. The Wildlife 
Conservation Act of 2009 was supposed to be „community friendly‟; instead it imposed more 
restrictions on grazing, farming, and settlement in game controlled areas − activities that had 
been permitted under the WCA of 1974 (URT, 2009). In 2013, the National Assembly repealed 
the WCA of 2009, and passed the Wildlife Act of 2013. Nevertheless, the inheritance of 
centralised control and ownership of wildlife remains vivid in the new legislation (URT, 2013). 
Running parallel with the continued fortress conservation regime, were the creation and 
expansion of new PAs and upgrading of old PAs, accompanied by forced evictions, 
uncompensated resettlement, and restrictions on access to natural resources (Mkumbukwa, 2008; 
Nelson et al., 2007).  
 
Currently, about 40 % of the total land area of Tanzania is set aside under different categories of 
protection (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010a). The numbers of different types of PAs and the 
percentage of land area they occupy are presented in the following list:  
i. 15 national parks (~4.9 %) – only education, research, and non-consumptive tourism are 
permitted;  
ii. the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (0.88 %) – multiple land use area (settlement by Maasai, 
grazing, non-consumptive tourism, education and research are permitted);  
iii. 32 game reserves (12.98 %) – licensed hunting, non-consumptive tourism, research and 
education are permitted;  
iv. 38 game controlled areas (5.54 %) – licensed hunting, non-consumptive tourism, research 
and education are permitted;  
v. 23 wildlife management areas (WMAs) (2.49 %) – some restrictions on harvesting natural 
resources and settlement;  
vi. 570 forest reserves (15 %) – of which 3 % overlaps with PAs set aside for wildlife 
conservation;  
vii. wetland reserves/areas (10 %) − overlaps with other types of PAs (game reserves, game 
controlled areas and forest reserves) (URT, 2007).  
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The PAs are managed by different institutions under the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 2: Terrestrial natural resources management in Tanzania (Source: URT, nd.) 
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as the Community Conservation Services of Tanzania National Parks, whereby 7.5 % of a 
national park‟s operating budget is used to finance community facilities (e.g. schools, 
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Joint Forest Management), community-based wildlife programmes, and forest management 
programmes. An example in the wildlife sector is the establishment of WMAs − a new PA 
category in Tanzania, managed by local communities (Baldus and Cauldwell, 2004). In spite of 
their community-based goal, WMAs have been beset by some pitfalls, for example, in many 
cases their creation has not been a community-driven process. Rather, a „handful of transnational 
conservation organisations‟ has driven the process to a large extent, by providing expertise, 
necessary resources, and technology (Igoe and Croucher, 2007, p. 537). 
 
For instance, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) has facilitated the establishment of WMAs 
in the northeast of Tanzania; Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) has worked at 
Selous and in its neighbourhood; the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) has dealt with Serengeti 
and its neighbourhood; and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has supervised WMAs in 
the southwest of the country (Igoe and Croucher, 2007). 
 
2.10 The main actors, interests and implications for conservation 
2.10.1   Sovereign states 
The first International Conference on Wildlife Preservation in Africa held in London in 1900 
sought active collaboration and cooperation between sovereign states as an important 
prerequisite for achieving international conservation goals (Adams, 2004; Gißibl, 2006). This 
conservation strategy has continued to be pursued through international, regional, or bilateral 
treaties, conventions, and agreements. For example, Tanzania ratified the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Cartagena Protocol of 1993, in 2003 (URT, 2012). 
 
The CBD parties aim to extend and merge officially recognised PAs and support other effective 
area-based biodiversity conservation initiatives (CBD, 2010). Most national states are dedicated 
to meeting conservation goals and the vast majority rely for this on PA coverage that includes 
„representative samples‟ of main ecosystems (CBD, 2010). The aim is to protect areas important 
for ecosystem functioning and biodiversity conservation, and to build greater networks of PAs 
that will lead to the protection of larger landscapes and/or seascapes (CBD, 2010).  
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Governments usually establish conservation frameworks through the formulation of policies and 
legislation, and make rules as to who can use natural resources, when, where and how (Peluso, 
1993). They enforce the rules by making use of state actors such as national and sub-national 
agencies responsible for PA systems (e.g. parastatal agencies such as the Tanzania National 
Parks Authority), legislators, the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, agencies and staff from 
various government sectors concerned with natural resources, state commercial enterprises, PA 
managers and staff, and local authorities. These actors usually claim legitimate authority to 
enforce conservation ideology, and thus the conservation of the environment and natural 
resources often involves coercion, especially where communities have been expelled from the 
conservation areas (Peluso, 1993).  
 
2.10.2  Local communities 
Unlike the fences and fines approach that separated local people from PAs, the win-win 
discourse focuses on local communities as key actors in the strategy for success of conservation 
objectives. The term „community‟ may be defined in various ways. Some studies refer to 
„community‟ as a „small spatial unit, a homogenous social structure, and shared norms‟ (Agrawal 
and Gibson, 1999, p. 630), while others refer to community as a spatial unit, an economic unit, or 
a unit consisting of a web of kingship, social and cultural relations (Dikeni et al., 1996). Kepe 
(1999) notes that the term „community‟ is „highly elusive, with numerous competing 
interpretations‟ (p. 418). Agrawal and Gibson (1999) suggest a more political approach, where 
community „must be examined by focusing on the multiple interests and actors within 
communities, on how these actors influence decision making, and on the internal and external 
institutions that shape the decision-making processes‟ (p. 630).  
 
In  PAs strategy, the local community may include resident indigenous peoples; users of areas in 
and around the PAs (both settled and mobile communities) such as those who depend on natural 
resources either directly or indirectly; people from different clans, economic classes, or ethnic 
groups; different special interest groups, and both men and women. The community is not a 
homogenous entity, but rather, comprises many groups that are involved with PAs, either directly 
or indirectly (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). Therefore, efforts to involve the local community 
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must recognise, and carefully examine the complex linkages within households, as well as the 
heterogeneity of groups within a particular community.  
 
2.10.3 International aid donors 
Effective biodiversity conservation requires extensive financial resources, which are usually 
provided by bilateral and multilateral aid donors. Miller et al. (2012) identified the top 10 
biodiversity aid donors between 1980 and 2008. These were: the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, United States of America, 
Netherlands, Germany, the European Communities, United Kingdom, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the African Development Bank. After the World Bank committed 31 % of the aid, the 
GEF was the second largest funder for biodiversity, providing 28 % of all biodiversity aid 
(Miller et al., 2012). In its first decade of operation after its founding in 1991, the GEF spent 
about US$4 billion on over 1000 projects in 160 developing countries (Horta et al., 2002). Kiss 
(2004), cited by Nelson (2009), indicates that „estimates range from US$500 million spent 
annually by the international community on biodiversity conservation in the tropics, to US$778 
million in bilateral development assistance alone with a biodiversity conservation component‟ (p. 
1103).  
 
Examples of donors involved in the wildlife sector in Tanzania since the 1990s include the 
following: DANIDA (the Danish International Development Agency), GTZ (Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit), NORAD (the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) 
and USAID (the US Agency for International Development). Donors in the forestry sector 
include NORAD, the World Bank, the GEF (Global Environment Facility), GTZ, DANIDA, 
SIDA (the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), FINNIDA (the Finnish 
International Development Agency) and DFID (UK Department for International Development). 
 
2.10.4 International conservation bodies 
Various conservation organisations have become influential agents in the developing world in 
recent decades through conservation activities such as funding, technical assistance, and training, 
in some cases pushing for the expansion and creation of more PAs. The leading conservation 
organisations include the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (formerly called the World 
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Wildlife Fund, and maintaining the original name in the USA and Canada), Conservation 
International, Nature Conservancy, the African Wildlife Foundation, the Wildlife Conservation 
Society; the United Nations Environment Programme, and the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (Chapin, 2004; Dowie, 2009; Miller et al., 2012).  
 
The large conservation NGOs have been criticised for „growing too powerful, concentrating 
funds and influence, and getting unhealthily close to larger corporations and oppressive states‟ , 
whilst ignoring local environmental groups who could join hands to protect the environment 
(Brockington and Scholfield, 2010, p.2). For instance, the growing influence of the World Bank, 
bilateral agencies, and other conservation organisations has made it difficult for them to take a 
critical view on corporate enterprises that are socially and environmentally disruptive, such as 
extractive industries (Dowie, 2009). To illustrate this point, Igoe et al. (2010) give an example of 
the emerging partnership between the IUCN and Shell Oil, as well as between the IUCN and the 
Rio Tinto Mining Group (p. 5). 
 
Sachedina (2008) highlights an example by describing how the AWF, in the course of  pursuing 
greater amounts of donor funds  led the foundation to seek closer ties with the central 
Government of Tanzania, leading the organisation‟s withdraw from „politically laden conflicts 
over land tenure, money, and resource rights between pastoral communities and the State‟ (p. 
355). In addition, Nelson (2009) notes that in the process of relying on host-country governments 
for the approval of aid-funded projects, memoranda of understanding, and the approval of 
expatriate staff work permits, NGOs face considerable barriers in addressing the political and 
institutional dimensions of natural resources management. 
 
2.10.5  Tourism industry investors 
The tourism industry is considered to be the second largest and the fastest growing industry in 
the world (Mhlanga, n.d.), with PAs playing a vital role in its expansion. The industry consists of 
vast numbers of small and medium-sized businesses, as well as large multinational corporations. 
Tourism, especially the development of ecotourism, is argued to be one of the best approaches to 
„improve inequality that emerges within neoliberal conservation contexts‟ (Brondo, 2013, p. 11). 
Many PAs propose ecotourism as a way of attaining both conservation of biodiversity as well as 
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an alternative livelihood strategy for local people living within the PA impact zones or 
boundaries (Brondo, 2013). The International Ecotourism Society (TIES, 2011) defines 
ecotourism as responsible travel to natural areas that conserves the environment and improves 
the well-being of local people. 
 
The private sector is progressively becoming prominent as an economic development and 
sustainability engine in Tanzania, with the private tourist sector being viewed as a partner in the 
PA strategy. For instance, recent institutional reforms and social-economic liberalisation policies 
have generated an environment that is conducive for investors. The wildlife sector in particular, 
has been earmarked as one of the most important areas for tourism investment (URT, 1998).  
 Most private tourism investors promote community-based approaches, but in many cases, the 
communities are invited into a tourism development venture, rather than the other way around 
(Spenceley, 2003). The partner (who is often the project driver) is external, and often not 
selected by the community, which has an impact on the amount of power and influence they 
have in the venture (Spenceley, 2003). In most cases, the community is perceived as the weaker 
partner in these arrangements (Spenceley, 2003; Nelson, 2012). Thus, there is little to 
substantiate the belief that the tourism-conservation sector is a saviour for poor communities 
(Nelson, 2012). Other pitfalls of ecotourism include: investors‟ unwillingness to make major 
investments in local areas (e.g. Duffy, 2002), unequal sharing of tourism revenues among local 
people (e.g. Igoe and Crouncher, 2007), increase of tourist pressure on natural resources (e.g. 
Puntenney, 1990), emergence of conflicts especially on land use (e.g. Hoffman, 2009), and the 
introduction of new practices and values between local people and their natural environment 
(Macintyre and Foale, 2007). 
 
3.  Contemporary issues in conservation 
The previous sections have elaborated on the linkage between conservation and local people. 
This section gives a brief introduction to contemporary issues surrounding conservation and local 
people, in relation to the research questions. These issues are further elaborated in the four 
articles that form part two of this thesis. 
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3.1    Impacts of conservation on local communities 
It is well known that most rural people in developing countries depend on natural resources such 
as fodder, firewood and bush meat for their livelihoods, including the sale of such products (Roe 
and Elliot, 2006; Timko et al., 2010). An estimated 1.6 billion people in the world depend on 
natural resources for part, if not all, for their livelihood and food security requirements (Roe and 
Elliot, 2006). Within poor communities, the dependence on natural resources increases with 
increased poverty levels (Babulo et al., 2008). For example, in rural Equatorial Guinea, 
households consume wild plants and animals more than half the time (Allebone-Webb, 2009).  
 
While there is much reliance on natural resources by poor people in developing countries, their 
land is increasingly being converted into PAs (CBD, 2012). PAs have been the major focus of 
global conservation targets since the first IUCN World Parks Congress in 1962. There is growing 
recognition of the importance of PAs in terms of biodiversity richness, ecosystem services and 
mitigation against climate change, as well as reducing rate of global deforestation, preventing 
species extinction, and conserving land and water resources (Brooks et al., 2009; UNEP, 2009). 
Critics of the „fortress conservation‟ approach however, argue that the creation of PAs restricts 
community development opportunities and increases poverty (e.g. Schmidt-Soltau, 2003; West et 
al., 2006). Such criticism results from evidence that PAs are associated with forced evictions 
with little or no compensation, changes in land tenure, and denial or restrictions on access to 
natural resources which communities have been using and depended upon for a long time 
(Gillingham and Lee, 2003).  
 
Further hardships suffered by local communities include human-wildlife conflicts such as crop 
loss, property damage, livestock depredation, human deaths, injury and fear, sleepless nights 
while guarding crops from wildlife, and conflicts that arise from PA law enforcement activities 
(Brockington and Igoe, 2006; Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau, 2004; Ferraro, 2002; 
Kideghesho, 2006; Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012). In some cases, PAs deprive local 
communities of the opportunities necessary for their survival and development, including basic 
social services (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2003). Moreover, the displacement of local people 
from PAs results in impoverishment (Fabricius and de Wet, 2002; Nabakov and Lawrence, 2004) 
as they become victims dispossessed of their resources. As a result, they are exposed to higher 
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risks of landlessness, homelessness, joblessness, food insecurity, economic marginalisation, 
increased mortality and morbidity rates, and loss of environmental services and access to 
common property (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Brockington et al., 2008). In most cases, local 
communities are left without alternatives, which in the long run, results in squatting, 
encroachment and poaching to keep them alive (Colchester, 2002; Gillingham and Lee, 2003).  
 
These impacts resulting from the establishment of PAs affect local people and households in 
different ways. For instance, politically weak and poor people, who become further 
disempowered and marginalised with regard to the management of natural resources, have borne 
most of the costs (Brockington et al., 2008). Men and women are impacted differently by the 
creation of PAs due to the gender division of labour, rights, and responsibilities (Rocheleau et 
al., 1996; Thomas-Slayter and Sodikoff, 2001). Usually women depend directly on access to 
natural resources such as fuel wood, fodder, and plants for traditional medicine (Asimalowo and 
Lipsanen, 1998; Igoe, 2006; Leach and Green, 1995; URT, 1998). The closure of large land areas 
for biodiversity conservation puts an extra strain on women, who bear the burden of searching 
for firewood and fodder (Badola and Hussain, 2003). Furthermore, women may undergo 
difficulties in dealing with changes that affect their livelihoods and/or the ability to realise other 
forms of income generating activities (Spieldoch, 2007). Men may face additional workloads 
such as guarding crops against raids by wildlife (Wang et al., 2006), and/or the loss of income 
sources. Studies conducted by Nabane (1996) and Metcalfe (1996) in the CAMPFIRE 
programme in Zimbabwe reveal that the programme did not address gender and intra-community 
aspects. Benefits from park revenues did not benefit women, for example, the electric fences 
increased the distance and time taken for women to search for firewood and fodder.  
 
Nevertheless, some studies show that PAs have contributed to improving the economic situation 
for both men and women. For example, a study in Costa Rica shows that women‟s participation 
in handicraft projects aimed at tourists gave them more economic power than was previously the 
case (Vivanco, 2001).  
 
PAs are often established with little consideration of their impacts on the livelihoods of local 
communities. It has become clear that it is essential to understand how the establishment and 
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management of PAs affect local communities. Failure to do so can lead to increased rates of 
community noncompliance with PA regulations and hostility, both of which have led to the 
failure of many biodiversity conservation objectives (Andrade and Rhodes, 2012).  
 
3.2   Participation and benefit sharing in conservation 
There is increasing realisation that for conservation to succeed, the involvement of neighbouring 
communities is a prerequisite (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2002). Some studies claim that the cost 
of conservation has been largely skewed towards local people; there should be equitable sharing 
of benefits and costs (e.g. Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2002; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004).  In 
recent years, in particular in developing countries, there have been some efforts to involve local 
communities in a PA strategy to address some of the conservation related impacts described in 
the preceding section. Exclusionary conservation practices have been remodelled in a number of 
ways in order to integrate development and conservation aims (Lockwood et al., 2006; Vedeld, 
2002).  
 
PAs are beginning to be considered not only as a conservation tool, but also as a resource base to 
contribute to the reduction of poverty in many developing countries (Redford et al., 2008). 
Different actors – international conservation groups, development partners, and African 
governments − cite local participation as an important component in their programmes; however, 
they have different approaches, and perceptions of what really constitutes participation and its 
role in conservation (McLaughlin, 2011). An array of various initiatives have been implemented 
to involve and benefit local communities (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Roe and Elliot, 2006). 
These initiatives include: integrated conservation and development programmes, sharing tourism 
revenue generated from PAs such as entrance fees, provision of social services to adjacent 
communities, communities selling goods and services to tourists, employment opportunities 
(Adams and Infield, 2003; Bajricharya et al., 2006; Bedunah and Schmidt, 2004), or natural 
resources withdrawal from PAs (DAI, 2012). 
 
In Uganda, 20 % of the income generated from PA entry fees is directed to local people 
(Tumusiime and Vedeld, 2012), while in Tanzania it is claimed that 7.5 % of the parks‟ 
operational budget is used to support local community development projects (Goldstein, 2005). 
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The performance of these approaches may vary depending on a myriad of aspects, such as the 
degree of involvement, the quantity of benefits received, and their distribution (Tumusiime and 
Vedeld, 2012). Some studies show that tourism rarely generates substantial benefits or provides 
sustainable local livelihood alternatives (e.g. Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006; Hackel, 1999). 
Furthermore, any benefits generated by tourism face a number of obstacles such as a lack of 
transparency, corruption (Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Cooksey, 2011; Nelson, 2010, 2012; 
Sachedina, 2008), and unfair distribution within local communities (Ferraro, 2002; Kideghesho, 
2006; Kiss, 2004; Tumusiime and Vedeld, 2012; West et al., 2006). 
 
Participatory approaches have been criticised for failing to achieve their objectives in terms of 
devolving decision-making powers to and/or benefiting local people while promoting 
conservation (e.g. Barrett et al., 2001; Newmark and Hough, 2000; Songorwa 1999). The 
participation of local people in conservation is often used as a promotional tool to enhance 
conservation initiatives, rather than to empower and benefit them. Igoe (2006) notes that „local 
people believed that community-based approaches to conservation were simply a new ploy for 
limiting their access to the natural resources‟ (p. 72). Hence, for conservationists to realise 
conservation goals, they must make an effort to „work with communities and give them the tools 
they need to improve their livelihood and environment on their own, rather than working around 
them‟ (McLaughlin, 2011, p. 16). Although the concept of participation is broadly supported, it 
remains a challenge to define the extent and the conditions of participation.  
 
3.3   Costs, benefits and attitudes towards conservation 
As elaborated above, PAs incur costs and offer benefits to different stakeholders. For instance, 
for local people, costs may be in the form of displacement to pave the way for conservation 
areas; prohibited access to land and natural resources; increased human-wildlife conflicts such as 
crop damage, livestock losses, threats to human life; and changes in land tenure (Coad et al., 
2008). The benefits can comprise direct revenue from conservation (e.g. tourism, payment for 
ecosystem services), development projects (such as schools, water, roads) and provision of 
ecosystem services (Coad et al., 2008).  
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There is a growing realisation that most costs of biodiversity conservation are not equitably 
shared and it is necessary to consider ways in which costs and benefits can be allocated fairly 
among different actors. Studies have revealed that many of the benefits from conservation are 
global, but most costs of conservation, including displacement, are borne almost completely by 
local people, particularly poor and politically weak groups (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Balmford 
and Whitten, 2003). These groups may further be disempowered and marginalised in terms of 
natural resource management (e.g. Adams and Hutton, 2007; Balmford and Whitten, 2003; 
Brockington et al., 2008; IUCN, 2005; Lele, 2002). Most gains from biodiversity conservation 
are appropriated by the developed world, local elites, and regional users of ecosystem services 
(Adams and Hutton, 2007; Lund et al., 2014; Ribot et al., 2010). Both legal and illegal benefits 
derived from PAs „tend to reproduce existing economic inequalities within local communities 
and wider societies‟ (Adams and Hutton, 2007, p. 161). Studies carried out in various parks in 
Africa reveal that poor farmers living close to PAs generally lose more than half of their per 
capita income due to damage caused by wildlife, thus exacerbating the hardships for people 
already living below the poverty line (e.g. Distefano, 2005; Mishra, 1997). 
 
Benefit sharing has been designed as a strategy to offset conservation costs and build support for 
biodiversity conservation among local communities (Adams et al., 2004; Western et al., 1994). It 
is necessary that the benefits should match the extent and nature of the costs. Inequitable sharing 
of the costs and benefits of conservation is an obvious challenge that needs to be appropriately 
addressed in the management of PAs, as it often affects the attitude of people towards 
conservation (Arjunan et al., 2006; Gillingham and Lee, 1999). Attitudinal studies are 
increasingly being used to evaluate local peoples‟ perceptions towards conservation, and enable 
PA management to create appropriate strategies (Gillingham and Lee, 1999; Holmes, 2003; 
Kaltenborn et al., 2011; Kideghesho et al., 2007). Waylen et al. (2009) argue that „attitude 
change is often the only tool available to conservationists when other approaches such as 
regulations are ineffective‟ (p. 350). Nonetheless, some studies show that positive attitudes alone 
may not directly translate into friendly conservation behaviour (Holmes, 2003; Waylen et al., 
2009).  
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Quantitative methods for assessing attitudes, such as questionnaires, are believed to have high 
coverage (they can cover a large sample), they are quick to use, and generate large quantities of 
numerical data that can be worked with easily. However, the problem with such methods when 
used to assess attitudes is that it is difficult to claim validity, since the answers respondents give 
may be what they think the researchers would want them to say (Wiseman, 2012). Furthermore, 
such methods sometimes can‟t answer questions like „how?‟ or „why?‟ or describe relationships 
fully. Qualitative methods, on the other hand, tend to generate more in-depth data, since the 
method is more probing – such methods seek the reasoning behind certain things and can more 
directly investigate people‟s feelings, motives, and opinions (Wiseman, 2012). However, the data 
collection is expensive, time consuming and generates large amounts of data that might be 
difficult to analyse. Quantitative and qualitative methods can be used together to complement 
each other. In such situations, combining both methods can yield a clearer picture of the 
condition and more accurate information than either would alone (Rabinowitz, 2013). 
 
The mismatch between local reality and conservation actions has created hostility and non-
cooperation between local people and PA management. In Tanzania, the centralised system of 
control over natural resources has removed incentives for communities to conserve natural 
resources and has led to extensive poaching (Swiderska et al., 2008). In most cases, local people 
use covert or overt methods „to challenge the hegemony of conservation imposed by PAs 
authorities‟ (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006, p. 1100). Shafer (1999) argues that people reflect their 
combative attitude by „poaching, destroying government property, blaming the government for 
wandering large mammals … extracting resources [recklessly]... and spreading false 
information‟ (p. 130). Other studies reveal that people resist conservation by destroying the 
resources they once valued due to changes in tenure rights (Harkness, 2000), killing wildlife 
(Western, 1994), illegally using land in the PA (Li, 2007), destroying PA infrastructure 
(Meyerson, 1998), and collaborating with poachers (Western, 1994). Continued hostility from 
local people is clearly counterproductive to sustainable conservation efforts (Weladji and 
Tchamba, 2003). 
 
Separating people from nature may solve the problem in the short term, but would not lead to 
successful conservation efforts (Folke, 2006). Conservation laws that are resisted by the majority 
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of the local people are deemed to fail (Sayer, 1991). This implies that although conventional 
approaches to biodiversity conservation in the developing world may claim some success, they 
are becoming more and more unsustainable (Vermeulen and Sheil, 2007). Colchester (1997) 
argues that attempting to conserve biodiversity in small PAs without taking social realities into 
consideration is largely unsuccessful. PAs under authoritarian regimes have been a source of PA-
people conflicts, adversely affecting efforts to combine local livelihoods and biodiversity 
conservation (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006). These challenges underline the importance of the 
need to investigate various ways in which different user groups may share the costs and benefits 
of conservation. 
 
3.4   Human-wildlife conflicts 
This section delves into the literature on human-wildlife conflicts, focusing specifically on those 
between humans and elephants. Human-wildlife conflict (HWC) has become a significant and 
growing conservation problem around the world (Distefano, 2005; Wang and Macdonald, 2006), 
and can have significant impacts on both human and wildlife populations. HWC is defined as 
interactions between humans and wildlife where negative consequences, whether perceived or 
real, exist for one or both parties (Decker et al., 2002). HWC has existed for a long time in 
human history − as long as humans and wildlife have shared the same landscape and competed 
for limited space and resources (Berger, 2006; Graham, et al., 2005; Lamarque et al., 2009). 
Various case studies demonstrate that HWC can be most challenging for local people living 
inside or near PAs (e.g. Linkie et al., 2007; Weladji and Tchamba, 2003).  
 
The suite of potential impacts of wildlife on humans comprises the following types: economic 
(wildlife damage negatively affects local people‟s income and livelihood), health and safety (e.g. 
diseases, injuries or even death inflicted by wildlife), and psychological (e.g. wildlife „nuisance‟, 
fear of dangerous wildlife) (Decker et al., 2002). The most common forms of manifestations of 
HWC include crop raiding, property damage, livestock killing, and human injury and deaths 
(Inskip and Zimermann, 2009; Ogra and Badola, 2008).  
 
Human-wildlife conflicts involve charismatic species of wildlife, with the principal culprits 
being birds, primates, rodents, ungulates, large and small carnivores, and crocodiles (Hill, 2000; 
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O'Connell-Rodwell et al., 2000). Wild animals such as elephants, hippopotamuses, buffalo, 
antelopes, bush pigs, rodents, primates, and birds tend to be most responsible for crop raiding 
(Lamarque et al., 2009).  
 
The frequency and occurrence of crop-raiding can depend on a number of factors such as 
„availability, variability and type of food sources in the area, the level of human activity on a 
farm, and the type and maturation time of crops as compared to natural food sources‟ (Lamarque 
et al., 2009, p. 8). Generally, elephants are identified as the major threat to farmers because a 
single night raid can destroy a whole field (Parker et al., 2007). During periods of drought, 
elephants are reported to break storage containers and steal grains (Lamarque et al., 2009). Most 
small-scale farmers are incapable of handling the problem of elephant damage, and governments 
offer hardly any help or compensation for the damage (Lamarque et al., 2009).  
 
Crocodiles, large carnivores, large herbivores like hippopotamuses, elephants, and buffalo are 
reported to be responsible for human deaths or injury (Lamarque et al., 2009). Elephants attack 
humans when they are guarding their crops at night against crop raiding animals, or when people 
accidentally meet animals in areas such as water points, or encounter injured animals whose 
„normal sense of caution is impaired‟(Lamarque et al., 2009, p. 5). Competition for scarce 
resources such as water and fodder can lead to deaths of livestock, humans or wildlife. Elephants 
can damage infrastructure such as water systems, or tracks in PAs. In addition, wildlife can 
transmit diseases to both humans and domestic animals (Lamarque et al., 2009).  
 
Human-elephant conflicts have significant implications for conservation because retaliation by 
affected people has been identified as one of the sources of elephant killings (Moss, 2008; WWF, 
2010). Although local community losses from wildlife damage may not be economically 
significant at a regional or national level, such damage can be significant for the affected 
households (Mishra, 1997; Oli et al., 1994). Thus, understanding the social and economic strain 
of conflict on local peoples‟ livelihoods is central to abating such conflicts. Furthermore, it is 
crucial to learn more about local people‟s attitudes and experiences with wildlife and PAs, and 
the different forms of conflicts they suffer. 
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Conservationists have been testing different measures to reduce human-wildlife conflict, such as 
compensation schemes that are disbursed directly to individuals to offset wildlife costs. These 
payments may be full or partial, in the form of cash or other assistance, such as help with 
mitigation measures (Nyhus et al., 2003; Treves and Jones, 2010). In some instances, local 
people are compensated to help them tolerate wild animals on their lands (Nyhus et al., 2003; 
Treves and Jones, 2010). The assumption is that by removing all, or at least part of the economic 
burden from local people, it encourages participation of the people in conservation projects 
(Treves and Jones, 2010). However, Nyhus et al. (2003) argue that compensation should be 
carried out with caution, otherwise it „can waste resources and do more harm than good‟ (p. 40). 
Other studies claim that compensating local communities for conservation costs can create 
„perverse incentives‟, such as negligence in protecting their property, ultimately increasing 
extent of damage and exacerbating conflict (e.g. Naughton-Treves et al., 2003; Nyhus et al., 
2003). In contrast, others argue that linking wildlife revenues directly to the survival of wildlife 
may create pro-wildlife attitudes among communities (e.g. Mishra et al., 2003; Schwerdtner and 
Gruber, 2007).  
 
4.  Understanding the relationship between people and environment 
In understanding the relationship between people and environment this thesis uses political 
ecology framework. Thus, this chapter will define political ecology and briefly outline the roots 
of this approach to the study of environmental phenomena. I move on to look at chains of 
explanation, networks of explanation, and webs of relation. Finally, the chapter looks at feminist 
political ecology and some of the main critique of political ecology. 
 
4.1   Defining political ecology 
There are various definitions of political ecology in scientific articles, books and anthologies 
(e.g. Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Peet and Watts, 1996; Robbins, 2012; Stott and Sullivan, 
2000). Some definitions of political ecology emphasise „political economy, others point to more 
formal political institutions, some stress environmental change, while others emphasise 
narratives or stories about that change‟ (Robbins 2012, p. 14). Many scholars (e.g. Forsyth, 2003, 
Peet and Watts, 1996; Walker, 2005) refer to Blaikie and Brookfield‟s (1987) definition that 
holds that: „The phrase „political ecology‟ combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly 
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defined political economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between 
society and land-based resources, and within classes and groups within society itself‟ (Blaikie 
and Brookfield, 1987, p. 17). 
 
4.2   Roots of political ecology 
Political ecology can be traced back to the work of Russian geographer and anarchist philosopher 
Peter A. Kropotkin in the 19
th
 century (Robbins, 2012). Many authors refer to Eric Wolf as the 
first person who coined the term „political ecology‟ in 1972 in his article Ownership and 
political ecology (Wolf, 1972). In that article, Wolf discusses how local rules of ownership and 
inheritance „mediate between the pressures emanating from the larger society and the exigencies 
of the local ecosystem‟ (Wolf, 1972, p. 202). The field of political ecology made further progress 
in the 1970s and 1980s with the work of Enzensberger (1974), Watts (1983), Blaikie (1985), and 
Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), among others. 
 
The roots of political ecology are discussed by Neumann (2005), Robbins (2012), and Peet et al. 
(2011). Early political ecologists were inspired by several different approaches, which are 
discussed in this section. Firstly, concerns emerged in the Global North in the 1960s about 
environmental degradation. Many studies based on neo-Malthusian assumptions linked 
environmental degradation with population growth (Hardin, 1968; Meadows et al., 1972). Such 
studies include Hardin‟s article The tragedy of the commons, in which he argues that the 
collective use of natural resources can lead to over-exploitation and hence resource depletion. 
This manner of thinking is grounded in one of the assumptions of neo-classical economics that 
states that „rational behaviour for individuals is to maximise their own individual utility‟ (Vatn, 
2005, p. 87). Hardin‟s answer to the tragedy of the commons was state control and/or private 
market solutions (Hardin, 1968; Robbins, 2012).  
 
Today, the field of political ecology has rejected simplified „tragedy of commons‟ explanations 
for resource degradation and argues that the resources that Hardin described are managed under 
an open access regime rather than common property regime (Vatn, 2005). Common property 
theory emerged as a critique of tragedy of commons explanations. Common property theorists 
give empirical examples of „collective stewardship‟, in which common pool resources are 
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managed sustainably. They argue that any failure of such management regimes is associated with 
failures of the internal regulations and rules of the management, and not the regime itself 
(Ostrom, 1990; Robbins, 2012; Vatn, 2005). 
 
Hardin‟s view strongly influenced the field of natural resources management and was used by 
colonial and national governments, and conservation agencies to argue for state control and 
dispossession of local resource users in terms of land and natural resources. Based on neo-
Malthusian assumptions, natural resources management policies were designed to alienate local 
people from areas perceived to be important for conserving resources for national and 
international interests. However, various more recent studies reveal that the practices of local 
communities are not necessarily harmful to resource sustainability (e.g. Leach and Mearns, 1996; 
Schmidt, 2004). In many cases, it is in fact government policies that have played a role in the 
deterioration of natural resources (Dove, 2003). 
 
Secondly, early political ecologists were inspired by cultural ecology ideas that focus on 
explaining human adaptations to social and physical environments, and theories about the 
balance of nature. This type of work combined studies in cultural practices of production and 
biophysical change. However, from the 1980s, political ecologists started criticising cultural 
ecology for ignoring the wider political economic structures that influence human actions 
(Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Walker, 2005). 
 
Thirdly, early political ecologists were inspired by the hazard school (Burton et al., 1978), that 
emphasised the perceptual nature of environmental hazards and the ability of societies to adjust 
to and manage these hazards (Walker, 2005). The hazard school began as women‟s activist 
movement in North America, who were concerned about  human-induced environmental hazards 
in urban areas; today is mostly known as „environmental justice‟ (Robbins, 2012; Walker, 2005). 
 
Lastly, early political ecologists were inspired by neo-Marxism, which offered a means to „link 
local social oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and economic concerns 
relating to production questions‟ (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, p. 13). The early work in political 
ecology can often be linked to the neo-Marxist school of thought that focuses on describing class 
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inequalities, exploitative first/third world relationships, and finding explanations for third world 
environmental degradation. Examples of the early neo-Marxist influence in political ecology are 
the work of Michael Watts: Silent violence: Food, famine and peasantry in northern Nigeria 
(1983); and Piers Blaikie‟s Political economy of soil erosion in developing countries (1985).  
 
4.3   Perspectives in political ecology 
Since the inception of political ecology, most „research has sought primarily to understand the 
political dynamics surrounding material and discursive struggles over the environment in the 
third world‟ (Bryant, 1998, p. 89). However, several studies have focused on similar issues in the 
first world (e.g. Fortmann, 1996; McCarthy, 2006). The important areas of focus in political 
ecology include „the politics of environmental degradation and conservation, the neo-
liberalisation of nature, and on-going rounds of accumulation, enclosure and dispossession [...] 
and environmental struggles around knowledge and power, justice and governance‟ (Elmhirst, 
2011, p. 129). This coverage also takes into account the discursive, gendered, and unequal 
processes shaping resource access, control and management today (Schubert, 2005). 
 
Early work in political ecology was closely connected to the field of political economy, focusing 
on biophysical processes alongside social and economic factors (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). 
Based on this framework, various studies emerged, such as Bassett (1988), Leach and Mearns 
(1996), among others. For instance, the 1985 book by Piers Blaikie on The political economy of 
soil erosion in developing countries addressed the failure of policies and projects to address soil 
erosion in developing countries. Blaikie noted that environmental degradation is intrinsically and 
concurrently a social, ecological, political, and economic problem. He suggested three essential 
lines of inquiry for investigation: 1) place-based analysis – to investigate where degradation is 
taking place; 2) non-place-based analysis – to incorporate social and economic factors; and 3) 
„an assessment of the perceptions and rationality of not just the local land users but also of the 
government officials, conservationists and scientists‟ (Neumann, 2005, p. 31).  
 
The Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) book on Land degradation and society expanded the 
discussion of social contexts of environmental meaning explicated by Blaikie (1985), by 
stressing the historical aspects of environmental change, the importance of  social 
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marginalisation, as well as political influences on the way the environment is measured. The 
book covers the relationship between land degradation, the land manager, and society. The 
authors argue that „degradation‟ is a „perceptual‟ term, and they propose a chain of explanation 
in studying environmental problems, including three modes for analysing land degradation: „the 
interactive effects of degradation and society through time; the crucial consideration of 
geographical scale and the scale of social and economic organisation; and the contradictions 
between social and environmental changes through time‟ (p. 13). Drawing upon these methods, 
they introduce the notion of „regional political ecology‟ (p. 17) as an approach for studying land 
degradation and society. 
 
Post-structural political ecology (e.g. Escobar, 1996, 1998; Rocheleau, 1995) focuses on the 
political aspects of political ecology, especially on the discursive dimension of power. This 
theoretical framework conceptualises the environment as being intrinsically „politicised‟ (Bryant 
and Bailey, 1997). The same authors argue that the environmental problems faced by developing 
countries are not simply a reflection of a single factor such as policy or market failure, but are a 
manifestation of broader political and economic forces. The book Liberation ecologies by Peet 
and Watts (2004) tries to re-theorise political ecology, with its focus on political economy and 
resource conflicts, within poststructuralist framework interested in the discursive production of 
knowledge, power and truth and cultural politics.  
 
Fairhead and Leach‟s (1996) Misreading the African landscape marks a change in approach, 
which appeared during the 1990s. The authors studied vegetation change in Kissidougou, West 
Africa, using satellite images, historical sources, and ethnographic interviews. They emphasise 
the importance of being aware of multiple readings and understandings of the environment. The 
authors adopted a pluralistic ecology approach, in which they carefully analysed biophysical 
data, and tracked „alternative perspectives‟ by incorporating local knowledge to deconstruct 
deforestation crisis narratives observed in forest islands in the area. They argue that these 
narratives can be understood by paying attention to power and politics as state technologies to 
justify nationalised control over land. Drawing on the literature on agrarian change, they provide 
insights on how resource use and management, social arrangements, and everyday struggles 
evolve together with their resolution (Fairhead and Leach, 1996). Their study is one of the 
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political ecology studies that began to challenge the notion of a universal truth, and raised 
questions about different types of knowledge (Zimmerer, 2006). Aspects such as the socially 
constructed nature of knowledge, and the nature and power of discourse and narratives became a 
major focus (Forsyth, 2003).  
Often the degradation discourse tends to present local people as incapable resource stewards, and 
stresses the necessity of external intervention to improve the situation on their behalf (Fairhead 
and Leach, 1996). Benjaminsen and Berge (2004) challenge the prevailing narrative of Sahel 
desertification by showing that its origin is a flawed study from the mid-1970s, and that the 
narrative has been upheld largely because powerful actors have much to gain from keeping it that 
way. Narratives such as desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion (Forsyth 2003) tend to 
give demographic explanations of environmental problems and legitimise policies that are often 
highly unfavourable to marginalised groups of people who depend on the very resources in 
question for survival. 
 
Peet and Watts (2004) describe the current perspective as political ecology‟s „turn to discourse‟. 
This produced large quantities of work such as Shiva (1991; 1993) – the „politics of knowledge‟, 
including a gendered basis for environmental knowledge; Bryant (1998) – the dominance of 
Western scientific knowledge over other forms; and Neumann (2005) – a discursive construction 
of the environmental narrative. The focus in this phase of political ecology studies is increased 
interest in „local level studies of environmental movements, discursive and symbolic politics, and 
the institutional nexus of power, knowledge and practice‟ (Walker, 2005, p. 75). 
 
Most early work in political ecology had a tendency to favour case study research, rather than the 
development of coherent theories (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Peet and Watts, 1993). However, 
more recent developments have contributed to building more coherent theories (e.g. Forsyth, 
2003; Robbins, 2012). More often, studies within political ecology seek explanations behind 
problems inherent in a present situation by studying not only the present, but also various 
elements of the situation that have occurred over time (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010b). 
 
4.4   Chains of explanation, networks of explanation, and webs of relation 
Building on the „progressive contextualization‟ (Vayda, 1983), Blaikie and Brookfield 
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(1987) suggest a „chains of explanation‟ for studying environmental problems. The „progressive 
contextualization‟ suggests inductive observation so as to arrive at an empirically accurate 
explanation, starting with an analysis of actors and interactions at the individual level, 
progressively placing and seeing these within larger structures and the wider context in which 
they are situated. Political ecologists have criticised „progressive contextualization‟ as it is 
inclined to deliver „apolitical‟ explanations (Robbins, 2004).  
 
The „chains of explanation‟ starts by attempting to understand the agency of the individual land 
manager and then moves „upwards‟ in scale. Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) describe the 
approach as follows: 
It starts with the land managers and their direct relations with the land (crop rotation, fuel 
wood use, stocking densities, capital investment and so on). The next link concerns their 
relations with each other, other land users, and groups in the wider society who affect 
them in any way, which in turn determines land management. The state and the world 
economy constitute the last links in the chain (p. 27). 
 
The „chains of explanation‟ offers similarities to that of „progressive contextualisation‟, since the 
predetermined starting point is located at the micro scale. Robbins (2004) however, suggests 
moving from chains to „networks of explanation‟, arguing that the „chains of explanation‟ may 
be conceived as a rigid conceptual hierarchy of power that tends to neglect the interactions 
between actors at various scales. He thus suggests a comparative anatomy of networks, where: 
Networks organize and are organized by a range of human and nonhuman actors, through 
systems of accumulation, extraction, investment, growth, reproduction, exchange, 
cooperation and coercion. […] a network allows us a change of places for progressive 
political action and normative change (Robbins, 2004, p. 212).  
This approach allows for a study with a starting point and focus at a range of various places and 
levels. 
 
Similarly, Rocheleau (2008) proposes „webs of relation‟, stating that: „The centre of gravity is 
moving from linear or simple vertical hierarchies (chains of explanation) to complex 
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assemblages, webs of relation and “rooted networks”, with hierarchies embedded and entangled 
in horizontal as well as vertical linkages‟ (Rocheleau, 2008, p. 724). 
 
As another trend, the same author identifies an increased embrace of complexity e.g. 
homogenous versus heterogeneous communities, and a return to ecology and science. However, 
these new directions largely build on and are consistent with pioneering work in political ecology 
and the chains of explanation, although the focus might have shifted. 
 
4.5   Feminist political ecology 
Feminist political ecology emerged in the 1990s as a subfield of political ecology, building on 
the previous work of political ecology and feminist scholars in agriculture, forestry, development 
and feminist theories ranging from socialist to reformist, and eco-feminist to post-stucturalist 
(Hovorka, 2006; Nelson and Seager, 2005; Nightingale, 2006; Rocheleau et al., 1996; Schroeder, 
1999). Feminist political ecology has „extended the multiple scale analysis of environment and 
power in political ecology to gendered relations both within and beyond the household, from 
individual to national scales‟ (Rocheleau, 2008, p. 722).  
 
Feminist political ecology critically investigates concepts such as „community‟, „local‟ and 
„household‟, as well as „homogenous conditions‟ and „shared interests‟ (Rocheleau, 2008). It 
addresses „women as a group and gender as a category‟ (Rocheleau, 2008, p. 716), and considers 
gender as an important element in political ecology analysis. It examines the position of gender 
in the political ecological landscape and explores gender as a factor in political and ecological 
relations (Hovorka, 2006). Feminist political ecology considers gender as a „critical  
variable in shaping resource access and control, interacting with class, caste, race, culture, and 
ethnicity to shape processes of ecological change, the struggle of men and women to sustain 
ecologically viable livelihoods, and the prospects of any community for sustainable 
development‟ (Rocheleau et al., 1996, p. 4-5). 
 
The book Feminist political ecology edited by Rocheleau et al. (1996) highlights three key main 
lines of inquiry that intersect on gender and the environment. These are: (i) gendered 
knowledge/science (the „science of survival‟) used by women to maintain and protect healthy 
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environments; (ii) gendered environmental rights and responsibilities i.e. control of resources, 
access to resources (de facto and de jure rights, exclusive and shared rights, primary and 
secondary rights), gendered use of resources (as inputs, products, assets, for subsistence and 
commercial purposes), and gendered responsibilities to produce and/or manage resources for 
family and community use; and (iii) gendered grassroots activism and environmental politics. 
The first aspect (gendered knowledge) led the authors to conclude that scientific discourse is 
„gendered‟ because gender inequities in science deny women the knowledge necessary to address 
environmental problems. Rocheleau et al. (1996) thus deconstruct the „myth of value-free 
objectivity and universality in science‟ (p. 9). 
 
Empirical studies demonstrate how women are increasingly (re)defining their identities, and the 
meaning of gender to include women's interests and epistemologies, often in relation to 
substantial constraints (Rocheleau et al., 1996). Other studies have also contributed knowledge to 
„identify and remove gendered suppression and injustice associated with environmental issues‟ 
(Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010b, p. 7). However, the main focus in feminist political ecology 
is skewed largely towards women and their place in the environment. For example, Rocheleau et 
al. (1996) seem to use the term „gender‟ synonymously with „women‟. Nightingale (2006) warns 
of the danger in such a „conceptualisation of falling back into essentialist understandings of 
women and their natural connection to the land‟ (p. 169).  
 
In this thesis, the term „gender‟ does not only imply „sex‟, the set of biological, hereditary and 
genetic characteristics that structure men and women. Rather, it refers to the socially constructed 
relations and differences between women and men that define roles, identities, entitlements, and 
perceptions, which frame ownership of assets and access to resources, and affect structure and 
decision making within families, communities, and institutions (Anoko, 2008; Espinosa, 2010). 
These relationships can vary depending on geographical area, context, situation, and time, and 
can be negotiated based on position in hierarchies and based on an individual‟s own life cycle 
and agency (Espinosa, 2010). It is crucial to examine factors such as class, ethnicity and socio-
cultural affiliation when studying differences between women and men in relation to 
conservation. 
 
 44 
 
Gender based rights, roles, responsibilities and opportunities in various societies are not 
stationary, but are in constant change and tend to vary from place to place, over time and among 
individuals and households (Quisumbing and Pandolfelli, 2010). Accommodating a gender 
perspective in biodiversity and natural resources management, entails understanding and 
incorporating the differences and relations between women and men into conservation initiatives 
(Anoko, 2008). This includes the different roles, opportunities and rights of women and men to 
access, use, conserve and manage natural resources. It also involves understanding the various 
ways in which conservation problems affect both women and men (Anoko, 2008). 
 
4.6   Critiques of political ecology 
Political ecology research has been criticised on a number of issues. Some scholars have debated 
whether political ecology is sufficiently „political‟ or „ecological‟. For instance, Bassett and 
Zimmerer (2004) argue that political ecology has focused on „politics without paying enough 
attention to ecology‟ (p. 103). Walker (2005) criticises political ecology research for the lack of 
attention to biophysical aspects, mainly in the poststructuralist branch of political ecology. He 
poses the question as to „whether the field is likely to (or even whether it should) retain a claim 
to its identity as political „ecology‟ rather than a primarily social science/humanities study of 
environmental politics‟ (p. 73). Walker (2005) stresses the need for political ecologists to engage 
in „mature collective reflection‟ (p. 80) over the future of the field, otherwise it might risk 
becoming a purely philosophical exercise in studying environmental politics. This may result in a 
negative effect and weaken the capacity of the field to influence policy debates on environmental 
management.  
 
Similarly, Vayda and Walters (1999) argue that much political ecology research concentrates on 
factors assumed in advance to be important, thus becoming blind to other (non-political) factors 
affecting environmental change, or national and global economic systems (p. 168). The authors 
propose „event ecology‟ (similar to progressive contextualisation) as a tool for political ecology 
research that will be „guided more by open questions about why events occur than by restrictive 
questions about how they are affected by factors privileged in advance by the investigator‟ (p. 
170). 
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While most of the studies mentioned criticise political ecology for little or no focus on ecology, 
Forsyth (2003) remarks that political ecology research lacks a congruent definition of the term 
„ecology‟. Walker (2006), on the other hand, asks „where is policy?‟ He stresses that the subfield 
lacks engagement with practical problem solving aspects. Walker (2007) further criticises 
political ecology research for not paying enough attention to the ethical obligation of „giving 
back‟ to its research subjects. Moritz (2006) criticises political ecology studies in Africa for not 
paying enough attention to politics. Further, Watts (1990 in 2005) expresses the need for political 
ecology studies to engage with the „rough and tumble‟ of environmental politics (p. 75). Moore 
(1993), on the other hand, calls for political ecologists to turn their attention to the „micro-
politics of peasant struggles over access to resources and [...] the symbolic contestations that 
constitute those struggles‟ (p. 381). 
 
5.  The study area and people’s everyday life 
5.1   The study area 
This study was conducted in three villages bordering the Enduimet WMA (in the Enduimet 
Division) – Tingatinga, Olmolog and Sinya; and three villages bordering the Kilimanjaro 
National Park and/or the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation (in the Siha Magharibi Division) – 
Engare Nairobi, Matadi and Namwai. These villages are located in the West Kilimanjaro basin, 
in the Siha and Longido districts of the Kilimanjaro and Arusha regions respectively. The area 
consists of diverse landscapes including grazing lands in the rain shadow of the mountain, and 
agricultural fields at the lower slopes of both Mount Kilimanjaro and Meru. The altitude is 
between 1,230 to 1,600 m above sea level. The area experiences bi-modal rainfall. The long rains 
(masika) last from March to May, while short rains (vuli) are from November to December.  
 
5.1.1 The Enduimet Wildlife Management Area 
The Enduimet WMA lies on the western side of Mount Kilimanjaro in the Longido District on 
the border with Kenya. The WMA covers an area of 742.275 km
2
, combining land from eight 
villages in the Enduimet Division: Sinya, Tingatinga and Ngereyani in the Tingatinga Ward; and 
Elerai, Olmolog, Lerang‟wa, Kitendeni and Irkaswa in the Olmolog Ward. In addition, the 
village of Kamwanga in the Olmolog Ward is also part of the WMA, despite not having suitable 
land to set aside for wildlife conservation and tourism. The WMA is divided into three 
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management zones by the Monduli District authority in order to regulate land use: the 
Olkunonoi-Kitendeni Zone – a wildlife corridor; the Ronjoo Zone (80 % of the area) – a zone for 
economic and tourism activities; and the Embarnati Zone – a settlement area (RMZP, 2005). 
 
The area constitutes an important transnational migratory route and dispersal zone for several 
wildlife populations, including elephants (Honey, 2008; Kikoti, 2009; Trench et al., 2009). 
Following a wildlife survey report of 1997 that attributed an observed decline in wildlife 
populations due to bush meat „poaching‟, the area was considered in need of formal protection 
(Nelson, 2007). Based on these observations, the Wildlife Division proposed the establishment 
of a WMA in the area. The Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism approved the AWF as the 
facilitator of the process.  
 
A community-based organisation (CBO) was established in 2004 to manage the area. The CBO 
is made up of 27 members from nine villages − two men and one woman from each village, 
chosen by the village assemblies. The CBO members choose their chairperson, secretary, and 
treasurer and form various committees. In 2007, the CBO was officially declared an Authorised 
Association by the Minister, and granted user rights in the WMA, based on a Resource 
Management Zone Plan. At that time, the WMA consisted of only eight villages, but in 2010, the 
Sinya village joined the WMA after initially refusing to do so, due to a range of concerns (see 
Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010a). According to the Wildlife Policy of 1998, WMAs are 
supposed to be „community-based‟ and meet community needs. Nevertheless, the process of 
establishing the Enduimet WMA was externally driven and constituted by the state government 
and the AWF.  
 
Villagers in the Enduimet Division are mainly pastoralists and agro-pastoralist Maasai, but on 
more heavily cultivated lands, there are also Chagga, Pare, Meru and Waarusha people. 
Agriculture is practised in eight villages (except Sinya, which is purely pastoral because their 
land is too arid for any farming attempts). In 2009, the Enduimet Division had a total population 
of 45,763 people (according to the village registers).  
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Figure 3: Map showing the study area in West Kilimanjaro, Tanzania 
 
5.1.2 Kilimanjaro National Park and West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation 
The Kilimanjaro National Park is one of the 15 parks in Tanzania managed by the Tanzania 
National Parks Authority. The park was formerly known as Mount Kilimanjaro Forest, protected 
by the German Colonial Government under the Forest Conservation Ordinance of 1904 
(Kivumbi and Newmark, 1991). In 1940, it was gazetted as a forest reserve by the British 
Colonial Government under the Forest Ordinance of 1921, for water catchment and forest 
products. In 1941, the colonial government approved the so-called „half-mile forest strip‟, an 
area of 87.69 km
2
, and width of 0.8 km, as a buffer zone in more densely populated areas 
between the forest reserve and the villages along the southern lower slopes of the mountain. The 
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motive was to provide local people with firewood, fodder, building poles, wood and non-wood 
products. The local Chagga Council managed this strip (Kivumbi and Newmark, 1991).  
 
In 1973, the mountain above the tree line (~2,700 m) was reclassified as a national park covering 
an area of 753.81 km
2
. The park was opened for visitation in 1977 and classified as a UNESCO 
world heritage site in 1989. The remaining part of the forest reserve, with an area of 1,078 km
2
 
and a boundary length of 238 km, spreading across three districts in the Kilimanjaro region (Hai, 
Moshi Rural, and Rombo) continued to be managed by the erstwhile Forest and Beekeeping 
Division (FBD). Following the formulation of decentralisation policies in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the participatory aspects were incorporated in the Forest Policy of 1998. Joint Forest 
Management was adopted in the Kilimanjaro Forest Reserve with the involvement of local 
people.  
 
In 2001, the United Nations Development Program/Global Environmental Facility Small Grants 
Program conducted an aerial survey that revealed major threats to Mt. Kilimanjaro in the form of 
logging, fires, charcoal burning, shamba (farm) system practices, livestock grazing, forest 
villages (squatters), and landslides (Lambrechts et al., 2002, p. 5). The survey report initiated a 
process to incorporate the forest reserve into the Kilimanjaro National Park (Agrawal et al., 
2003; UNESCO, 2011). Thus, in September 2005 the forest reserve, formerly managed by the 
FBD was officially gazetted as part of the Kilimanjaro National Park (GMP, 2006). 
 
Currently, the park covers an area of 1,831.81 km
2
 (GMP, 2006). The main activities allowed in 
the park are non-consumptive tourism, education, and research. The Kilimanjaro Mountain 
(5,963 m altitude) is one of the major attractions in the park. The park is self-sustaining, 
financially paying for its administrative and management costs from the tourism revenues 
(Durrant and Durrant, 2008). The park borders 90 villages, with 70 villages falling adjacent to 
the half-mile forest strip. All the bordering villages are included in the park‟s outreach 
programme.  
 
On the north and north-western side of Kilimanjaro, below the level of natural forest and village 
land, there are forest plantations which were established in 1926 and 1954 respectively, during 
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the colonial period for timber and poles production, and expanded after independence. The total 
area of the plantations on north Kilimanjaro is 67.54 km
2
, while that on north-western 
Kilimanjaro, commonly called the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation, is 60.19 km
2 
(Ngaga, 
2011). Of the latter, only 44.58 km
2
 is covered by trees (TASONABI, 2001). The remaining area 
consists of steep slopes, valley bottoms, hills and water sources (WKFP Plan, 2008). The West 
Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation was established through the taungya system for licensed 
cultivators. The taungya is an agroforestry system in which short-term food crops are grown in 
the early years of tree growth in order to satisfy farmers‟ quest for arable land, control weeds, 
reduce establishment costs, generate early income, and stimulate the development of woody 
perennial species (Agyeman et al., 2003). The Plantation is owned by the Government of 
Tanzania under the Tanzania Forest Services Agency.  
 
Mount Kilimanjaro is characterised by a bimodal rainfall pattern, with long rains from March to 
May, and short rains from October to December (Kaseva and Moirana, 2010). The rainfall varies 
with altitude and ranges from 2,300 mm in the lower parts of the forest belt to less than 200 mm 
at the summit (UNEP-WCMC, 2009). 
 
Over one million people occupy the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro (Hemp, 2006). The Chagga are 
the largest ethnic group on the southern and eastern slopes. The Maasai, the Safa, the Pare, and 
other small ethnic groups are found on the western and northern parts of the mountain. The 
annual population growth rate for the Kilimanjaro region was 2.9 % during the 1988-2002 
intercensal period (Population Planning Unit, 2005). In 2009, the population of the study villages 
(Namwai, Engare Nairobi, and Matadi) in the Siha Magharibi Division was 23,411. Due to the 
high population density and land scarcity along the mountain slopes, many people practice zero 
grazing, which means that the forest is the main source of fodder. The main economic activities 
are small-scale farming, small-scale livestock keeping, small-scale business, and casual labour in 
plantations. Very few people are employed and some practice the taungya system in the forest 
plantation. 
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5.2   People’s everyday life in West Kilimanjaro  
5.2.1 Everyday life in the Enduimet Division  
The Enduimet Division acts as the migratory route for wildlife to various PAs such as 
Kilimanjaro, Arusha, and Amboseli National Parks, and the Enduimet WMA. Due to wildlife 
movements, repeated cases of wildlife damage (such as crop raiding, livestock killings and 
threats to human lives) are common in villages located between and in close proximity to these 
PAs. During interviews, focus group discussions and personal observation, I learnt how people 
fear wildlife attacks in the evening and at night. In Tingatinga village, for instance, people avoid 
staying outside after 6 pm due to fear of wildlife attacks. I encountered a case where a ten-year-
old boy was afraid to go home after 6 pm due to fear of elephant attacks. He spent the night with 
the family that hosted me. In the same family, during my fieldwork, the elephants raided and 
destroyed the banana garden in a single night. There were many other reported cases of livestock 
death, crop raiding and human-wildlife conflicts in the area.  
 
The Enduimet Division is occupied mainly by the Maasai who are pastoralists and agro-
pastoralists. On the more heavily cultivated lands, there are also other ethnicities such as Chagga, 
Pare, Meru and Waarusha (Trench et al., 2009). Due to the semi-arid climatic conditions, agro-
pastoralists tend to depend on rainwater for agricultural activities. During periods of drought, 
farming is affected by water scarcity and crop raiding animals in search of pasture and water. For 
instance, during the severe drought of 2009, the land became bare, water and pasture were very 
scarce, and both domestic animals and wildlife died. Livestock grazing took place in PAs, where 
such activity is normally not permitted. Food aid was crucial for the people due to low or lack of 
harvest as crops dried up before maturing and wild animals raided the few that survived. Birds 
became victims, as women collected their nests as a source of fodder for small livestock. Most 
women (some with donkeys and/or children) walked long distances in search of water, which 
could take several days due to the increased distances and demand for water. Some villages in 
Enduimet division depend mainly on the River Simba for domestic and livestock water 
requirements. However, during drought seasons, the flow becomes too low; the flow of water is 
also affected by farmers who use water to cultivate vegetables, and tourism activities 
(accommodation camps) located upstream.  
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 The Maasai are well known for their „strong socio-cultural practices and norms that govern all 
dimensions of their community‟ (Ngoitiko 2008, p. 3). They are a very patriarchal society, where 
women are generally inferior, and do not have „property ownership rights, access to social 
services, and the power to make decisions about their own lives‟ (e.g. access to health services, 
education, marriage) (Ngoitiko 2008, p. 2). Men own livestock and can make decisions about 
selling them without the involvement or consent of the wife/wives (Walsh et al., 2003). Women 
interviewed claimed that they do not have a right even to resources available in their own 
compounds (Interview nos. 38 & 39, 2009; Walsh et al., 2003). I encountered a case where a 
woman complained that her husband sold a cow and spent all the money in town without sparing 
any for family needs. Some women claimed that they are perceived to be children − always 
incapable of making decisions on their own (Interview nos. 37-39 & 45, 2009). 
 
The division of labour is strongly gender based. Mainly men herd livestock; men are also 
responsible for protecting livestock against predators and enemies during the night. In the 
evening they bring the herds inside an enclosed area (fenced with thorn bushes) of the kraal 
(settlement) whose entrance is also sealed with thorn bushes. Women are responsible for all 
domestic tasks, including building huts (bomas) from mud, sticks, grass, cow dung, and urine. 
Other tasks for women include milking cows, collecting water and firewood for domestic use, 
cooking, looking after children, growing basic food in small farms, partly taking care of small 
livestock such as goats, sheep and calves, and preparing young girls for marriage. A few women 
also make pearl jewellery which they sell to tourists, at the markets or to wholesalers. I noticed 
very few women who engage themselves in activities such as small-scale business, politics, or 
public employment. I also noticed a man who helped his wife to fetch water.  
 
The wealth of a Maasai man is measured in terms of the number of cattle he holds. Cattle and 
goats play an important role in religion, food, medicine and social relations. It is believed that the 
Maasai do not eat wildlife meat. However, this perception is fading away. Some villagers 
interviewed claimed that in critical situations such as the severe drought of 2009, some families 
consumed wild meat due to the lack of other food; for instance, Sinya villagers shared the meat 
of a giraffe. I observed a boy in Ngereyani village chasing a wildebeest with the aid of a dog. 
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During interviews some cases were reported where wild animals were killed for money, for food, 
and as a source of medicine (oil).   
 
The Maasai try to maintain their traditions but at the same time take part in a modern lifestyle. 
Few families in the area, particularly „modern‟ Maasai, live in iron-roofed houses, while the 
strict, traditional Maasai still live in grass-roofed mud houses (called bomas). Some men, 
especially those who own many cows, practice polygamy because they are capable of paying a 
„bride price‟ of more than 30 cows. Most women in polygamous families live in different bomas, 
but in most cases in the same compound.  
 
Every Maasai from birth belongs to a certain age set, which determines his social life, status and 
the tasks required of him. For instance, the warriors do not generally associate with women. 
However, young boys (uncircumcised) can mingle with women. When I was in Sinya village for 
fieldwork, I observed some women who, while having lunch together, closed the door 
immediately after they noticed a Moran (warrior) coming towards the kiosk where they were 
sitting. I asked them why, and they said that their tradition does not permit Moran to see them 
while eating. Elders are highly respected, and are considered decision makers (Kipuri and 
Ridgewell, 2008). Some people in the area still use the traditional Maasai dress (Rubega), while 
others dress in „western‟ style.  
 
It is government policy to involve women in development activities. However, in the Enduimet 
Division, employment is considered to be mainly men‟s activity. For instance, during my 
fieldwork, more than 47 game scouts employed by the Enduimet Community-Based 
Organisation (CBO) were men; not a single woman was employed in safari and hunting 
companies operating in the division. Of the 27 members in the Enduimet CBO, only nine were 
women, who are selected as a compulsory requirement. The top leadership of the CBO – that is, 
the chairperson, secretary, treasurer, and accountant − were all men. The CBO board has eight 
members only three of whom were women. In all the villages I studied, the chairpersons were 
men. One woman was a Councillor (through special seats reserved for women) and very few 
were employed. Of 12 members on the Tingatinga village natural resource committee, there were 
only two women members; in Sinya village, there were only six women members out of 26 
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membership seats in the village government. Men want to be representatives in different posts 
and in committees because they claim to be strong and able to fight for their families and the 
community.  
 
In one of the meetings I attended at Tingatinga village, women claimed that in the seats reserved 
for women, men tend to elect the women they want, who do not know anything and cannot 
represent their fellow women. This allows men to continue dominating decisions by obscuring 
women‟s priorities. In some cases, these women are chosen because they are related to one of the 
village government leaders. One woman said that women who are members in the village 
government are fearful and cannot speak. In the women‟s meeting, one woman told others: „let 
us be alert so that men will not oppress us. Men should give us the opportunity to choose our 
representatives who we know can represent women‟s interests in village meetings‟ (Women‟s 
meeting, Tingatinga village, Sept. 2009). Even when women are chosen to be representatives, 
they are few and are merely token appointments. One woman complained that: „although it is the 
country‟s policy for women to be selected in different decision-making arenas, women‟s 
participation in the Maasai community is very poor‟ (Interview no. 38, 2009). Although the 
Enduimet CBO specifically sought to address this bias through the idea of increased participation 
of all people including women, only one woman per village is allowed to be a member of the 
CBO, even in cases where some villages would have more potential women representatives.  
 
The female literacy rate is low in most Maasai communities, when compared to their male 
counterparts. This is because many girls are forced into early marriages, have heavy workloads, 
and lack support for education. During my fieldwork, several girls had passed standard seven 
examinations and were selected for secondary education. However, due to a lack of support from 
parents and donors, they failed to continue with secondary school education. Some of the girls 
were forced into early marriage by their fathers, because a bridal dowry adds cows to the 
family‟s livestock holdings. Nevertheless, with increased literacy levels, the young men are 
slowly changing, even though older men maintain cultural practices (Interview no. 52, 2009). I 
experienced this trend during interviews, and observations of some men who supported the 
education of women and girls.  
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Maasai women do not have the physical and cultural space to make their opinions known. One 
woman said bitterly: „We are so much despised, we are nothing. We do not have a voice. Even 
when we have requested something to be followed up, I have never seen any action taken. We 
are not given a chance even if we have a point. When men accept something spoken by women, 
it is counted as an insult‟ (Interview no. 37, 2009). One woman gave an example where women 
marched to the District Commissioner‟s office, protesting the negligence of the wildlife officials 
after an elephant killed a man, and the district officials delayed for three days. Men forced the 
women to go back home and promised to solve the matter. On the contrary, the men punished the 
women because they claimed to be disgraced and insulted by their action (Interview no. 39, 
2009).  
  
Many young women do not generally attend meetings. I observed a group of young women in 
Tingatinga village going to fetch water without paying attention to the village assembly taking 
place. I asked some women and men about it, and was told: „In the past, the Maasai culture did 
not allow women to attend meetings together with men. If women had something to present to 
the village meeting they used to send one representative, who was an elderly women. Currently, 
some women attend meetings but the young married women and young people do not generally 
attend because they are perceived as incapable of making decisions‟ (Interview no. 42, 2009).  
 
Fear is a significant weapon against women‟s participation and representation. Due to strong 
cultural constraints, very few women (mostly the „modern‟ Maasai women and non-Maasai 
women) feel confident enough to speak during group meetings in the presence of men. It is 
believed that if a woman stands boldly before men something bad might happen to her. One 
young man in Sinya Village gave the example of a woman who stood up, and spoke before men, 
and later broke her leg (Interview no. 47, 2009). In most cases, the presence of women in 
meetings does not necessarily imply their active and meaningful participation. A woman in 
Tingatinga Village said that „when a woman speaks and asks questions, men say you have bad 
manners, a woman is nothing‟ (Interview no. 45, 2009). It is clear that a major underlying issue 
relating to this reluctance to speak lies in the extremely low value accorded to women‟s opinions 
and ideas in the study areas. Women themselves are not confident in expressing their own 
opinions and ideas.  
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5.2.2 Everyday life in the Siha Magharibi Division 
The three studied villages in this division, are occupied by Chagga, Safa, Pare and other small 
ethnicities who have different cultural values. The villages are located in close proximity to one 
of the routes to Mt. Kilimanjaro called Londros. Most villagers live in iron-roofed houses built 
from timber/peg or bricks, and dress in the western style. They are small-scale farmers, small-
scale livestock keepers, small-scale business people, casual labourers, government or private 
sector employees, and tourists‟ porters. Each of the three villages has a village government office 
and village centres. Engare Nairobi village centre is the largest, housing the divisional, ward, and 
village government offices; a health centre; the primary court; and small shops, small restaurants, 
and bars. Many people from the villages visit the centre for different services. Various vehicles 
arrive at the centre including lorries that pick people up early in the morning to take them to the 
forest plantation and bring them back in the evening. Most of these people practice the taungya 
system in the plantation and some are labourers in the forest plantation and/or large-scale 
farmers. Most times in the evening, several people meet at the centre for beer, soft drinks, food, 
and barbecue (nyama choma).  
 
The villages border the Endarakwai Ranch, the West Kilimanjaro National Ranching Company 
(NARCO), the Kilimanjaro National Park, the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation, and 
agricultural plantations. In times of food and water scarcity, the human-wildlife conflict in these 
areas intensifies. For instance, during the drought period of 2009, wild animals moved from the 
PAs to people‟s farmland searching for pasture and water. On the private Endarakwai Ranch and 
in the Kilimanjaro National Park, it is forbidden for local people to harvest natural resources 
such as fodder, firewood, and plants for traditional medicine. 
Although the village lands border the forest plantation and/or national park, some parts of the 
land are semiarid and infertile. The common crops planted by local people on their own plots 
include maize, beans, garden peas, banana, and potatoes. During the drought period of 2009, 
villagers that border the Engare Nairobi River were able to continue farming vegetables and 
maize in small plots using the water from the river. 
 
The division of labour in these villages is again gender based. Women are responsible for all 
domestic tasks such as caring for children, collecting fodder and fuel wood, fetching water, 
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preparing meals, attending weekly markets, and farming. Young girls assist their mothers in 
these tasks and other farm tasks. When compared to the Enduimet Division, firewood and fodder 
are scarce in Siha Magharibi.  
 
During my fieldwork, I observed people fetching water from the Engare Nairobi River, and 
watering their gardens using the canals channelled from the river. Some people were buying 
firewood and fodder and women were searching for firewood. I also observed people selling 
wildlife meat and oil on the black market. During the interviews and focus group discussions, I 
heard complaints concerning crop raiding and lack of compensation, thus causing hatred and 
resentment towards conservation. Women claimed to be more affected by such crises, 
particularly food shortages, because family members depend on them for food.   
 
Men concentrate mainly on income related activities such as public or private employment, 
farming, timber/logs business, casual labour, and assisting tourists as porters. Few women are 
public employees. Due to power relations between men and women, women are forced to do 
activities that do not involve cash benefits, such as household chores and community 
development work. In the meeting I attended at Engare Nairobi village, the village leadership 
stated that in community activities where there are no economic issues at stake, most men 
usually send their wives. The village leadership said that if men continue to send their wives, 
women will be sent back home and men would be fined. In the meeting, many women attended 
and some gave their opinions, but few were able to challenge the opinions of the men who hold 
the decision-making power. 
 
Women‟s participation in decision making and leadership is limited to village government 
membership, and not top leadership. The three studied villages are led by men, and the village 
executive officers are also men. In the village government, there are 10 out of 25 women 
members in Engare Nairobi, 7 out of 25 in Namwai, and 12 out of 25 in Matadi. At the 
household level, which is the primary platform for the division of power in the community, most 
households are headed by men. 
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6. Methodology 
6.1   Research strategy 
This study takes mainly a qualitative methodological approach in data collection and 
interpretation. Qualitative methodology is used because of its ability to provide rich in-depth 
information such as „descriptions of complex phenomena, tracking unique or unexpected events, 
illuminating the experience and interpretation of events by actors with widely differing stakes 
and roles, and giving voice to those whose views are rarely heard‟ (Sofaer, 1999, p. 1101). My 
ontological position is one of social constructivism, which means that reality is socially 
constructed and built up from the consequent actions, perceptions and interpretations of social 
actors (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2007; Bryman, 2008). Ontology refers to the 
study of „being‟ and is concerned with „what is‟ (Crotty, 1998, p. 10).  
 
Epistemology is about assumptions that one makes about „the very bases of knowledge – its 
nature and form, how it can be  acquired and communicated to other human beings‟ (Cohen et 
al., 2007, p. 7). Epistemology is concerned with the question of how people make sense of the 
world around them and how a researcher should set aside pre-conceptions in his or her 
understanding of that world (Bryman, 2008, p.15). I chose an epistemological position of 
interpretivism which implies that the subject matter of social science (i.e. people and institutions) 
is different from that of natural science (positivism) (Bryman, 2008, p.15). This position helped 
me to explore and understand the subjective meanings motivating the actions of social actors and 
the differences between people in their role as social actors (Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
6.2   Research design 
The research design guides the researcher in the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting 
research data. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the situation in West Kilimanjaro, I 
chose a case study research design. According to Bryman (2008, p. 30) a case can consist of a 
range of different types of groups, such as an organisation, a community, a family or a school. 
Yin (2009) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that „investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context‟ (p. 18). This design allows the researcher 
to conduct an in-depth analysis of the case at hand and then to situate the case within a wider 
theoretical discussion. Although case studies are good at generating detailed information about 
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the situation in a particular case, as a design they have often been criticised for providing little 
means for scientific generalisation (Yin, 2009). However, Yin (2009) suggests that case studies, 
like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions. Schofield (1993) adds that 
specific ideas or conclusions from a piece of qualitative work can stimulate further research that 
provides information on their replicability.  
 
6.3   Sample selection 
This study is part of the larger PAPIA (Protected Areas and Poverty in Africa) and EKOSIASA 
(Political Ecology of Wildlife and Forest Governance in Tanzania) projects. Therefore, the study 
areas were selected because they are among the focus areas for these projects. The snowball 
sampling technique was used to choose interviewees. In this method, information gained from 
one interviewee is used to find the next interviewee (Weiss, 1994). The first individuals in the 
study area, who were purposively selected, were asked for referrals in order to identify other 
people considered relevant for the study. As Bryman (2008) points out, this method does not 
claim to produce a statistically representative sample since it relies on social contacts between 
the villagers to obtain new interviewees (p.184). I reached the saturation point when the new data 
collected did not shed any further light on the study topic (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 136). 
 
6.4   Methods of data collection 
6.4.1 Primary data collection 
Prior to commencement of data collection, I clarified the purpose of the study that it was 
academic purpose, and did not have connections with government or conservation institutions or 
NGOs. I sought consent from the participants and assured them anonymity and confidentiality. 
Primary data were collected through interviews, focus groups discussions, participant 
observation, and informal interviews and discussions. In-depth interviews were conducted with 
161 participants, both men and women aged 18 years and over. I also conducted 17 focus groups 
discussions, and attended three village assembly meetings.  
 
The fieldwork was carried out during different periods, between September and December 2009, 
in March 2010, between August and December 2011, and in September 2012. Most of the 
research was done in the field, i.e. at the case study site in the villages bordering the Enduimet 
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WMA and those bordering the Kilimanjaro National Park.  I used a field notebook to record 
details of the interviews, discussions and to keep track of relevant observations, information, 
ideas, and experiences; and where permission was granted, I used a tape recorder. In the 
Enduimet WMA, two research assistants (a woman and a man) assisted me, while at Kilimanjaro 
National Park I had only one research assistant. This is because at Enduimet, I needed a man to 
assist when interviewing Maasai men, especially elders, and a woman when interviewing 
women. During almost all periods of fieldwork, I stayed with local people in the study villages.  
 
Although, I am a cultural insider as a Tanzanian citizen, the areas I visited were new to me. As a 
PhD student, I was regarded as being of a higher social status than the majority of the people. To 
some extent, this affected the answers at the beginning of my research, as most people did not 
feel free to express themselves, because they were not sure whether my intentions were honest. 
However, after spending more time in the study areas and after several stays, I sensed that I had 
earned their trust.  
 
On the other hand, based on customs of the Maasai tribe, women do not mix with men. The fact 
that I am a woman, drew more women than men to me as a researcher. Although some men felt 
free to express themselves (especially those with higher social status in the community), others 
were reluctant, particularly about discussing gender issues. To some extent, this affected the 
number of male interviewees I was able to attract among the Maasai.  
 
6.4.1.1  Interviews 
Primary data were collected through in-depth interview with various actors in West Kilimanjaro. 
These included women, men, elders, young people, porters, village natural resource committee 
members, governmental officials at the village, ward, and divisional levels, and political leaders.  
 
In addition, I interviewed park staff (Community Conservation Services warden, Protection 
warden, and Tourist warden), the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation manager and staff, former 
forest reserve staff, and the Kilimanjaro Elephant Research and Conservation Project manager. 
Further interviewees included investors in safari tourism (Kibo Safaris, Shumata Camp, 
Olpopongi Maasai Cultural Village) and hunting tourism (Old Nyika, Northern Hunting), Non-
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Governmental Organisations operating in the area (African Wildlife Foundation), and the 
Community-Based Organisation leadership and members. I also interviewed regional 
government officials, Wildlife Division representatives, the Longido District Commissioner, 
Longido and Siha natural resources officers, and the Longido District Game Officer. Additional 
interviews were carried out in the Longido District, the town of Arusha, the Siha District, and in 
Dar es Salaam. Furthermore, I conducted a small number of telephone interviews to clarify some 
of the issues that emerged during the analysis of the interview data. These interviews were 
conducted as part of the triangulation process in order to gain additional information and 
perspectives on the situation around West Kilimanjaro. 
 
The interviews lasted for one to two hours. Most interviews were conducted in Kiswahili while a 
few were in English. During the interviews, I used an interview guide listing the issues I wanted 
to focus upon. However, I did not follow the guide very strictly, as its main purpose was to help 
me to stay focused on what I wanted to investigate in general, while at the same time being open 
to a wide range of information related to my research topic. While having a certain pre-
determined direction, semi-structured interviews allow for more flexibility during the interview 
itself (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). This enabled me to gain deeper insights on the study topic. 
A personal aim was to conduct interviews in the form of natural conversations as much as 
possible, rather than formal interviews (Bryman, 2008). During all the interviews, note taking 
and/or recording was taking place. The recorded interviews were later transcribed.  
 
6.4.1.2   Key informant interviews 
A key informant is understood to be a knowledgeable individual with specific insight into the 
research topic, who is willing to serve as an informant (Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 89; Weiss, 1994, p. 
20). Interviews were conducted with key informants in local communities bordering the 
Kilimanjaro National Park and the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation, and members of the 
Enduimet WMA. Seven key informants were selected due to their willingness, and the ability to 
contribute unique information, perceptions, reflections, and because they possess thorough 
insight into the research topic. The aim was to seek knowledgeable individuals who could offer 
insightful information on conservation and people, both past and present. Mikkelsen (2005) 
argues that key informants may provide biased information that may mislead the researcher. 
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However, in this case, these people have extensive knowledge about the study topic, so it was 
crucial to interview them.  
 
6.4.1.3  Focus group discussions  
I carried out 17 focus group discussions, with two to three groups in each study village. 
Generally, the groups consisted of 6 to 10 participants. These focus group discussions were used 
to understand collective views in the study villages about various aspects of people‟s lives and 
conservation. Despite the concomitant difficulties and special group dynamics of focus groups 
(e.g. dominant speakers, gender issues, fear of repression for speaking out), some important 
insights were nonetheless gained from these discussions.  
 
In the early phases of fieldwork, I conducted mixed group discussions with both men and 
women. However, I experienced that few women attended, and those who did, remained quiet 
and in some instances, merely confirmed the men‟s statements. I observed this aspect more in the 
study villages around the Enduimet WMA than in those around the Kilimanjaro National Park. I 
solved this difficulty later by conducting separate groups for men and women. This offered 
women the opportunity to express their complaints freely, for instance, how tradition/power 
relations prevent them from airing their concerns, particularly those related to human-wildlife 
conflicts; how male leadership has hindered their development in terms of training, employment; 
and how women have little power over resources in the household. Nevertheless, in some groups 
where powerful women (such as wives to village leaders, wealthy women) were present, other 
women were reluctant to express their concerns. In such cases, I followed the matter further 
through key informants or/and other focus group sessions.  
 
6.4.1.4  Participant observation  
Participant observation is mainly associated with anthropologic and ethnographic research, 
where the researcher spends an extended period of time within a group or a social setting. This 
allows people to feel comfortable with his or her presence, and thus behave and act „naturally‟; it 
also reveals how processes or events develop and evolve over time (Bryman, 2008). In this 
sense, participant observation as a research method is an important tool (Bryman, 2008). Being 
in the case study area for several months, I became immersed in the role of a participant 
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observer. I was able to listen to conversations, observe behaviour, the natural environment, the 
social setting, people‟s daily activities, and the operation of the village assemblies. I was able to 
experience people‟s interaction with PAs – the extraction of resources from PAs, wildlife 
movements towards local settlements, crop raiding, and people‟s mitigation methods. My 
observations and experiences provided valuable data to triangulate information collected via 
other methods.  
 
6.4.1.5   Informal discussions 
I engaged in informal meetings and discussions that led to important insights and contributed to 
understanding daily life in general in the Enduimet WMA, the Kilimanjaro National Park and the 
West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation. These informal ways of interaction were helpful in the 
triangulation of data e.g. comparing conflicting assertions and claims.  
 
6.4.2 Secondary data 
In case studies, secondary data are most important to corroborate and augment evidence from 
other sources (Yin, 2009). As pointed out by the same author, there is no reason to assume that 
written sources are necessarily more reliable than other types of sources. Written documents may 
be biased or even inaccurate. However, documents may be useful in the data triangulation 
process, and also to verify specific details, titles, and spelling.  
  
Documentary information can take many forms (Bryman, 2008; Yin, 2009). In my study, I used 
a broad spectrum of documents, including books, articles published in peer review journals, 
reports, and international conventions and treaties related to conservation and development in 
order to learn about current and relevant debates. In addition, I reviewed conservation policies 
and legislation, land policies, wildlife regulations, declarations, governmental notices, and 
reports – to learn about the rhetoric and practice of conservation in Tanzania. Furthermore, I 
reviewed formal letters (e.g. CBO complaints about investors, CBO letter to Kibo Safaris 
concerning revenues), minutes (e.g. from the village of Sinya), a document describing the court 
case between Kibo Safaris and the Northern Hunting Company, financial documents, PA 
management plans, studies conducted in the area, reports, and village registers. I reviewed 
information from the AWF, the Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute and the Longido and Siha 
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district level offices. However, it was highly challenging to gain access to official documents, 
particularly government financial documents.   
 
6.5    Data analysis 
The gathering and analysis of data has been a continuous and parallel process. The analysis of 
information gathered and the insights gained gave decisive clues as to what further data I should 
seek. It directed my plan from day to day and influenced the direction of my research and further 
fieldwork. I wrote down main ideas during the data collection process, immediately after data 
collection, and during reviews of the audio data collected. For audio recorded data, initially I 
chose to make „detailed‟ transcriptions (Elliot, 2005, p. 51). All pauses, repetitions, and verbal 
utterances were transcribed in as much detail as possible, to avoid the loss of any valuable 
information. However, I ended up using mostly „clean‟ or „sanitised‟ transcripts (Elliot, 2005) as 
they are easier to read, and do not involve all the extra verbal material captured on the research 
tape recorder. I read my field notes and the transcripts several times. This increased my 
familiarity with the accounts given by the interviewees and made it easier to reduce and select 
relevant information.  
 
After data transcription, I read the transcripts and highlighted ideas, categories or themes that 
helped to answer the research questions. Then I looked for relationships that emerged from the 
data categories. Later, I conducted a sorting process to compile and arrange themes, codes, and 
illustrative quotations to explain the phenomena being researched. Quotations constitute pure 
data and form a separate dimension from data analysis. Mikkelsen (2005) notes that there is a 
tendency to present verbatim quotations as the analysis. However, in this thesis, quotations from 
the participants are used to support and explain some of the findings, as this may provide a 
thicker, richer description of reality. 
 
6.6   Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity address issues about the quality of the data and appropriateness of the 
methods used in carrying out a research project (Bryman, 2008). Reliability is concerned with 
consistency of the data and stability, and about whether repeated application of the methods 
under similar conditions will yield consistent results (Bryman, 2008). Validity relates to the 
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extent of causal relationships examined – how the data support conclusions (internal validity), 
and how the results of the study can be generalised beyond the specific contexts in which the 
research was conducted (external validity or representativeness) (Bryman, 2008). 
 
In order to enhance reliability, it is important to ask the same question in various ways (Ragin, 
1994). In this thesis, I used multiple data collection methods to increase the reliability of the 
results. Multiple methods allowed for triangulation of the data and therefore reduced the 
possibility of misleading interpretations.   
 
Most of the people interviewed speak Swahili, a language in which I am fluent. My position as a 
cultural insider offered an added practical advantage in obtaining original responses from 
interviewees and thus it increased validity. Nevertheless, it was a challenge to conduct interviews 
with conservation officials, PA managers and a few of the local people. Some tried to give 
answers that seemed to satisfy the researcher (i.e. „Hawthorne effect‟) (Cohen et al., 2007). To 
avoid this, deeper probing was used, together with longer stays in the study areas. I also 
conducted interviews at different periods of time, which provided a good opportunity to compare 
and verify the answers. 
 
7. Summary and synthesis of the main findings 
There is an on-going debate about how to balance conservation and development goals. The 
critical literature in the field of conservation questions several aspects, including the history, 
policy, and practice of conservation initiatives. There is increasing recognition that „many costs 
of PAs are borne locally, particularly by poor communities, while benefits accrue globally‟ 
(IUCN, 2005).  
 
This thesis considers the social and economic impacts of conservation, how costs and benefits 
are shared between various actors, and the reaction of local communities towards these impacts. 
The previous sections provide the basic background for the four individual but interrelated 
studies presented in part two of this thesis. This section presents a summary and synthesis of the 
main findings from the four interrelated studies. 
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7.1   Gendered impacts of wildlife conservation in West Kilimanjaro (Paper I) 
The creation of PAs goes hand in hand, in most cases, with an increase in conservation costs for 
communities living adjacent to these PAs. The impacts are distributed differently among various 
groups in the community, and gender is one of the categories. Paper I used insights from feminist 
political ecology to examine gendered impacts associated with recent expansion of the 
Kilimanjaro National Park and creation of the community-based Enduimet WMA. 
The results of Paper I reveal that changes in resource access and control, as a result of land 
appropriation by powerful actors (the state and conservation agencies) (discussed in Paper IV), 
have to a great extent impacted both men and women negatively. The impacts include those 
associated with natural resources restrictions, illegal entry to PAs (beatings, fines, rapes, 
imprisonment, fear), human-wildlife conflicts, increased living costs (time, labour, and money), 
and bad relationships between PAs and local people. These findings dovetail with the growing 
body of literature on the gendered impacts of conservation initiatives (e.g. Coad et al., 2008; 
Ogra, 2008; Sarin et al., 1998). 
 
Both men and women suffer the consequences of restrictions on access to natural resources. 
Nevertheless, women are impacted substantially worse than men, due to the gendered division of 
labour and inequality in access to and control of resources that exposes them to high risks as they 
struggle to provide for their families. An explanation for this may be found in the social 
construction of gender that often overlooks women‟s rights regarding access to and control of 
resources, and inequality in the division of labour. Poor men and women suffer more from strong 
restrictions on access to PA-based natural resources because they have limited access to 
alternatives. Therefore, they spend more time and energy in searching for resources. Most 
women in female-headed households are also impacted more strongly, because they lack 
sufficient labour in searching for resources, and lack power to purchase the resources.  
 
There are variations between the two cases studied. In the Enduimet WMA, men and women 
have access to natural resources for household use, and obtain some direct and indirect benefits 
from tourism activities, while in the Kilimanjaro National Park, resource access is denied and 
local tourism benefits are minimal (discussed in papers II, III). This study found that the PAs‟ 
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approach to benefit sharing as a substitute for resource restrictions does not meet the felt needs of 
men and women. The ways in which PAs are functioning have aggravated the workload of men 
and women instead of addressing community interests, paying attention to their relevant 
livelihood needs, and improving their well-being.  
 
Due to consequences associated with restrictions on access to natural resources, and punishments 
when caught inside the PAs, enmity is evident between local people and PA staff (partly 
discussed in Paper III). Resentment causes enmity that leads men and women to oppose 
biodiversity conservation goals through increased illegal activities, including collaboration with 
poachers (partly discussed in papers III, IV). For instance, in November 2014, Maasai 
pastoralists burnt 16 tourist tents and 9 vehicles in the Endarakwai Wildlife Ranch to ashes, due 
to conservation related costs. Western (1994) reports a case where exclusion of Maasai from the 
Amboseli National Park in the late 1970s led them to kill wildlife, continue with grazing, and 
increase collaboration with poachers. Similar cases have been reported, for example, in 
Indonesia (Li, 2007) and Guatemala (Meyerson, 1998). 
 
Feminist political ecology has been useful in illuminating the injustices and struggles of both 
men and women in the process of trying to sustain their everyday life in the midst of changes in 
resource access and control (Rocheleau et al. 1996). Further, it sheds light on how access to and 
control of resources are affected by the social construction of gender, as well as power relations 
and authority that are embedded in formal and informal institutions. The discussion of the micro-
politics of everyday natural resource access and control has offered a hint of understanding into 
the broader macro-political forces at work in natural resources conservation. This investigation 
of everyday gendered experiences of conservation in West Kilimanjaro highlights the mismatch 
between the rhetoric and practice of conservation− and the challenges in combining conservation 
and development agendas.  
 
7.2   Examining transparency and local benefits from ecotourism in the Enduimet    
Wildlife Management Area in Tanzania (Paper II) 
In the 1990s, the Government of Tanzania introduced the notion of community-based wildlife 
management areas (WMAs) (URT, 1998). The WMAs were proposed as community-run 
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conservation areas, where several villages would come together and set aside land for wildlife 
conservation. In return, the villages would receive a certain proportion of the tourism revenues 
from these areas. Safari tourism, together with sport hunting, is presented as the main source of 
revenue for WMAs. Various actors – the Government of Tanzania, leading conservation NGOs, 
some donors and parts of the tourist industry − present WMAs as a win-win solution, where local 
people participate in conservation activities and accrue benefits from their efforts, implying that 
both environmental conservation and local development goals can be achieved. 
 
Paper II examines the collection and flow of tourism revenue, ideally and in practice, in the 
Enduimet WMA, and investigates whether or not the Enduimet CBO receives what it is entitled 
to receive. The results of Paper II show that although the WMA concept is promising, the 
revenue sharing as demonstrated in the Enduimet case, does not support the win-win discourse; 
instead, it is in line with the notion of „accumulation by dispossession‟ (Harvey, 2003). The 
revenues that reach the villages are minimal and pass through a complicated, non-transparent 
system. While the local people protect the WMA, they do not collect the revenues from tourist 
companies operating in the area. The tourist companies pay their fees to the government through 
the Wildlife Division. The Wildlife Division is required to channel 65 % of safari tourism and 
35 % of hunting tourism to the CBO that manages the WMA. In practice, the WMA received 
less than 65 %; each village received about 3.6 % of the safari tourism fees.  
 
Several factors affect the system of revenue flows and local benefits. Firstly, inappropriate 
leakages as well as blatant corruption reduce revenue shares for local communities (partly 
discussed in Paper III). Corruption in the wildlife sector has been previously reported (see 
Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Cooksey, 2011; Nelson, 2009, 2010, 2012; Sachedina, 2008). The 
centralised collection of fees from safari tourism has provided more opportunities for state 
officials to appropriate this revenue. In addition, it has decreased the income in villages that 
previously had individual business deals with tour companies, since the total income is currently 
divided among more villages. Moreover, the fees paid by safari companies to Wildlife Division 
have increased substantially, which has led investors in Enduimet to close down or scale down 
their activities. This might in the long run reduce the likelihood of stable and sustainable income 
from the tourism sector for the villages in the Enduimet WMA.   
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Secondly, there is a lack of transparency by different actors – tourism investors and government 
− in providing detailed information about their revenues and how these are disbursed. For 
instance, safari investors failed to provide detailed information such as number of bed-nights and 
game drives, and one of the two hunting companies in Enduimet refused to share any 
information. Furthermore, the Wildlife Division declined to provide information about how 
much it has received from different safari companies and how much it has distributed to the 
Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund, the District Council, and the Central Treasury. Based on the 
figures provided by the Wildlife Division for the Enduimet CBO, the CBO received considerably 
less in 2010 than what it was entitled to. This lack of transparency makes it possible that 
revenues disappear on the way through the system due to corruption (partly discussed in Paper 
III).  
 
Thirdly, the system is not efficient, since the money flow involves several agencies in a 
centralised chain of transactions, which incur large transaction costs. This means that a large 
share of benefits goes towards paying for various types of administration fees. It is also clear that 
the current costs of wildlife conservation for the communities are higher than the revenues that 
these communities receive. The villages that incur the highest costs from wildlife conservation 
(crop damage, livestock killings, and wildlife attacks on people) do not receive larger shares of 
income from the WMAs.  
 
In practice, the case of the Enduimet WMA leads to capital accumulation by various actors who 
try to extract revenues by changing community rights over land and resources, thus negatively 
affecting the livelihoods of communities. Although the WMAs are a mechanism to enhance 
wildlife conservation, they have also enabled the Wildlife Division to accrue more funds. There 
is no evidence, in this case, of the initial concept of rural benefits and development that was 
central to WMA initiatives.  
 
7.3   Comparing local participation and benefit sharing between a national park 
and a state forest plantation (Paper III) 
Participatory approaches to natural resources management evolved as a way of securing local 
people‟s support for environmental conservation (Scherl et al., 2004; Western et al., 1994). 
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Different actors (conservationists, government officials, and development partners) present 
participation as a win-win strategy, meaning that conservation and development can be achieved 
(Western et al., 1994). Paper III compares the local participation and benefit sharing strategies 
employed by the Kilimanjaro National Park and the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation, and 
how these affect local people‟s attitudes towards the study areas. The park deals with natural 
resources conservation by prohibiting the withdrawal of natural resources, and sharing benefits 
with the local people through an outreach programme. The forest plantation, on the other hand, 
benefits the local people in the form of access to forest products, and casual labour and farming 
opportunities. 
 
The results of Paper III show that the performance of the two study areas is different, despite the 
fact that both fall under the same ministry. The performance of the two areas is affected by 
sectoral policies, and legislation that dictates the manner of involvement of local people and how 
they may benefit from natural resources management.  
The criteria and procedures for benefit sharing for the Kilimanjaro National Park are 
bureaucratic, complex, and lack transparency, while those of the forest plantation are much 
clearer and more transparent. The Kilimanjaro National Park channels less than 7.5 % of the 
park‟s operating budget to local people. Only one village among the three study villages was 
financially supported in 2002/03 (partly discussed in Paper I). The scheme is affected by external 
political influence, with funds being diverted to areas not directly affected by the park. In 
addition, mismanagement and the misuse of funds by national parks headquarters officials 
adversely affect the benefits for local people (Juma, 2009). The West Kilimanjaro Forest 
Plantation has a positive impact on neighbouring villages; however, the kind of employment 
offered is only casual labour, and casual labourers are paid too little. Local communities opted 
for low pay because they lacked alternatives, and this provided a way to increase their chances of 
obtaining farming plots. The findings show that the allocation of farming plots is affected by 
favouritism.  
Both areas share a centralised structure in terms of decision making on matters pertaining to the 
management of natural resources and benefit sharing (discussed in papers II, IV). Thus, it is 
difficult for communities to influence or challenge the operation of the structure (discussed in 
papers II, IV). The park management system in the Kilimanjaro National Park does not have 
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space to accommodate local people‟s opinions because of its top-down and para-military nature. 
This was revealed during the inclusion of the forest reserve into the park, with no awareness 
sensitisation on imminent changes to user rights; thus the process took people by surprise 
(discussed in Paper I). Not a single local person in the study area plays any active role in park 
administration or sourcing temporary employment opportunities in the park. The park takes 
notice of local people only when there is fire outbreak; thus local people claimed to be used as 
„tools‟. As a result, some do not turn up to help, while others demand payment. Local people 
have no opportunities to contribute to the park‟s planning and decision making, or to have any 
dialogue with park staff where they could express their problems and seek solutions for the same. 
Moreover, most collected revenue is retained by the national parks headquarters and local people 
do not have power or influence over it.  
 
The West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation involves local people in plantation management through 
different activities in the plantation. But local people do not have any influence on decision 
making; nor do they have any power or share in the revenues collected from the sale of logs and 
poles (apart from payment received for casual labour). The income from the sale of logs is 
remitted to the central government. The people have no influence over the amount of payment 
for casual labour, nor do they receive any incentive for tending trees. Moreover, local people in 
the forest plantation are seen as beneficiaries, and not as decision makers over forest use. In both 
areas, participation is used as a means to improve environmental conservation and a way to 
accrue more revenue for the government. 
 
The effect of  lack (or very few) benefits, denied access to natural resources, lack of buffer zones 
where they may harvest natural resources, ill-treated when found in the park and lack 
compensation for crop raiding, led people to withdraw resources from the park illegally, in spite 
of park ranger patrols.  In addition, villagers referred to the park staff as „enemies‟ who do not 
care about their livelihoods (discussed in Paper I). In the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation, 
benefits obtained by the local people from the forest plantation seem to have positively affected 
the relationship. This was revealed through local people‟s responses in cases of fire outbreaks, or 
during tree planting activities, and their attitude towards plantation staff.  
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The differences observed between the two PAs are related to sectoral legal reforms that occurred 
in the 1990s, following the economic crisis of the 1980s, and declining capacity of the central 
government (Nelson and Blomley, 2010). In the forestry sector, local proponents of reforms 
and/or donors managed to leverage the reform process due to the Forest and Beekeeping 
Division‟s lack of alternative sources of political power and financial capital. However, in the 
wildlife sector, donors had very little influence due to the ability of policy makers to acquire 
rents from tourism that provided them with financial assets and enabled them to deflect reform 
pressure from donors (Nelson and Blomley, 2010). 
 
The findings of Paper III indicate that the extent of benefits received and the degree of local 
participation are associated with negative/positive attitudes toward the study areas. The study 
concludes that for local people to support conservation efforts and resist illegal activities, the 
PAs should allow meaningful local participation in PAs management and equitable sharing in the 
benefits. 
 
7.4   Elephants over the cliff: Explaining wildlife killings in Tanzania (Paper IV) 
Elephant populations in Tanzania have recently declined, after two decades of increasing 
numbers (Douglas-Hamilton and Poole, 2010; TAWIRI, 2010). One of the reasons for the  
decline in elephant numbers may be the resurgence of the ivory trade, due to a rise in demand in 
China and East Asian countries (Martin and Vigne, 2011; Milliken and Sangalakula, 2009). 
There are other reasons however, besides the international ivory trade that contribute to attacks 
on elephants. 
 
Paper IV uses the political ecology inspired „webs of relation‟ to unwind the interrelated causes 
behind the case of elephant killings in Tanzania, where numerous villagers chased a herd of 
elephants over a cliff, killing six of them.  
 
The results of Paper IV show that local people‟s burden of conservation, such as repeated crop 
raiding, threats to their lives, and livestock killing (discussed in papers I, II) constitutes part of 
the explanation behind the elephant killings. People living in the area claimed that elephants 
caused more than 75 % of wildlife-related human deaths in their village. Kikoti (2009) found that 
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elephants stayed in the riparian forests along the Engare Nairobi North River during the daytime 
and raided local field crops at night. Trench et al. (2009) found that some villagers at Tingatinga 
have given up farming because of elephant-related problems. Similar observations have been 
reported in Kenya (Smith and Kasiki, 2000). 
 
Another explanation is related to the severe drought in northern Tanzania and Kenya in 2009. 
The drought intensified conflict as wild animals migrated to human settlements and plantations 
in search of pasture and water. People tried to prevent elephant raids by guarding the fields at 
night, building fences and hedges, and burning chilli pepper. However, elephant raids were still 
significant. The government recognised the crop-raiding problem, especially in 2009, but 
villages did not receive any compensation from the government (partly discussed in Paper I). 
Besides the above reasons, increases in the human and elephant populations escalated the 
conflict as both competed for limited space and resources. The human population in the area has 
increased substantially for the following reasons: natural increase, eviction of more than 30,000 
inhabitants from the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation and natural forest, immigration due to 
farming opportunities in the forest plantation, and the establishment of several new villages in 
2007. The elephant population has also increased which has led to an increase in crop raiding, 
the destruction of water facilities, threats to human life, and livestock killings. 
 
While these factors constitute part of the explanation for the incident of elephant killings, Paper 
IV shows that land use changes add insight to the explanation in this case. Large areas have 
become protected in various ways during the last few decades, influenced by various actors. 
These include state agencies such as the Wildlife Division and the Tanzania National Park 
Authority under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, international conservation 
organisations (e.g. AWF), and tourism operators in the area (partly discussed in papers 1, II). 
Local people try to sustain a living on the remaining land, while encountering growing problems 
with wildlife. This has left local communities with an increasing feeling of being marginalised 
and disempowered, with limited possibilities to influence the situation through democratic 
means. 
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In the case under investigation, the elephant killings can be interpreted as a form of resistance 
against conservation practice and in particular, elephants taking over the space considered by the 
villagers as their legitimate area of use. Similar cases have been reported in India and Sumatra, 
where more than 60 elephants were found dead through poisoning by plantation workers (WWF, 
2010). 
 
In order to avoid human-elephant conflicts in the future, this study recommends that land use 
plans should demarcate conservation areas, settlements, and other forms of land use. In addition, 
active participation in decision making on wildlife conservation is required to give villagers a say 
in wildlife management. The provision of compensation for wildlife damage and fair benefit 
sharing are essential to enable local communities to perceive the value of wildlife conservation. 
 
8. Conclusions and policy recommendations  
8.1   Conclusions 
In this thesis, I have employed a qualitative methodology to describe and analyse the social, 
economic, and political impacts of conservation on local people in West Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. 
The study also examines the theory and practice of the current win-win discourse advocated by 
external actors and employed in different categories of PAs. 
 
The findings of this thesis do not support the win-win claims advocated in the study areas by 
various actors. There is a discrepancy between the successful stories presented by different actors 
at global, regional, and national levels, and how wildlife management is really practised in West 
Kilimanjaro. Instead of a win-win situation, where local people benefit from natural resource 
conservation and biodiversity protection, the findings indicate that conservation has worsened 
the well-being of local communities who live adjacent to the study areas. 
 
The findings reveal that in recent years, the Government of Tanzania has appropriated large 
tracts of land in West Kilimanjaro for conservation purposes and vested the authority and control 
in the state or the private sector. Various actors have facilitated the conservation strategy in West 
Kilimanjaro, such as government conservation agencies (Wildlife Division, Tanzania National 
Parks Authority), international conservation organisations (the African Wildlife Foundation), 
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tourists companies, and donors. However, the expansion/creation process was done in a manner 
that did not consider the concerns of local communities. 
 
As a result of the establishment of PAs, local communities face disproportionate impacts on their 
daily lives, including harassment by PA staff, lost land and natural resources, and conservation 
costs. The impacts affect people differently because of the heterogeneous nature of the 
community, and the gender division of labour. Both men and women are impacted by restrictions 
on access to resources, but women are impacted more, due to inequality in the gender division of 
labour and resources in the household. Poor men and women suffer more because they lack 
alternatives. Women in female-headed households are affected more than women counterparts in 
male-headed households, because they lack sufficient labour power in searching for natural 
resources, lack purchasing power, and some are elderly and have no relatives willing to help. 
 
In the Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009, the Government of Tanzania legislated the possibility 
of consolation payments in the case of crop raiding, death, and livestock depredation. However, 
no consolation has been paid to local people in West Kilimanjaro, despite the fact that 
government officials have documented the costs. 
 
Local participation and benefit sharing has been employed in these study areas, but the level to 
which it is practised in each case varies greatly. The benefits directed to local communities are 
insignificant for the local communities to see any value in conservation. As was elaborated by 
the case of Enduimet, the government, conservation NGOs, and other external actors claim that 
WMAs reflect a win-win situation, implying both environmental conservation and local 
development goals can be achieved; however the case does not support the win-win discourse. 
Limited benefits reach the local communities, and are not directed to the people who bear the 
direct costs of conservation. In the case of the Kilimanjaro National Park, the benefits distributed 
to local people are minimal compared to the park‟s income. In the West Kilimanjaro Forest 
Plantation, local people are involved and benefit through various activities in the forest 
plantation. 
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Many factors affect the level of participation and amount of benefits distributed to local people in 
all study areas. In Enduimet, the WMA concept has become a tool to promote conservation and 
has increased income for the Wildlife Division from wildlife conservation outside PAs. The 
initial concept of economic development that was central to WMA initiatives is largely absent. 
Instead, the WMA concept has become a form of accumulation by different actors who extract 
revenues by changing community rights over land and resources, thus negatively affecting the 
livelihoods of communities. WMAs can be seen as a non-coercive means of implementing the 
conservation interests of dominant actors.  
 
The approach in the Kilimanjaro National Park does not consider the needs of the local people; 
tourism and conservation goals are pursued at the expense of local people‟s livelihood needs. 
Although the park claims to benefit local people through its outreach programme, it is evident 
that it operates under a closely monitored fences and fines strategy. The benefit-sharing scheme 
is affected by corruption, bureaucratic procedures, too few benefits, lack of transparency, 
mismanagement, misuse and deviation of funds, lack of decision-making power, minimal/passive 
participation, and a lack of communication and awareness. In the West Kilimanjaro Forest 
Plantation, there is a lack of decision-making power, low payment for casual labour, favouritism 
in allocating taungya plots, and no revenue sharing from the sale of logs and poles. 
 
The level of involvement and benefits directed to local people affects the relationship between 
them and the study areas, as revealed in the case of the Kilimanjaro National Park. The attitudes 
of local people towards the forest plantation are more positive than in the case of the national 
park. The negative relationship between local people and the park is triggered by the costs of 
conservation such as crop raiding, harassment by park rangers, and restricted access to natural 
resources after expansion of the national park by inclusion of the forest reserve. The differences 
observed between the two areas are related to sectorial legal reforms that occurred in the 1990s 
following the economic crisis of the 1980s, and declining capacity of the central government. 
 
Due to the huge burden of conservation, the lack of power to influence decisions about land and 
wildlife, and the lack of support from government and other actors to relieve the burdens, local 
people retaliate by killing wildlife in secret or by collective action, as illustrated by the Engare 
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Nairobi case. Furthermore, they feel resentment towards conservation initiatives and/or they 
engage in the illegal withdrawal of natural resources from the PAs, as was revealed in the case of 
the Kilimanjaro National Park. 
 
All areas studied (the Enduimet WMA, the Kilimanjaro National Park, and the West Kilimanjaro 
Forest Plantation) share a centralised structure of decision making on matters pertaining to the 
management of natural resources and benefit sharing. Thus, it is extremely difficult for 
communities to influence or challenge the operation of the central structure. Local people lack 
full participation in decision making in the management of the PAs. In all three areas, 
participation is used as means to improve environmental conservation and as a way to accrue 
more revenue for the government.  
 
The political ecology approach has proved to be useful in studying human-environment 
interactions – „the way nature is understood and the politics and impacts of environmental 
action‟ (Adams and Hutton 2007, p. 147). This approach has helped to understand how the costs 
and benefits of conservation are distributed; how unequal power relations influence control, 
access to and use of natural resources at different levels; and who are the winners and losers in 
West Kilimanjaro. The „webs of relation‟ has been useful for studying the factors behind 
conflicts over the land and natural resources. This approach highlights the hierarchies embedded 
and entangled in horizontal as well as vertical linkages, thus embracing different levels of 
complexity. It provides a framework for explaining more complex interrelationships (Rocheleau, 
2008). Feminist political ecology has been useful in illuminating the injustices and struggles of 
both men and women in the process of trying to sustain their everyday life in the midst of 
changes in resource access and control (Rocheleau et al. 1996). The participatory framework has 
been useful in understanding the theory and practice of participation, the extent of local people‟s 
participation, and where participation has been used as a means or as an end in the study areas. 
 
While the case study of West Kilimanjaro provides limited scope for scientific generalisation, the 
findings from this study offer insights into the complex relationship between communities and 
conservation. Moreover, the study findings seem to support recent studies in Tanzania on 
biodiversity conservation/development, stressing that participatory strategies have failed to meet 
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either conservation/development goals effectively. There is a mismatch between the rhetoric and 
practice of win-win claims advocated by actors of participatory approaches, and there is unequal 
sharing of the costs and benefits of conservation. To sum up, this thesis can be seen as an 
empirical research contribution to support these claims. 
 
8.2   Policy recommendations 
Based on the research findings and the conclusion of this study, the following are recommended: 
 
1. A better way of sharing benefits with local people should be employed as a means to give 
them a sense that conservation is beneficial to their lives. The benefit sharing system should 
be transparent in terms of revenue collected and distributed. 
 
2. In the Enduimet WMA, the current percentage of benefit sharing should be increased to be 
tangible to member villages. The CBO should receive at least 75 % of photographic tourism 
revenue and at least 75 % of hunting tourism revenue, while the remaining percentages 
should be set aside for district and central government and for technical support for the 
WMA. The CBO should also be given the power to collect the revenue and distribute it to 
other actors in order to reduce transaction and administration costs, so as to make the sense 
of „community-based conservation‟. 
 
3. In the Kilimanjaro National Park: 
i. The current percentage for local communities (7.5 % of the park‟s operating budget) is too 
low; in practice, less than 7.5 % is distributed. To be tangible, the share should be 
increased to at least 25 % of the park‟s tourist entry fees. 
ii. Many of the criteria for benefit sharing and procedures for supporting community initiated 
projects are bureaucratic and cumbersome. These procedures and criteria should be 
simplified so that villagers may follow their application. 
iii. For the past 17 years of community conservation services operation, less than half of 90 
villages surrounding the park have been supported. Thus, the park should make sure it 
supports all villages, because its negligence of these villages might be contributing to the 
increase in illegal activities.  
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iv. The current focus on social projects should be extended to include other aspects such as 
capacity building for local people on conservation issues, to increase the chances of their 
employment in the park. The training can also focus on income generating activities. All 
such initiatives should be gender sensitive.  
v. A buffer zone has proved to be very important for many PAs in many countries − a buffer 
zone enables communities to meet their immediate needs for firewood and fodder. In case 
the park cannot afford to render part of its area as a buffer zone, it could purchase a piece 
of land from government agricultural plantations to enable local communities to access 
natural resources. A buffer zone would reduce people‟s dependence on the park, reduce 
women‟s workload and improve their wellbeing. It would also reduce the illegal 
withdrawal of natural resources, resentment and hatred. 
vi. While conservation is of national and international importance, the Government of 
Tanzania should not use its power to conserve and invest in wildlife while oppressing local 
communities. Rather, it should adhere to former land use plans (that were friendly to local 
people) or develop new ones that demarcate different land use areas (e.g. PAs, settlement, 
grazing, agriculture, investments, and other uses) in order to avoid future conservation 
related conflicts. The process must be highly participatory and include all stakeholders. 
 
4. For conservation to be successful, full participation of local communities is necessary. The 
following should be considered: 
i. Kilimanjaro National Park: The park should promote good communication with local 
communities, raise their awareness of conservation imperatives, and offer opportunities to 
engage in decision making, policy planning and implementation. This is of paramount 
importance to give local people some influence over environmental management. Giving 
local people the opportunity to play an active role as main stakeholders in PAs will provide 
them with the ability to affect conservation rules and regulations. As a result, they will have 
their concerns addressed, and will be able to support conservation goals. Local people must 
be included in planning committees and given real representation in Community 
Conservation Services. In order to have real local involvement, there need to be some 
structural changes and allocation of funds from the Kilimanjaro National Park to local 
communities. 
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ii. West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation: The Tanzania Forest Services Agency should allow 
Joint Forest Management and local influence on decision making. This will create a sense 
of ownership of natural resources among local communities. 
iii. Enduimet Wildlife Management Area: The government should give power to local people 
to collect and distribute revenues and make decisions over the running of the WMA.  
 
5. Reducing conflicts between humans and wildlife is crucial for the long-term maintenance of 
wildlife populations and public support of conservation. Failure to resolve conflicts will lead 
to failure to achieve wildlife conservation objectives, based on the fact that local 
communities living adjacent to PAs play an important role in conservation issues. The 
following needs to be done to reduce the magnitude of the problem: 
i. Game scouts, park rangers, and game officers need to respond on time when called upon by 
communities. In addition, collaboration between villagers and protection wardens/game 
scouts could reduce the enormity of the problem. 
ii. To enable people to tolerate wildlife on their land, effective compensation schemes are 
necessary to pay individuals or their families, in full or in part, to offset wildlife damage 
(crop raiding, livestock depredation, property damage, human deaths/injury). 
 
6. Misconceptions about relationships between the community and the environment need to 
be addressed by listening to those who are not often represented in the debate on what is 
best for the environment – the people who live adjacent to PAs and are most affected by 
conservation initiatives. Their stories can provide valuable insights into the pitfalls of 
conservation and the complexities of the human-environment relationship, perhaps 
legitimising the human‟s place in nature.  
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Abstract  
In most cases, the establishment of protected areas (PAs) goes hand-in-hand with an increase 
in conservation costs to communities living adjacent to the PAs. In this study, I use a feminist 
political ecology perspective to examine gendered impacts of the expansion of the 
Kilimanjaro National Park (NP) and the creation of the Enduimet Wildlife Management Area 
(WMA) in Tanzania. Feminist political ecology may be a useful approach to illuminate the 
impacts associated with conservation on gender and further consequences in everyday life. 
The findings reveal that the PAs impact both men and women, but the most significant 
impact is felt by women due to inequality in the gendered division of labour and resources at 
the household level. Poor men and women, together with most women in female-headed 
households, suffer more from strong restrictions on access to PA-based resources than other 
people as they have limited alternatives. The benefits of PAs in compensating for resource 
restrictions, were found to be modest and do not meet the needs of predominantly poor men 
and women. The majority of local people collect resources from PAs illegally to meet their 
livelihood needs, despite restrictions on resource access. This study concludes that, instead of 
PAs paying attention to people‟s relevant livelihood needs and improving their wellbeing, 
they have unfortunately worsened their situation.  
 
Key words: conservation, feminist political ecology, gendered impacts, livelihoods, protected 
areas 
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Introduction  
Most of the world‟s poor populations (an estimated 1.6 billion people) rely heavily on non-
cultivated natural resources for their income and household use (Roe and Elliot 2006). In 
Africa, approximately two-thirds of 600 million people depend on natural resources for cash 
and/or subsistence income (Timko et al. 2010). Given such widespread reliance on natural 
resources, there is much pressure to conserve more areas, including land used by small-scale 
farmers and pastoralists (Kikoti 2009). This pressure is linked to growing recognition of the 
importance of protected areas (PAs) in conserving biodiversity richness, promoting  
ecosystem services and mitigating against climate change, as well as increasing  rate of 
global deforestation, preventing species extinction, and conserving land and water resources 
(Brooks et al. 2009). 
 
In modern times, the number of PAs had grown from less than 1,000 in 1940 (Veit and 
Benson 2004) to over 161,000 in 2010, representing over 13% of the world‟s land surface 
area (UN MDG 2010). Almost all the strictest categories of PAs (categories I and II) under 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are found in the developing 
world (Naughton-Treves et al. 2005). Governments, conservation organisations, and private 
entities have established PAs aimed at promoting national development and public interest, 
adopting conventional exclusionary approaches; however, there is minimal/ no consideration 
of the implications for the people who depend on these areas for their livelihoods (Scherlet al. 
2004).  
 
The majority of Tanzanians (75%) live in rural areas where they rely heavily on natural 
resources for their livelihoods (Nelson 2004). For instance, over 90% of inhabitants rely on 
wood and other vegetation to provide domestic energy (Johnsen 1999; URT 1998a). 
Nevertheless, about 40% of Tanzania‟s land area is under conservation measures 
(Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010), coupled with control and access restrictions.  
 
Although many PAs generate economic benefits, much of these benefits are enjoyed by 
national and international elites, while most of the conservation costs are borne almost 
entirely by the local people, particularly poor and politically weak groups (Adams and Hutton 
2007; West  et al. 2006). Previous studies have found that local people are disempowered 
4 
 
 
 
when the control of natural resources is taken over by government or private investors 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). In most cases, local communities are left without 
alternatives, which in the long run, results in squatting, encroachment and poaching to keep 
them alive (Colchester 2002). Furthermore, restricting access to resources such as firewood is 
reported to be problematic (Coad et al. 2008; Vedeld et al. 2007), as wood provides about 
70% of the energy consumed in Africa (Coad et al. 2008).   
 
While many studies have focused on the livelihood impacts of PAs on local communities (e.g 
Clements et al. 2014; West et al. 2006), some studies have failed to understand communities 
as heterogeneous entities composed of multiple actors with different and dynamic interests 
(Agrawal and Gibson 2001). Such heterogeneities imply that different actors may be 
impacted differently by conservation measures. Gender is a particularly important category to 
examine because it cuts across all other categories. Dependence on natural resources tends to 
be gender specific due to existing gender divisions in terms of labour, rights, and 
responsibilities (Rocheleau et al. 1996). For example, women in rural areas in Tanzania 
collect firewood, fodder, and wild foods mainly for household use, while men rely on natural 
resources such as timber, animal protein, and poles, mainly for sale (Asimalowo and 
Lipsanen 1998). Research in rural Tanzania has found that women in some areas walk up to 
10 km a day collecting and carrying firewood with loads of up to 38 kg (Practical Action 
2012).  Men face additional challenges such as guarding crops against raiding by wildlife 
(Barua et al. 2012), and the loss of income sources. 
 
There are several studies in various parts of the world that have investigated the impacts of 
conservation practices on gender roles (e.g. Ogra 2008; Mahat 2006; Clancy et al. 2003; 
Sarin et al. 1998). In Tanzania, particular studies have focused on gender and natural 
resources. For instance, Songorwa (1999) investigated gender participation in natural 
resource management; Makalle (2012) studied gender-specific utilisation and conservation of 
natural resources; Mhache (2014) investigated gender equitable entitlements of coastal 
resources; and Kaarhus et al. (2005) discussed women‟s land rights in Tanzania. Very few 
studies however, have attempted to document the magnitudes of these impacts on men and 
women, particularly when they try to exercise their former (before the establishment and 
expansion of PAs) resource user rights. 
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This study therefore investigated how the creation and expansion of two PAs in Tanzania 
have impacted men and women in different ways. In recent years, the Government of 
Tanzania has appropriated large tracts of land for conservation and vested the authority and 
control of these areas in the state and private sector. In West Kilimanjaro area, the 
Kilimanjaro National Park (NP) was expanded in 2005, and the Enduimet Wildlife 
Management Area (WMA)
1
 was established in 2007. These PAs are subject to restrictions on 
access to natural resources, hence involving considerable risks for women and men who try 
to access such resources. Besides access restrictions, there have also been increases in 
conservation costs to local communities. I argue that instead of PAs improving the 
livelihoods and wellbeing of men and women, they have threatened and exacerbated their 
situation. Men and women are regarded by PAs staff as being destructive and a threat to 
conservation practices, rather than as major stakeholders in the conservation process (Mariki 
2013).  
 
The reasons for selecting the two protected areas in this study are that they are located in the 
same ecosystem and they were created or expanded in recent years.  The creation of these 
areas is associated with changes in natural resource control and access rights. Investigating 
the impacts of such PAs on local men and women can shed light on injustices in the form of 
restricted access rights, and provide evidence that may lead to their reduction if not their 
discontinuation. 
 
The following section provides a brief discussion of feminist political ecology, followed by 
the research methodology adopted for this study. Thereafter, the findings and discussions are 
presented, followed by conclusions.  
 
The feminist political ecology perspective  
Feminist political ecology (FPE) emerged in the 1990s as a subfield of political ecology, 
building on previous work by feminist scholars and feminist theorists (Elmhirst 2011; 
Nightingale 2006; Rocheleau et al. 1996). The approach has extended „the multiple scale 
analysis of environment and power in political ecology to gendered relations both within and 
                                                          
1
WMAs are portions of village land set aside for conservation, with the intention of generating revenues from 
tourism (URT 1998b).
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beyond the household, from individual to national scales‟ (Rocheleau 2008: 722). FPE 
critically investigates concepts such as community, household, homogenous conditions, and 
shared interests (Rocheleau 2008). Gender is considered to be a critical factor in „shaping 
resource access, and control, interacting with class, caste, race, culture and ethnicity to shape 
processes of ecological change, the struggle of men and women to sustain ecologically viable 
livelihoods, and the prospects of any community for sustainable development‟ (Rocheleau et 
al. 1996: 4-5).  In particular, access to and the control of natural resources are structured by 
power relations and authority that are embedded in formal (e.g. the state, and global rules and 
regulations) and informal (e.g. social norms) institutions at local, national and international 
levels (Ahmed 2001). Access to natural resource can be viewed spatially, across the 
landscape, or by scale, in relation to hierarchically arranged political economic structures that 
influence local use (Peet and Watts 1996). In order to understand differential control over 
resources, power hierarchies, and relationships between men and women, feminist 
researchers have argued for a thorough examination of intra-household gender dynamics 
because the household is a complex arena and a very important institution, in which power 
and resources are bargained and distributed (Ogra 2008). 
 
As can be expected, the main emphasis in FPE is skewed largely towards a focus on women. 
For example, according to Rocheleau et al. (1996), the term „gender‟ seems to be used 
synonymously with „women‟. Nightingale (2006) warns against the danger in such a 
„conceptualization of falling back into essentialist understandings of women and their natural 
connection to the land‟ (p.169).  
 
The term „gender‟ does not only imply „sex, a set of the genetic, hereditary, and biological 
characteristics that structure men and women‟ (Anoko 2008:11), but rather, the socially 
constructed relations and differences between men and women that define roles, identities, 
entitlements, and perceptions. These relations frame the ownership of assets and access to 
resources, and affect structure and decision making within families, communities, and 
institutions (Anoko 2008; Espinosa 2010). The situation varies depending on geographical 
area, context, and time period, and can be negotiated based on an individual‟s position within 
hierarchies such as age, class, seniority, or ethnicity, own life cycle and agency (Espinosa 
2010).  
 
7 
 
 
 
In the field of biodiversity conservation, considering a gender perspective entails 
understanding and incorporating the differences and relations between men and women into 
conservation initiatives (Anoko 2008). This includes consideration of the different roles, 
opportunities and rights of men and women in terms of access, use, conservation and 
management of natural resources (Anoko 2008). It also involves understanding the various 
ways in which conservation problems affect both men and women (Anoko 2008). 
 
The terms „women‟ and „men‟ do not refer to a single homogenous group, but rather to actual 
material differences among men and women in relation to nature and the environment 
(Agarwal 1998). For instance, the position of women or men in a nomadic tribe might be 
completely different to those in a sedentary tribe. It is crucial to examine factors such as 
class, ethnicity, age, and socio-cultural affiliation when studying differences between men 
and women in relation to the impacts of conservation. 
 
Feminist political ecology is useful in this study to illuminate gendered relations both within 
and beyond the household, as well as the impacts of PAs on gender roles, particularly in 
everyday life. 
 
Study area 
This study was conducted in three villages bordering the Kilimanjaro NP (in the Siha 
Magharibi Division) – Engare Nairobi, Matadi and Namwai; and three villages bordering the 
Enduimet WMA (in the Enduimet Division) – Tingatinga, Olmolog and Sinya. These villages 
are located in the West Kilimanjaro basin, in the Siha and Longido districts of the 
Kilimanjaro and Arusha regions respectively. The altitude of the area is 1,230 to 1,600m 
above sea level. The area experiences bi-modal rainfall. The long rains last from March to 
May, while short rains fall from November to December. In 2009, the population of the Siha 
and Longido districts was 121,000 and 96,244 respectively, while that of the three study 
villages of the Kilimanjaro NP was 23,411 and that of the Enduimet WMA was 12,922. 
 
Kilimanjaro National Park  
The Kilimanjaro NP was established in 1973 with an area of 753.81km
2
. The park is 
surrounded by the Kilimanjaro Catchment Forest Reserve that was established in 1940 
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covering an area of 1,078km
2
, with a boundary length of 238km, encompassing three districts 
(Hai, Moshi Rural, and Rombo) in the Kilimanjaro region. There is a Half Mile Forest Strip 
(HMFS) with an area of 87.69 km
2
 and a width of 0.8km, around most of the forest reserve 
that was approved in 1941 by the British colonial government as a buffer zone between the 
forest reserve and the villages on the lower slopes of the mountain. This buffer zone provides 
local people with wood and non-wood forest products (Kivumbi and Newmark 1991)
2
. 
Between the forest reserve and the villages in northwest Kilimanjaro, there are patches of 
forest plantations (60.19km
2
) established in 1954 by the British colonial government and 
expanded after independence in 1961 for the production of timber and poles (TASONABI 
2001). The forest reserve borders 90 villages, with 70 villages being adjacent to the HMFS.  
 
Before 1998, forests in Tanzania were managed centrally by the Forest and Beekeeping 
Division (FBD) under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Their management 
was ineffective, thus leading to continued deforestation. In response to the situation, a new 
forest policy was released in 1998. It promotes, among other things, the involvement of local 
people in the management of and benefits arising from forest products (URT 1998a). Based 
on this experience of involving local people, Joint Forest Management (JFM) was introduced 
to the Kilimanjaro Catchment Forest Reserve, to allow access to forest resources. In 2001, the 
United Nations Development Program/Global Environmental Facility Small Grants Program 
conducted an aerial survey that revealed major threats to Mt. Kilimanjaro (Lambrechts et al. 
2002: 5). The survey report initiated a process to include the forest reserve in the Kilimanjaro 
NP (Agrawal et al. 2003; UNESCO 2011). Thus, in 2005, the forest reserve (formerly 
managed by the FBD) was officially gazetted as part of the Kilimanjaro NP (GMP 2006). 
 
The three selected villages in the Kilimanjaro NP are located close to one of the routes 
leading to Mt. Kilimanjaro, called Londros. They are occupied by the Chagga, Safa and Pare 
tribes, and other small ethnic groups. Most villagers are small-scale farmers, small-scale 
livestock keepers, small-scale business people, casual labourers, and tourists‟ porters. Some 
people practice the taungya system
3
 in the forest plantation, and some are labourers in the 
                                                          
2
The north western side of the forest reserve, including the study villages, does not have a HMFS. 
3
Taungya is an agroforestry system in which short-term food crops are grown in a forestin the early years of tree 
growth (Mongo 2007). 
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forest plantation and/or large-scale farmers. The villages border the Endarakwai Ranch, the 
National Ranching Company, the Kilimanjaro NP, the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation, 
and agricultural plantations. In the private Endarakwai Ranch and the Kilimanjaro NP, people 
are prohibited from harvesting natural resources such as fodder, firewood, and plants for 
traditional medicine. 
 
The division of labour in these villages is strongly gender based. Women are responsible for 
all domestic tasks such as caring for children, collecting fodder and firewood, fetching water, 
preparing meals, and farming. Young girls assist their mothers with household chores and 
farm tasks. Men concentrate mainly on income related activities such as casual labour, 
employment, farming, the timber/logs business, and assisting tourists as porters. Due to 
unequal power relations between men and women, women are forced to do activities that do 
not involve cash benefits, such as community work, and household chores.  
 
 Moreover, women‟s participation in decision-making and village leadership is limited to 
village government membership and not top leadership. The village chairpersons and 
executive officers in the villages studied are all men. In the village government there are 10 
female members out of 25 in Engare Nairobi, 7 out of 25 in Namwai and 12 out of 25 in 
Matadi. However, some women stated that although they are village government members, 
their views are often not taken seriously and the sole decision makers are men. Most 
household heads are men
4
 and very few women are public employees. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 1: A map locating the study villages in West Kilimanjaro, Tanzania  
 
Enduimet Wildlife Management Area 
The Enduimet WMA is a community-based conservation area that covers 742,275km
2
. It was 
established following a wildlife survey report in 1997 that revealed a decline in the wildlife 
population due to bush meat „poaching‟ (Nelson 2007). A Community-based Organisation 
(CBO) was established in 2004 to manage the area, with 27 members (9 women and 18 men). 
                                                          
4In this study a „household head‟ refers to a person who controls the maintenance of the household and exercises 
the authority to run the household. 
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The Enduimet WMA is divided into three management zones by the Monduli District 
Authority in order to regulate land use. These zones are the Olkunonoi-Kitendeni Zone (a 
wildlife corridor), the Ronjoo Zone (an area for economic and tourism activities covering 
80% of the WMA), and the Embarnati Zone (settlement area) (RMZP 2005). 
 
The Enduimet WMA acts as the migratory route to various PAs such as the Kilimanjaro, 
Arusha, and Amboseli national parks. Due to the movement of wildlife in the region, cases of 
wildlife damage are common, such as crop raiding, killing of livestock, and threats to human 
life in villages located in close proximity to these PAs.  
The three selected villages in the Enduimet WMA are occupied mainly by the Ilkisongo 
Maasai who are pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. The Maasai are „well known for their 
strong socio-cultural practices and norms that govern all dimensions of their community‟ 
(Ngoitiko 2008:3). They are very patriarchal, with women generally being regarded as 
inferior, without „property ownership rights, access to social services, and the power to make 
decisions on their own lives‟ (Ngoitiko 2008: 2). Men own the livestock and can make 
decisions about selling them and spending the money without the involvement or consent of 
their wives (Interview no. 19, Sept. 2009).  
 
The division of labour in these villages is also gender based. Men are responsible mainly for 
livestock grazing and protection. Women are responsible for all domestic tasks, including 
building bomas(huts), milking cows, collecting water and firewood for domestic use, 
cooking, looking after children, growing crops in small fields for basic food supply, partly 
taking care of small livestock, and preparing young girls for marriage (Kipuri and Ridgewell 
2008). Some women also make bead jewellery which they sell to tourists, markets or 
wholesalers. Very few women engage in small-scale business, politics, or public 
employment.  
 
Employment and leadership are considered to be activities mainly for men. The Maasai elders 
are highly respected, and are considered to be decision makers. In all the villages studied, the 
chairpersons and village executive officers are men. In the village of Sinya, for example, only 
six members out of 26 in the village government are women. Men generally do not associate 
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with women, but uncircumcised boys may mingle with women. Most men who own many 
cows practice polygamy because they are capable of paying a „bride price‟ of up to 40 cattle. 
 
In most Maasai communities the female literacy rate is lower compared to their male 
counterparts. This is because many girls are forced into early marriages, have heavy 
workloads, and lack support for education. Many young women do not generally attend 
meetings. Due to strong cultural constraints, very few women, mostly the „modern‟ and non-
Maasai women, are confident enough to speak during group meetings in the presence of men.  
 
Methodology 
Fieldwork was conducted in different periods between 2009 and 2014. Interviewees were 
chosen purposively based on gender, living proximity to the PAs, and dependence on PAs. 
Data were collected on the gender-based division of labour, power relations, access to 
resources at the household level, livelihood activities, access to natural resources, costs of 
conservation, benefits received from the PAs, and livelihood alternatives. Interviews were 
conducted in Kiswahili, a language in which most people in the study area are fluent. The 
interviews involved 41men and 50 women. The sample size was limited when further data no 
longer added new insights in answering the research questions. The interview sessions lasted 
between one and two hours. Participants were encouraged to express themselves freely, and 
they were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality. Although I used a Maasai man as a 
research assistant to assist me when interviewing Maasai men, very few Maasai men felt free 
to discuss gender matters. 
 
Six focus group discussions (three from each PA) were conducted, generally with 6 to 10 
people, in order to gather various viewpoints on how men and women are impacted by PAs. 
This method was mainly a triangulation tool used to determine the representativeness of the 
answers obtained during the interviews. At first, the focus groups included both men and 
women. However, in these groups, few women felt free to express their views in the presence 
of men. Thus, in order to provide an opportunity where both men and women could express 
themselves freely, I conducted groups that involved men alone, women alone, and both men 
and women. Separating men and women enabled me to understand, for instance, how 
traditional power relations have prevented women from airing their concerns; how leadership 
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dominated by men has curtailed women‟s development such as training and employment; and 
why women have limited power over household resources. Nevertheless, some women were 
still reluctant to express their concerns in groups where powerful women such as political 
leaders were present. In these cases, I followed up with key informants or/and other group 
discussions. 
 
I attended a women‟s meeting in the village of Tingatinga where I learned and observed 
various issues surrounding women and their environment. A few women from wealthy 
families dominated the meeting. I also attended a village assembly in Engare Nairobi, where I 
gained insights on relationships between men and women, and conservation issues. At this 
meeting, some women contributed, although most of the discussions were dominated by men. 
I further engaged in participant observation and informal interviews in order to learn about 
local people‟s everyday activities in relation to the PAs. 
 
Finally, I reviewed relevant documents and several other studies that have been conducted in 
the area. I used a field notebook to record information, and where permission was granted, I 
used a tape recorder. After data collection, all recorded data were transcribed, later organised 
into categories, and grouped into themes. The identified core themes were linked to the aims 
of the study, and these served as the basis for my findings and discussion, presented below. 
Statements supported by appropriate quotations from the interviews are provided where 
necessary, to elucidate the particular theme. 
 
Impacts of the expansion of protected areas on gender 
The analysis of field data revealed five main themes: impacts on access to natural resources, 
impacts associated with illegal entry and/or withdrawal of natural resources, impacts on 
human-wildlife conflicts and living costs, impacts on relationship between communities and 
protected areas‟ staff, and livelihood alternatives. A description and discussion of each theme 
is presented in the following sections and the summary of the impacts is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 about here 
Table 1: Overall gender impacts associated with the expansion of the Kilimanjaro NP 
and the creation of the Enduimet WMA 
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Impacts on access to natural resources  
Following the inclusion of the forest reserve in the Kilimanjaro NP, the reserve became a „no 
use‟, „no entry‟ zone. Access to, and the withdrawal of natural resources was prohibited, as 
one man explained: 
When we were under Forestry and Beekeeping Department (FBD) we had a very 
good system. If a villager wanted firewood for cooking, we paid US$3 for a tractor 
full of firewood. We were also allowed to cut grass, collect firewood, and some other 
forest products twice a week. All are now restricted. (Interview no. 1, Nov. 2009)  
 
The change in user rights was made without the full involvement and awareness of all 
community members. It was a top-down exercise, with no space for representation of the 
ideas and interests of the communities. The park staff did conduct random household surveys, 
in which they talked to household heads who were mainly men (cf. NBST 2002).Unclear user 
rights led some women to continue with their former routine of withdrawing resources from 
the forest, as they had done under the previous FBD regime (Interview no.4, Nov. 2009). 
Several studies have revealed that almost all decisions concerning the management of 
wildlife resources in Tanzania are made by the central government, without consultation with 
the affected local communities (e.g. Mariki 2013; Nelson 2007; Neumann 2004). 
 
The creation of the Enduimet WMA has restricted men and women in terms of the amount 
and type of subsistence natural resources they may collect, and the numbers of livestock that 
may graze in the area. For example, grazing high numbers of livestock (conducted mainly by 
men
5
) is restricted in the WMA. Charcoal burning, the collection of firewood for sale, 
farming, tree cutting, and sand or gravel extraction are all prohibited to both men and women. 
Only collection of dry twigs and branches (done mainly by women) for firewood is allowed 
for household purposes.   
 
Although the land devoted to the WMA belongs to villagers, men and women do not have 
any power to negotiate on resource use in the WMA. This indicates that the government has 
stretched its powers and authority to control what are claimed by government to be „village 
                                                          
5
 The Maasai keep large numbers of livestock; thus they practise open grazing. 
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resources‟. The women interviewed claimed to have become victims when restrictions were 
imposed because they lack alternative income sources (Interviews no.38, 2009; 43, 2012).  
 
Men and women are affected differently in terms of access to natural resources, according to 
their economic situation. For instance, in Kilimanjaro NP, the well-off women are less 
affected by resource restrictions because they can afford to buy fodder, firewood or rejected 
timber from industries, which is not the case for the poor counterparts. The poor men and 
women expose themselves to more risks as they enter the forest illegally to collect fodder and 
firewood for sale or for household use (Interview no. 18, 2009). West Kilimanjaro has several 
sawmills (e.g. Tanscan Timber Co., Fadhila Sawmill, Vijana Sawmill) due to the presence of 
the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation. In the sawmills, timber splitting is done twice a year. 
The owners sell the rejected timber to local people for activities such as cooking, as stated by 
one well-off woman: “I don‟t go to the forest because I don‟t want to fight with park rangers. 
I buy the rejected timber for cooking from that sawmill!” (Interview no. 17, Nov. 2009). 
However, because timber production in the plantation is low (Interview with plantation 
management, 2012), rejected timber is very expensive and affordable by few people. The 
villagers claim that the rejected timber is not readily available because business people 
purchase it and sell it in nearby towns. One full truck of rejected timber was sold for about 
US$ 200 (Interview with plantation management, 2012).  
 
Women in female-headed households are affected more by resource restrictions than women 
in male-headed households. This is because many female-headed households lack sufficient 
labour power, relatives willing to help, and some are old and sick and thus have less energy. 
As one old widow expressed it: „I cannot walk long distances, I might have food but lack 
firewood to cook it…‟ (Interview no. 43, 2012). Another woman stated that: I have a relative 
willing to help but the help is occasional... (Interview no. 44, 2012).Very few such women 
can afford to buy fodder and firewood, and thus many walk longer distances in search of 
these resources. Consequently, this situation increases their workload, and limits their time 
for household chores, participation in income generating activities, and educational or 
training opportunities (cf. Cecelski 1995; Clancy et al. 2003). 
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Some families in the vicinity of the Kilimanjaro NP have their own plots that provide fuel 
wood and fodder.  However, women are not allowed to harvest any tree without their 
husband‟s permission. They may only access those branches that are unfit for sale, after the 
harvest. 
 
Impacts associated with illegal entry and/or withdrawal of natural resources 
Firewood is the main source of energy in the villages studied (cf. Monela 1989). Mongo 
(2007) found that about 92% of households in three districts (Moshi Rural, Hai and Rombo) 
adjacent to the Kilimanjaro NP depend on firewood as their main source of energy. The 
buffer zone (half-mile forest strip) provides 64% of firewood; while own plots, the buffer 
zone, and the forest reserve provide about 61% of fodder (Mongo 2007). These findings show 
that people from the three districts enter the forest reserve to supplement their collection of 
forest products, despite having the buffer zone. The consequence of a lack of a buffer zone in 
West Kilimanjaro is high and exposes men and women to more risks when compared to local 
people in other parts bordering the Kilimanjaro NP. Possible explanations for the lack of a 
buffer zone in West Kilimanjaro might be the presence of agricultural plantations bordering 
the natural forest dating from the 1950s. The villages that border the plantations were 
established in the 2000s. During inclusion of the forest reserve into the Kilimanjaro NP, the 
park promised to demarcate a buffer zone for local people, but the promise seems 
improbable. 
 
The findings of this study show that, if they access forest products from the Kilimanjaro NP, 
men and women run the risk of severe punishment from park rangers. Women‟s gender roles 
bring them into contact with the PAs often and thus they are at a high risk of violent action 
from park rangers. Women in the Namwai village for instance, informed me that there is no 
dead wood in their village; they sometimes have to walk deep into the forest and are afraid of 
being raped or tortured by the park rangers (Interview no.12, Nov. 2009). Some women 
claimed to be harassed, beaten, raped, had their tools confiscated by park rangers, and some 
suffered a miscarriage, as one stated: The problems we are facing are rape and beatings when 
we go to the forest to collect firewood and fodder. Three women went to the forest and they 
were raped... (Interview no.2, Nov. 2009)  
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These claims are not reported to the village government because victims know that entering 
the Kilimanjaro NP is illegal. The village chairperson asserted that: “I heard those claims but 
no one so far has reported to me because they are afraid. Nothing we can do, there is so much 
harm …” (Interview no.3, Nov. 2009). However, the Kilimanjaro NP Protection Warden 
denied such claims: “…there is no such a thing, it has never happened!” (Interview no.6, Dec. 
2009).  
 
It is not only women who suffer, but men are also sometimes severely beaten by park rangers. 
No man without a permit found in the forest by park rangers would leave unbeaten (Interview 
no. 15, Nov. 2009). Even if a victim surrenders, it was reported that park rangers keep on 
beating him, as one man stated: 
About a month ago (in 2009) a man was caught in Kilimanjaro NP trapping an 
animal…. They beat him until he became unconscious. They used knives to cut his 
feet. It was a very brutish action... When they beat you it is not a joke! (Interview no. 
9, Nov. 2009) 
After such beatings, the victim is taken to court; and depending on the magnitude of the 
offence, he can be imprisoned or fined. 
 
Consequently, men have developed a fear of going into the forest because they are not sure 
whether they will come back alive or not, as one man expressed: 
Men were afraid of grazing livestock in the forest during the drought period because 
some people were found dead. There was not enough evidence of who killed them. 
This year [2009] one young man was killed and the body stayed two weeks in the 
forest. We went and collected the bones. The park rangers took the bones, and they 
have never returned them. They said they were going to check them in the laboratory. 
Then another one was killed, but there was no direct evidence. It is terrifying! 
(Interview no. 13, Dec. 2009) 
 
The above findings indicate that park rangers are involved in unethical and improper 
implementation of protection activities, and they even violate human rights. Similar excessive 
use of force against local people has been reported by Pettersen (2010) who recorded that 
park rangers shot and killed a person in the Kilimanjaro NP. Elsewhere in Tanzania, several 
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allegations of harassment of local people in the process of the expansion and establishment of 
PAs have been made (e.g. Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Adams and Hutton 2007; 
Brockington and Igoe 2006; Neumann 2004). Similar findings were reported in India, in 
Uttarakhand (Ogra 2008) and Gujarat (Sarin et al. 1998), and in Nepal (Mahat 2006).   
 
Men are often killed because they fight back in the event of torture. Instead of reasonable 
force, park rangers respond with excessive force. In addition, there is evidence of the practice 
of the inherited protectionism philosophy of „shoot and kill‟, where traditional hunters pay 
with their lives. Veit and Benson (2004) exposed a case in the Serengeti NP in Tanzania, 
where park rangers found 19 traditional Kurya hunters in the park; ten escaped, one was 
wounded, and eight were executed (See also Neumann 2004). 
 
In the Enduimet WMA, notably in the villages of Tingatinga and Ngereyani, both men and 
women go into the bush to burn charcoal. When game scouts find them, their kilns are 
destroyed, their tools are confiscated, and they are later punished by the village government 
according to bylaws (Interview no. 23, Sept. 2009). Several studies in Africa (e.g. Amanor et 
al. 2005) reveal that it is mostly men who conduct charcoal burning. This study found that 
both men and women participate in the practice, with men‟s kilns being bigger (50-60 
charcoal sacks) than those of women. Men who participate in charcoal burning are mostly 
outsiders with only a few being from the villages. Women burn charcoal as an economic 
alternative to supporting their families, mainly after severe droughts or crop raiding by 
wildlife (Interview no. 23, Sept. 2009). Charcoal is sold mainly to neighbouring centres such 
as Namanga, Oldoinyosambu, Sanyajuu and Bomang‟ombe. Charcoal burning is claimed to 
be labour intensive and time consuming, yet it offers very low returns. This is because it 
holds risks, and sometimes men and women are injured in the process of fleeing from game 
scouts. Charcoal burners in the area are considered to be a nuisance and enemies of the 
environment. In the interviews I conducted, women avowed to know the effects of burning 
charcoal on the environment, but several of them said that they have to continue because 
viable alternatives are lacking (Interviews no.21&23, Sept. 2009). 
 
The Enduimet WMA zoning system (RMZP 2005) restricts the numbers of livestock allowed 
to graze in the area and livestock entry into tourist investors‟ blocks. Such restrictions have 
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caused local people to think they made a mistake in accepting the WMA concept, and men 
are querying the reason for imposing these restrictions (Interview no. 20, Sept. 2009). 
However, according to the data gathered from interviews, there were no reported cases of 
men being caught while grazing livestock illegally in the WMA. 
 
Impacts on human-wildlife conflicts and living costs 
The creation and expansion of PAs have created a conducive environment for wildlife to 
thrive. In both PAs in this study, wildlife movements have increased, thus exacerbating 
problems for local people, as one woman expressed: “Wild animals destroy our crops so 
much. If you dare to say or complain they tell you, you are living in wildlife corridor. ...We 
are not allowed to kill them or beat them” (Interview no. 18, March 2010).The wildlife 
authorities do not allow people to kill crop raiding animals or depredating animals, as one 
woman lamented:“…. They have stopped us from killing the wild animals when they eat our 
crops or kill our livestock, how does the CBO expect us to survive?” (Interview no.21, Sept. 
2009). Lerkelund‟s (2011) study in the Kilimanjaro NP yielded similar findings, namely that 
park rangers forbade local people to chase wildlife away from their farms because the 
animals would get high blood pressure. This attitude reflects a conservation bias in which 
biodiversity conservation is afforded higher priority than the needs of the local people. 
 
Men and women share responsibility for guarding their farms during the night from crop 
raiding wildlife, although most of the responsibility lies with men. Women interviewed 
reported that crop raiding affects family wellbeing and it affects them more than men as one 
stated: “...at home when a child is hungry it cries to the mother for food, not to the father” 
(Interview no. 29, Sept. 2009). The effects of crop raiding differ from one family to another. 
This is because some families have farming plots in the forest plantation that are rarely 
affected by crop raiding animals, and some families have money to purchase food. 
 
As wild animals move between the PAs, they not only raid crops, but also kill people and 
livestock. There have been several reports of people killed by wildlife, mainly men and 
mostly by elephants in the evening or at night. For instance, from January through August 
2009, in the Enduimet WMA, three men were attacked by elephants, and two by buffaloes. 
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This reduces freedom of movement when men may need to stay outside later, for various 
reasons such as guarding crops and livestock grazing (Focus group, Nov. 2009).  
 
The depredation of livestock in the area reduces the economic status of men. For instance, 
from January to August 2009, and from July to October 2010, 298 livestock were killed in the 
Enduimet WMA, and between March and August 2011 about 106 cattle in the village of 
Olmolog were killed by hyenas (ranking the highest), leopards, and lions. The increase in 
wildlife numbers has caused competition with livestock and people for water; this affects 
men because of grazing their livestock, and women fetching water for domestic use. Wildlife 
species like elephants have increased the workload of women because when they destroy 
water pipes, women have to walk longer distances to fetch water.  
 
In terms of increased living costs, the price of firewood has increased tremendously because 
the sellers (poor men and women) collect firewood in harsh conditions (Interview no.11, 
Nov. 2009). The lack of availability of these products has increased the time spent and labour 
required of individuals seeking such resources. Women in the village of Engare Nairobi 
claimed to use up to five hours per day searching for firewood and fodder which affects their 
back and chest (Interview no.7, Dec. 2009). Similar findings have been reported in Nepal 
where women walk over 20 km per journey searching for firewood (Mahat 2006). 
 
The Wildlife Act of 2009 provides for consolation payments in case of crop raiding, death, 
and depredation of livestock (URT 2009). However, until 2014, no consolation amounts had 
been paid to local people in West Kilimanjaro, nor had any mechanisms or policies been put 
in place to mitigate negative impacts. Local people wonder why they are not being 
compensated for conservation costs, as one woman questioned: “Do elephants have owners? 
Why we are not compensated when wild animals kill people and livestock, eat and destroy 
our crops? The problems remain to our children and us...” (Interview no. 28, Sept 2009). The 
government officials in the region and district offices claimed that the consolation payment 
process needs to pass through several levels of bureaucracy, which delays the outcome. 
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Impacts on relationship between communities and staff in protected areas 
The inability to access natural resources, harassments and punishments, and the lack of 
positive interaction between PA staff and communities, has led to hatred and enmity between 
them. Both men and women interviewed perceived PA staff as their enemies, as one man 
stated: “...Kilimanjaro NP work like military army...we see them as our enemies…there is 
nothing good coming from them. They are only increasing our problems...”(Interview no. 8, 
Aug. 2011). 
 
The park rangers ignore village leadership and handle matters themselves when they catch 
someone in the forest. Female victims are harassed, and males are taken directly to the 
district court after being beaten. The village government claimed that they obtain information 
on arrested individuals only later, from the affected family (Interview no.14, Aug. 2011). 
Although the park has promised to involve local people in park management (GMP 2006: 
125), this is not happening in practice. 
 
Due to enmity and resentment, men and women oppose conservation goals by increasing 
their illegal activities, and sometimes even collaborating with poachers (Interview no.14, 
Aug.2011).  For instance, in November 2014, Maasai pastoralists burnt 16 tourist tents to 
ashes, and 9 vehicles in the Endarakwai wildlife ranch due to conservation related costs 
(Interview no.1&2, Nov.2014). In 2009, villagers in Engare Nairobi protested against 
conservation initiatives by killing six elephants by forcing them over a cliff (Mariki et al. 
2015). Similar cases have been reported, for example, in Indonesia (Li 2007), Guatemala 
(Meyerson 1998), and Kenya (Western1994). 
 
In the Enduimet WMA, both men and women claimed to have been forced by the 
government and the African Wildlife Foundation to consent to the establishment of the 
WMA. They see the WMA as a form of exploitation. Both men and women expressed their 
hatred on game scouts as a result of the punishments they endure when they are caught in the 
WMA. They see the WMA as something that belongs completely to the government, as one 
man stated: “the government claimed to give us authority over WMA but what is happening 
is the government managing the WMA. We are complaining − we don‟t know where to go” 
(Focus group, Sept. 2009). 
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Who is more impacted by protected areas?  
As described above, both men and women suffer the consequences of restrictions on access 
to natural resources. However, women are more affected, due to inequality in the division of 
labour and resources at the household level (cf. Ogra 2008; Sarin et al. 1998). Several 
interviews revealed that most men do not bother about issues pertaining to household energy 
requirements as much as women do: “…men do not think about challenges we encounter to 
get firewood... When they arrive home they just need cooked food, and they might be angry if 
you delay serving food” (Interview no. 52, Aug. 2011). Established traditions, especially in 
the Maasai community, do not allow men to assist women in activities such as collecting 
firewood, fetching water, or preparing meals. 
 
Firewood collection is not only labour intensive, but it puts women at risk of violent acts, 
sexual assault, backache, exhaustion, falls and mental stress. Moreover, the activity is time 
consuming which restricts women‟s participation in education, development activities, 
decision-making activities, and having the opportunity to rest. In some instances, the burden 
placed on girls keeps them out of school, hampering their education, thus exacerbating 
gender inequalities. On the other hand, costs incurred by men such as fines, imprisonment, 
beatings or death, affect the welfare of the whole family. The family is also affected when 
there are delays in the provision of food, or meals are skipped as a result of time spent by the 
women searching for firewood.  
 
The increase in wildlife numbers due to successful conservation measures means that wild 
animals tend to move outside the PAs. As a result, they kill people (mostly men), and 
livestock which affects the economic status of men. Wild animals also raid crops, which 
affects both men and women. The destruction of water infrastructure affects both men and 
women, but again, women suffer significantly since the collection of water for all domestic 
activities depends on them. 
 
Well-off men and women suffer less compared to their poorer counterparts. They are capable 
of buying fodder and firewood, which is not an option for the poor. The poor men and 
women are forced to spend more time and labour in collecting natural resources, which 
affects their health and restricts their time available for participation in economic activities or 
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training/educational opportunities (cf. Cecelski 1995; Clancy et al. 2003). Households with 
farming plots in the forest plantation have access to firewood during pruning and harvesting 
periods. Also, families with bigger farms can plant trees, thus increasing their possibilities for 
access to firewood.  
 
There are various differences between the conditions and restrictions in the two PAs. In the 
Enduimet WMA, about 26 Maasai men are employed in tourist camps, and 45 as game 
scouts. Some women sell handcrafts. In addition, women are allowed to collect firewood for 
household use. For the period of four years (2008 to 2011), each village received a share of 
tourism revenue for community development projects of about US$9,851. In the Kilimanjaro 
NP, the park has not employed any villager in the three selected villages. The park‟s outreach 
programme supported only the Matadi Secondary School in 2002/03 to construct a water 
intake and storage tank worth US$13,571. However, natural resource access in the park for 
livelihood purposes is completely prohibited.   
 
 Restrictions: Are there alternatives? 
In the case of both PAs investigated in this study, resource extraction continues illegally, 
despite its many dangers, as one interviewee asserted: “ is it possible for a poor person to live 
next to the forest without a buffer zone and watch the forest without resource extraction? 
…Obviously resource extraction will occur illegally ...” (Interview no. 9, 2011). Another 
stated without hesitation: “We still collect firewood, fodder and traditional medicie from the 
forest clandestinely … because there is no other solution” (Interview no. 19, Dec. 2009). The 
charcoal burning continues to be conducted illegally in the Enduimet WMA. Also, „illegal 
hunting‟ is still practised in some villages, mostly by non-Maasai men, as a source of finance 
and protein (Interview no. 50, Nov. 2009). 
 
Firewood is provided freely by the Kilimanjaro forest plantation during the pruning and 
harvesting season, but it benefits only those people with plots in the forest plantation, and 
then only during the short periods when pruning or harvesting is conducted. Some people 
who have an income manage to buy fodder and firewood. Others supplement firewood with 
maize husks, sawdust and kerosene for the provision of household energy. 
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Lack of subsistence alternatives, has led many families to continue practising farming 
regardless of crop raiding animals that pose a significant constraint to farming attempts. In 
order to protect crops, people still guard their crops at night and sometimes kill problem 
animals (Interview no. 20, Nov. 2009). Furthermore, the increase in costs as a result of 
conservation, and lack of livelihood and subsistence alternatives, has sometimes led local 
people to resist conservation initiatives, using overt or covert methods (See Mariki et al. 
2015). 
 
Conclusions  
This article has used insights from feminist political ecology to examine gender impacts 
associated with conservation through land appropriations. The findings have revealed how 
changes in resource access and control, as a result of land appropriation by powerful actors 
(the State and conservation agencies), have impacted men and women in rural Tanzania. The 
approach has been useful in illuminating the injustices and struggles of both men and women 
in the process of trying to sustain their everyday life in the midst of changes in resource 
access and control (Rocheleau et al. 1996). Further, it has shed light on how access to and the 
control of resources are affected by the social construction of gender, as well as power 
relations and authority that are embedded in formal and informal institutions(cf. Rantala et al. 
2013). The discussion of the micro-politics of everyday natural resources access and control 
has offered a hint of understanding into the broader macro-political forces at work in natural 
resources conservation. This investigation of everyday gender experiences of conservation in 
west Kilimanjaro shows the mismatch between the rhetoric and practice of conservation− and 
the challenges in combining conservation and development agendas.  
 
The main impacts identified in this study include those associated with natural resource 
restrictions, illegal entry into PAs, human-wildlife conflicts, increases in living costs, and 
poor relationships between PA staff, and men and women. These findings dovetail with the 
growing body of literature on the gendered impacts of conservation initiatives (e.g. Sarin et 
al. 1998; Coad et al. 2008; Ogra 2008). 
 
There are variations between the two PAs studied. In the Enduimet WMA, men and women 
have access to natural resources for household use, and derive some direct and indirect 
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benefits from tourism activities, while in the Kilimanjaro NP, resource access is denied and 
local tourism benefits are minimal. The PAs impact both men and women, but the most 
significant impact is felt by women due to inequality in the gendered division of labour and 
resources at the household level. Further, poor men and women are stricken more severely 
since they lack livelihood and subsistence alternatives. In addition, women in female-headed 
households are affected more than their counterparts in male-headed households.  
 
This study found that the PAs‟ attempt at benefit sharing as compensation for resource 
restrictions does not meet the felt needs of men and women. The PAs function in such a way 
that they have aggravated people‟s workloads and risks, instead of addressing community 
interests, paying attention to relevant livelihood needs, or improving wellbeing.  
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Figure 1: A map locating the study villages in West Kilimanjaro, Tanzania  
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Table 1: Overall gender impacts associated with the expansion of the Kilimanjaro NP 
and the creation of the Enduimet WMA  
 
 Women Men 
 
Restricted 
access to 
natural 
resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firewood (increased time, labour, 
health effects− miscarriage, chest, 
back pains, falls); 
Fodder (increased time, labour, 
health effects− miscarriage, chest, 
back pains, falls); 
Loss of livelihoods (selling 
firewood, fodder, charcoal); 
Physical impacts (harassment, tools  
confiscated, rape, beatings);  
Psychological effects (fear, stress); 
Increased cost of living (buying 
fodder, firewood). 
 
Loss of source of income (selling 
fodder, firewood, charcoal, honey, 
wildlife meat); 
Loss of source of protein (traditional 
hunting); 
Physical impacts (beatings, death, 
imprisonment); 
Psychological effects (fear, stress); 
Increased cost of living (fines, buying 
fodder, firewood). 
 
Human-
wildlife 
conflicts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crop raiding (food insecurity, 
economic loss, increased 
agricultural labour); 
Livestock killings, injuries 
Destruction of water infrastructure 
(increased labour and time to 
search for water); 
Psychological impacts (fear); 
Limited freedom of movement at 
night; 
Sleepless nights (guarding crops); 
Fencing (increased time, labour, 
resources); 
Increased living costs (buying food, 
buying materials for mitigation 
measures, paying for guarding 
crops when time is not available). 
 
Crop raiding (economic loss, increased 
agricultural labour); 
Human injuries, death; 
Livestock killings, injuries (income 
loss); 
Sleepless nights (guarding crops); 
Psychological impacts (fear); 
Limited freedom to stay outside at 
night; 
Destruction of water infrastructure; 
Increased living costs (buying food, 
buying materials for mitigation 
measures, paying for guarding crops 
when time is not available). 
Relationships 
with PA staff 
Enmity Enmity  
 
Source: Fieldwork data 
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Introduction 
The Tanzanian government introduced the notion of Wildlife Management Areas 
(WMAs) in the late 1990s. The WMAs were presented as means to obtain a 
combination of wildlife conservation and rural development. On the one hand, 
the WMAs were seen to improve conservation by introducing land use 
restrictions on village land. On the other hand, this new type of environmental 
protection were intended to create economic benefits from which a substantial 
amount would be allocated to local communities (URT 1998). Management of 
WMAs is placed at the local level, as co-operation between several villages. 
Together with sport hunting, safari tourism is presented as the main source of 
revenues for WMAs.  
This chapter provides a case study of Enduimet Wildlife Management Area. It 
was formally established in 2007, and involves nine villages west of the 
mountain Kilimanjaro, in the Longido District in Arusha Region (Figure 1). We 
mainly focus on safari tourism in Enduimet and in particular on the system of 
collection and distribution of tourism revenues. Thus, we provide a comparison 
of how revenues ideally should flow through the system, and what happens in 
practice. This revenue flow starts when tourists make their payments to safari 
companies. It continues in terms of fees from the companies to a state office, 
moves on to various public entities, before some of the revenues finally goes to 
the involved villages (see Figure 2).  
Furthermore, we discuss the amount of benefits that reaches the local 
communities in the light of claims about the win-win outcomes of WMAs 
presented by conservation organizations, some donors and the government. We 
conclude that the benefits received in the villages are modest. This is particular 
so when taking into account the uncompensated costs that some villagers have to 
bear in terms of increased crop damage, livestock loss, and loss of human lives 
caused by increasing wildlife populations. Thus, our study questions the idea that 
Enduimet WMA secures a sustainable source of income for local communities 
from safari tourism.  
We also focus on transparency. Mismanagement and corruption represent 
threats to the revenue shares received by local communities in WMAs as well as 
in many other cases of conservation-based tourism. In recent years, several 
studies have reported extensive corruption and misuse of revenues in the wildlife 
sector in Tanzania (see e.g. Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Nelson 2010).  
Therefore, in order to secure benefits for local communities, revenue flows 
ought to be transparent. However, as we will show, our examination of the 
revenue sharing system in Enduiment WMA exposes a lack of transparency, 
which involves the whole wildlife sector in Tanzania. 
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In the following, we will first situate the case study in relation to the notion of 
‘ecotourism’ and the recent literature on conservation as ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. Thereafter, we briefly go through the history of WMAs in 
Tanzania as well as the particular history of Enduimet WMA, before we present 
the methods applied in the study. In the main section presenting the results of the 
study, we first provide an overview of the revenue flow and identify where in the 
system there is lack of transparency, before we go into details about the various 
parts in the revenue flow. Finally, we compare costs and benefits for local 
communities within Enduimet WMA.  
Ecotourism and conservation as accumulation by dispossession  
‘Ecotourism’ is defined in various ways in the literature. It has, for instance, been 
framed broadly as ‘tourism that involves traveling to relatively undisturbed or 
uncontaminated areas with the specific objective of studying, admiring, and 
enjoying the scenery and its wild plants and animals, as well as any existing 
cultural manifestations (both past and present) found in these areas’ (Ceballos-
Lascurain, 1991:25). Following this definition, ecotourism has been presented as 
the fastest growing economic sector in the world, growing three times faster than 
the general tourism industry and representing 6% of the world gross domestic 
product and 11.4% of all spending (Honey 2008). 
However, ecotourism is usually defined more narrowly. The International 
Ecotourism Society restricts the term ecotourism as ‘responsible travel to natural 
areas that conserves the environment and improves the well-being of local 
people’ (TIES 1990). Similarly, Boo (1992) defines it as nature tourism that 
promotes conservation and sustainable development (see also Ziffer 1989:6). 
Thus, ecotourism is considered to be a tool for biodiversity conservation as well 
as for economic development. It is often argued that ecotourism has the ability to 
generate local economic benefits, while also maintaining ecological integrity 
through low-impact, non-consumptive use of resources (Stem et al. 2003).  
Nevertheless, a number of case studies point at a variety of reasons that 
presumed ecotourism sites often fall short of these double objectives of 
biodiversity conservation and local economic development (Duffy 2002; Rutten 
2002). Ecotourism is not an apolitical activity, but involves political choices by 
interest groups who cater for tourist services (businesses, governments and 
NGOs) (Duffy 2002). Many argue that nature-based tourism is often neither 
ecologically nor socially sustainable, yet it is regarded as a strategy for 
biodiversity conservation and economic development (West et al. 2006; West 
and Carrier 2004). 
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When we in this chapter apply the term ecotourism in Enduimet WMA, we do 
this based on statements that Enduimet and WMAs in general represent cases 
where conservation and local economic benefits from tourism are to be 
combined. For instance, Tanzania Natural Resource Forum presents ecotourism 
in WMAs as ‘a natural partner for communities… that brings new income 
(employment) and other benefits to communities…’ (TNRF 2011:41). Thus, 
when we discuss ecotourism in Enduimet WMA, it is not as an endorsement of 
the community benefits associated with safari tourism in Enduimet. Our use of 
the notion ‘ecotourism’ rather reflects an often-stated aim associated with 
substantial parts of the safari business in Tanzania. 
The idea of ‘ecotourism’ is closely related to a win-win discourse on protected 
areas that consists of three main elements. First, contributors to the discourse see 
it as important that people in and around conservation areas participate in the 
management of these areas. Second, local people are argued to benefit 
economically from conservation. Third, the ultimate aims of the discourse 
producers are to conserve areas and biodiversity, and local participation as well 
as community benefits are seen to serve as means to achieve these aims 
(Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010; Tumusiime and Svarstad 2011).  
In sharp contrast to this win-win discourse, current critics of conservation 
practice see this practice as a form of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ following 
Harvey (2003). Recently, several conservation initiatives have been studied using 
this framework (Büscher 2009; Li 2010; Corson 2011; Kelly 2011; Benjaminsen 
and Bryceson 2012). Through the combination of conservation and tourism, non-
capitalist spaces and resources are opened up for the accumulation of capital by 
some powerful actors. Local people may be seen to be in the way of such 
investments. Thus, sometimes people are expelled from the areas, other times 
they may continue to live there, but get their livelihoods severely restricted. 
Hence, the win-win discourse may constitute a tool for the extraction of revenues 
from these spaces, while local resource users lose control over spaces and natural 
resources. The presentation in this chapter of the flow of revenues from safari 
tourism in Enduimet WMA shows that this cannot be seen as a case of 
ecotourism in the sense of a win-win between conservation and local economic 
benefits. Instead we found it to be a case in line with the notion of accumulation 
by dispossession. As shown by Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012), the process of 
accumulation by dispossession in wildlife management in Tanzania may be slow 
and incremental, for example as in Enduimet WMA, but it is also occasionally 
violent, as in Loliondo (Gardner 2012) and in Makao WMA (Nkwame 2011).  
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The history of Wildlife Management Areas in Tanzania and of 
Enduimet WMA 
In 1998, the Tanzanian government launched a new Wildlife Policy, which 
focused on the rights of rural communities to benefit from wildlife conservation, 
and the role that wildlife management could play for rural development. Three 
years earlier, the Wildlife Sector Review Task Force had concluded that ‘…local 
communities who live amongst the wildlife should derive direct benefit from it’ 
(WSRTF 1995). It called for devolving wildlife user rights and management 
responsibilities to communities and suggested the creation of Wildlife 
Management Areas (WMAs) as a means of pursuing conservation and rural 
development goals. The policy of 1998 stressed that conservation outside 
protected areas must generate benefits at the community level. To create local 
conservation incentives, it called for ‘conferring user rights of wildlife to the 
landholders to allow rural communities and private land holders to manage 
wildlife … with the aim of ensuring that wildlife can compete with other forms 
of land use’ (URT 1998:13-14). The policy also stressed that through WMAs 
‘local people will have full mandate of managing and benefiting from their 
conservation efforts’ (URT 1998:29). In late 2002, the government released the 
Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations and, in January 
2003, it formally launched the WMA process.  
Hence, WMAs were the main tool proposed to implement the new approach to 
provide a win-win between wildlife conservation and community benefits. These 
areas were proposed as community-run conservation areas, where several 
villages would come together and set aside land for wildlife conservation. In 
return, the villages would receive a certain proportion of the tourism revenues 
from these areas. In early 2012, there were 22 WMAs in Tanzania in various 
stages towards formal establishment. The number of villages in each WMA 
varies from 2 to 30. 
The main aims of WMAs were to conserve wildlife corridors, migration 
routes, dispersal areas, and buffer zones, and to ensure that local communities 
obtain substantial tangible benefits from wildlife conservation (URT 1998). 
There are, however, also certain restrictions put on local resource use in WMAs 
through the establishment of land use zones where agriculture and sometimes 
grazing are prohibited. Safari tourism and sport hunting are frequently presented 
as forms of ‘ecotourism’ (see e.g. Rees 2007; Hillstrom and Hillstrom 2003; 
Novelli et al. 2006), which represent the main sources of revenue in the WMAs.  
In the 1990s, Tanzania’s tourism industry grew by over 10% per year for 
almost a decade (World Bank/MIGA 2002). The industry contributed 12% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2001, which increased to 16% in 2004 and 
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17.2% in 2007 (Lyimo 2009; Michael 2009). The number of international tourists 
increased from 300,000 in 1995 to 770,000 in 2008 (Tarimo 2009).   
Enduimet WMA lies on the western side of Mount Kilimanjaro in Longido 
District on the border to Kenya. The WMA covers an area of 742 km
2 
combining 
land from eight villages in two wards: Sinya, Tingatinga and Ngereyani in 
Tingatinga Ward, and Elerai, Olmolog, Lerang’wa, Kitendeni and Irkaswa in 
Olmolog Ward. In addition, Kamwanga village in Olmolog Ward is also part of 
the WMA, despite not having suitable land to set aside for wildlife conservation 
and tourism. By adding the village populations for 2010 of the nine member 
villages of Enduimet WMA, we found that the total population in 2009 
constituted around 45,000 people. 
Enduimet has been presented as constituting an important transnational 
migratory route and dispersal areas for several wildlife populations including 
elephants (Muruthi and Frohardt 2006; Madulu et al. 2007; Honey 2008; Kikoti 
2009; Trench et al. 2009). A wildlife survey conducted by elephant researchers 
from the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and national and district wildlife 
authorities concluded that there is a decline in wildlife populations due to bush 
meat poaching (Madulu et al. 2007; Nelson 2007). Based on these conclusions, 
the Wildlife Division proposed to establish a WMA in the area. The AWF was 
approved by the Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism to be the facilitator 
of the process. In 2004, the Enduimet Community-Based Organisation (CBO) 
was established to manage the area, and in 2007 this organisation was officially 
declared as an Authorized Association (AA) by the Minister, and granted user 
rights in the WMA based on a Resource Management Zone Plan. At that time the 
WMA consisted of only eight villages, but in 2010 Sinya village also joined after 
initially refusing to do so due to a range of concerns (see Benjaminsen and 
Svarstad 2010). The Enduimet CBO is made up of three representatives from 
each village, two men and one woman, chosen by the village assemblies. Thus, 
with the nine villages, there are 27 CBO members. They choose their chairman, 
secretary and treasurer and form various committees. 
An interesting aspect with the establishment of the Enduimet WMA is that 
according to national policy documents, WMAs are supposed to be ‘community-
based’ and meet community needs. Nevertheless, the process of establishing 
Enduimet WMA did not come from the villages, but it was initiated and carried 
out by external actors constituted by the state government and the AWF. The 
AWF is a US based NGO with its main office in Washington DC. 
 
[Figure 1 in about here] 
Figure 1: Enduimet Wildlife Management Area  
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Methodology 
In order to describe and analyse the revenue flows, we carried out 71 informant 
interviews with various actors along the revenue chain. All these interviews were 
qualitative, semi-structured and prepared specifically for each interviewee. Thus, 
we met with people within all safari companies that at the moment operate in 
Enduimet. Furthermore, we talked with state officials at village, district, regional 
and central government levels. In addition, we interviewed leaders of the 
Enduimet Community-Based Organisation, many villagers as well as NGOs 
involved in Enduimet WMA. Besides, we collected and examined relevant legal, 
policy and project documents. On this basis, we identified how revenues are 
supposed to flow through the system and the various percentages that are to be 
distributed to different beneficiaries, and we identified where there is economic 
information available and what information that is not available in the system. 
Thus, we have ended up with a flow chart (Figure 2) and a description of 
available data of how revenues move through the system.  
Fieldwork was conducted in different seasons and periods of time during 
2008-2012. The languages used in the interviews were either Swahili or English. 
We asked for and were, with few exceptions, allowed to use a tape recorder as a 
means to obtain precise information.  
Revenue flows and transparency 
In the following we present the findings of how revenues are collected and move 
through the system down to the nine villages in Enduimet WMA. We start with a 
description of the main elements of the system and our assessment of its 
efficiency and transparency, as illustrated in Figure 2. If tourism in Enduimet is 
to be seen as a win-win between conservation and local economic benefits, the 
benefit sharing system must ensure an effective and transparent way to channel 
money from tourism to the villages. Furthermore, the amount of money received 
by the villages should be higher than the costs associated with increased wildlife 
populations, as well as compared to the administrative costs of managing the 
WMA.  
However, based on an examination of revenue flows, we conclude that the 
system is not transparent. The lack of access to relevant information makes it 
difficult to assess the revenue flows in detail. The issue of transparency became 
clear from the considerable work we have had to carry out in order to identify the 
revenue flows. We also found that how the system in general works is not known 
to the various actors who take part in the chains of transactions.  
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[Figure 2 in about here] 
Figure 2: Flow chart of revenues from tourism in Enduimet Wildlife 
Management Area. 
 
Starting on top of Figure 2, part of the payments from tourists to private travel 
and accommodation companies include fees to the office of the Wildlife Division 
(WD) in Arusha. The WD is one of the divisions under the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, and it is led by the Director of Wildlife. The WD 
headquarters is located in Dar es Salaam. We have not been able to obtain data 
on what safari companies earn, only what they pay in fees to the WD. 
The total list of safari tourist companies was not immediately available, so we 
had to spend time to establish this list including contact information for the 
companies. While these companies were generally willing to provide us with 
information, we were not able to obtain specific data from all of them about the 
number of bed nights, game drives, camping and vehicle entries. The companies 
are required to transfer fees to the WD every other week.  
In our case study, the main focus is on safari tourism. The revenue from 
hunting companies received by the Enduimet CBO from the WD office is very 
small. This revenue is mixed with safari tourism revenues before distribution to 
villages. We tried to obtain information on fees paid to the WD by the two 
hunting companies that operate in Enduimet, but the WD office in Arusha did not 
wish to provide any such information. One of these companies, Old Nyika 
Safaris, was willing to share some financial information with us, while Northern 
Hunting Enterprises declined to disclose any such information. At the Wildlife 
Division office in Dar es Salaam, we also experienced a certain unwillingness to 
share information about financial flows passing through its office.  
Within the Enduimet CBO on the other hand, there seemed to be full openness 
about money flows. According to the Wildlife Utilization Regulations of 2008, 
CBOs in WMAs are to receive 65% of revenues collected by the Wildlife 
Division, and half of this is to go to the villages of the WMA. However, due to 
lack of transparency in the chain of transactions, it is impossible for the CBOs 
and the villages in the WMA to know whether they actually receive what they 
are entitled to according to the regulations.  
Tourist companies and their local contributions 
In this section we introduce and discuss the activities of the safari companies that 
operate in Enduimet WMA. We show what types of fees they pay after the 
establishment of the WMA, as well as what some of the companies used to pay 
directly to some of the villages. Furthermore, we also show that some of these 
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companies are involved in voluntary support of projects in local communities. 
Since there is a lack of transparency about various aspects, we are not able to 
provide a full picture here of the revenue flows. 
Enduimet WMA is situated in Tanzania’s northern tourist circuit. Although 
many tourists fly in to Kilimanjaro International Airport, which is not far away, 
most of them head for some of the most famous sites, such as Serengeti National 
Park, Ngorongoro Conservation Area or go hiking on Mount Kilimanjaro. The 
manager of one company operating in Enduimet told us that their visitors tend to 
be experienced travellers who are out for experiences outside the most common 
destinations. Another operator said that many of their clients were elderly 
Americans. 
As mentioned above, tourist revenues in Enduimet WMA come from safari 
tourism on the one hand, and hunting tourism on the other. In 2011, Old Nyika 
Safaris was the only hunting company that operated in Enduimet WMA, and only 
in the southern part of the area. Northern Hunting Enterprises used to hunt in the 
area until 2010. From 2007 to August 2011, the Enduimet CBO had received 
only 17,273 USD (22,944,000TSH) from hunting tourism. Out of this 8,106 USD 
came from Old Nyika Safaris, while for the remaining, the source was not 
indicated. In this chapter we concentrate on analysing safari tourism, although, as 
shown in Figure 2, the revenue flows are to some extent handled together. Safari 
tourism is an activity that in itself often is seen as relatively harmless to the 
environment, so that if the activity also provides benefits and economic 
development for local communities, it can be seen to be in line with the restricted 
notion of ecotourism. 
There are only two tourist lodges in Enduimet WMA today. One of them is 
located in Elerai village. The lodge is called both Kambi ya Tembo (meaning 
‘Elephant Camp’) and Elerai Tented Lodge. This lodge is owned by the company 
Tanganyika Wilderness Camps and Lodges. Many visitors here have made their 
travel arrangements through Kibo Guide Tanzania Ltd. Both these companies are 
owned by the same three individuals; Willbard Chambulo who is of German-
Maasai origin and who holds 60% of the shares, and two Spaniards, Julio Teigell 
and Nuria Panizo, who hold 20% of the shares each.  
Kambi ya Tembo was first established in Sinya village in 2001.Tourist 
companies had started to visit this village for camping, nature walks and game 
viewing in 2000. These companies used to pay the village about 10 to 20 USD 
per person per night. One of the companies, Kibo Guide Tanzania Ltd, entered 
into a formal contract with the village to establish a tourist camp. From this 
agreement, Sinya received more than 30 million TSH (approximately 30,000 
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USD
1
) annually between 2001 and 2004 (Honey 2008; Trench et al. 2009; Sulle 
et al. 2011). This money together with tourist donations supported social services 
such as construction of new classrooms and dormitories, but some funds are also 
claimed by representatives from the government, NGOs and safari companies as 
well as by some villages to have been mismanaged by the village leadership.  
However, between 2001 and 2005 a conflict emerged involving Northern 
Hunting Enterprises and Kambi ya Tembo. Northern Hunting Enterprises is a 
hunting company owned by the Tanzanian-Asian entrepreneur, Mohsin 
Abdallah, commonly known as Sheni. Abdallah is known to have close allies in 
government and the ruling political party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). He also 
sits on the Board of Directors of Tanzania National Parks. 
Some villagers worked together with Kambi ya Tembo to block Northern 
Hunting Enterprises from the northern part of the village land, because they 
claimed the company was not beneficial to them. Thus they drafted several letters 
to higher wildlife authorities (Honey 2008). But Northern Hunting Enterprises 
had a legal permit to hunt in the whole area. Furthermore, according to tourist 
hunting regulations of 2000, tourism activities in a hunting block is not allowed 
without permission from the Director of Wildlife (URT 2000). On the other 
hand, the village had a land title deed according to the Village Land Act No.5 of 
1999. The case was tried in court. Kambi ya Tembo was accused of carrying out 
tourism business illegally in the hunting block, and Northern Hunting Enterprises 
won. In 2005 Kambi ya Tembo therefore had to leave Sinya and moved to the 
neighbouring village of Elerai. From 2005 to 2008 Kambi ya Tembo paid Elerai 
village for staying in their village and Sinya village for game drives on their land 
(see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1 Direct village income from Kambi ya Tembo and Hoopoe Safaris 
 (2005-2009) 
 
  Kambi ya Tembo 
[USD] 
 Hoopoe Safaris (Sulle et  
al. 2011) [USD] 
Year  Elerai Sinya  Olmolog 
2005  16,540 13,087  8,610  
2006  17,480   8,602  8,130  
2007  27,528 30,350  8,130  
2008  23,017 22,234  8,439 
2009  16,745 -  7,692 
Source: Tanganyika Wilderness Camps and Sulle et al. 2011 
 
                                                 
1
  1 USD was equivalent to 1,000 TSH at the time. 
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At the end of 2009, the direct payments to the two villages were stopped as 
Kambi ya Tembo instead was required to pay directly to the Wildlife Division 
according to the Non-consumptive Tourism Regulations of 2007. By December 
2011, Kambi ya Tembo had 14 luxury tents that could accommodate 28 tourists. 
The camp paid the Wildlife Division office in Arusha 15 USD per bed-night per 
day, 20 USD per tourist as conservation fee, and 15 USD as concession fee. The 
prices paid by tourists range between 250 and 350 USD per day depending on the 
travel agent that booked the safari. The number of tourists varies from 700 to 
1,000 per year. In 2010 and 2011, Kambi ya Tembo paid the Wildlife Division 
office in Arusha 76,375 USD and more than 66,185
2
 USD, respectively (see 
Table 2). Before this centralization of the collection of fees from tourists, Kambi 
ya Tembo used to pay Sinya and Elerai villages together up to 57,878 USD in 
one year (see Table 1). 
In addition, Kambi ya Tembo has assisted Sinya village to build two 
classrooms, a village office, a primary school dormitory and a dining hall; and 
Elerai village to build a nursery school, two classrooms, a primary school dining 
hall, a kitchen, and a dispensary. Also the company has assisted the villages in 
providing transport in emergency cases such as when villagers fall sick, or when 
pregnant women need to go to the hospital to deliver. The camp has 24 workers 
of whom 70% are Maasai. 
Shu’mata Camp is located on the village land of Sinya, and started operating 
in 2010. The camp is owned by a couple, Marlies (German-Namibian) and Jörg 
Gabriel (German), who also run the Hatari Lodge (opened 2004) just outside the 
nearby Arusha National Park. Prior to Shu’mata Camp, Hatari Lodge had 
brought visitors to Sinya (and some other parts of Enduimet) for game drives. 
Due to the wildlife potential in Sinya, Marlies and Jörg Gabriel decided to build 
the Shu’mata Camp through contractual agreement with the village3. On their 
webpage, they describe a trip for the guests to Shu’mata Camp as ‘an exclusive 
bush experience’ and ‘an add-on to their stay at the Hatari Lodge’ 
(www.hatarilodge.com). Shu’mata Camp had in 2011 five luxury tents, which 
was an increase from four tents in 2010. In 2010 and 2011 they had an estimated 
600 and 700 to 800 bed-nights, respectively. The cost for one night is more than 
600 USD (including meals, drinks, game drives, transport etc). The camp had in 
2011 16 staff, of whom 10 were from Sinya village. The wage levels per person 
range between 70 and 100 USD per month (Interview with member of Enduimet 
CBO,June 2012). 
                                                 
2
  The June-August fees were not available. 
3
  At that time Sinya village had refused to be part of WMA. The Sinya village joined WMA in 2010. 
After this, Shu’mata Camp was required to have a contract with the WMA and not the individual 
village. 
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According to information from Shu’mata, this camp paid 15,555 USD in 2010 
and 19,660 USD in 2011 to the Arusha office of the Wildlife Division (see table 
2). Before the company started paying the WD, it had given Sinya village about 
1,000 USD to repair a village water pump machine, and the village had also 
received diesel several times for a water pump (Interview Sinya Village 
Executive Officer, October 2009). Other direct income to the village includes 
visits to Maasai bomas where tourists spend about 25-30 USD including buying 
some handicrafts. In addition there are in-kind benefits from donations from 
tourists such as provision of solar lamps to households, donations to the school, 
to the clinic, and to a water project with the help from a company in Germany. 
 
 
Table2  Payments from Shu’mata Camp and Kambi ya Tembo to the Wildlife 
Division in 2010 and 2011 
 
 
Sources: Interviews at Shu’mata in May 2012 and Tanganyika Wilderness Camps office in April 2012. 
*Income for ten months only. 
 
 
There are also some other safari companies that so far had occasional activities 
such as game drives, mobile tents, and horseback riding that bring tourists to 
Enduimet WMA and pay fees for this to the office of the Wildlife Division in 
Arusha. These companies include Kilele Savannah, Safari Express, Tierhilfe Ltd, 
Tanzania Travel Company, Access Tanzania, Exuetria Safari, Makoa Farm 
Horseback Riding Safaris and Endarakwai Ranch Camp. In 2009 and 2010, 
Makoa Farm Horseback Riding Safaris paid the Wildlife Division, but Enduimet 
Community-Based Organisation did not receive its share from the Wildlife 
Division (interview with Enduimet CBO representative in June 2012). After 
Enduimet CBO complained to the WD, it received 7,500 USD in 2011 and 3,000 
USD in 2012 (Enduimet CBO Administrator, October 2012). The specification 
of revenue collected from other less frequent companies was not given to us by 
the WD office in Arusha, and in the WMA’s financial documents the companies 
are grouped together as ‘photographic tourism’ and the names of the companies 
are not known by representatives of Enduimet CBO. According to financial 
documents of Enduimet WMA from 2011, Enduimet CBO received two transfers 
of 13,180 and 2,540 USD for ‘photographic tourism’ from January to August 
2011. 
    2010 USD)    2011 (USD) 
Shu’mata Camp 
 
15,555           19,660 
Kambi ya Tembo 
 
76,375     66,185* 
Total 
 
91,930             91,635 
65% of Total   59,755          59,563 
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Another source of income for Enduimet WMA is the Olpopongi Maasai 
Cultural Village. This is a visitor centre with a Maasai boma, museum and 
overnight facilities. It is located in Tingatinga village, but outside the WMA. It is 
owned by a German named Tom Kunkler. His professional focus is marketing, 
advertising, and product sourcing. He runs several projects in the Kilimanjaro 
region. In 1997, Tingatinga villagers were looking for an investor for their 
village. Tom Kunkler was invited through a villager who knew him. Negotiations 
were made between the village government and Mr Kunkler. Land was provided 
by the village government, and the construction started in 2009. In 2011 the 
cultural village started to operate and by August 2011 the village had received 
cash benefits of one million TSH (667 USD
4
) in addition to in-kind benefits from 
tourist donations such as school books, sport equipment, medicines and 
equipment for the village dispensary. Other villages and the leadership of 
Enduimet WMA started complaining that it was not fair that Tingatinga received 
all the benefits from this cultural village. For instance, it was argued that Sinya, a 
village contributing all of its best land to the WMA, ought to benefit from the 
revenues from Olpopongi. The Arusha office of the WD then sent its staff to 
Tingatinga and demanded payments to be channelled through its office and not 
through the village. The reasons given were to protect the WMA concept, to 
hinder other villages with tourism potential to imitate and do the same, and to 
stop conflicts within the WMA (Enduimet CBO chairman, August 2011; 
Tingatinga village chairman August 2011). By September 2012, the CBO 
administration was not sure which company name the Olpopongi Maasai 
Cultural Village was using to pay the WD. Previously, the administration of 
Enduimet CBO had contacted the WD office about the same matter with no 
success (Enduimet CBO Administrator, October 2012). 
During 2002-2009 the Hoopoe Safaris Company had a small tented camp in 
Olmolog village that they called Hemingway’s Camp. They also made plans to 
build a five star hotel in Olmolog. A contract was made for this with the same 
village in 2004, and the African Wildlife Foundation participated in negotiating 
this contract with Olmolog. There were also discussions with the WMA in 2008-
9, but the company withdrew and the plans were dropped in the second half of 
2009. The investors withdrew because they experienced the process as ‘too 
cumbersome, fraught with tensions between village interests and the overall 
WMA interests’, and because there were added costs imposed by the revenue-
sharing arrangements and fee schedule produced by the Wildlife Division (Sulle 
et al. 2011:13). We also learned from interviews that the financial crisis might 
                                                 
4
  1 USD was equivalent to 1,500 TSH. 
14 
have had an impact as well as considerable delays by the National Environment 
Management Council in carrying out the environmental impact assessment.  
Hoopoe Safaris owns and runs Kirururmu Tented Lodge located near Lake 
Manyara, and the company also has seasonal mobile tented camps in Serengeti 
and Tarangire National Parks and in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. On its 
website (http://www.hoopoe.com/aboutus.htm), Hoopoe states that it is ‘proud to 
be the preeminent luxury camping outfitter in East Africa’. As the first African 
tour operator, Hoopoe Safaris won an award in 2004 called ‘The Condé Nast 
Traveller Ecotourism Award’. It presents itself as ‘dedicated to the protection of 
the environment by supporting effective community partnerships and sustainable 
tourism projects’. Hoopoe Safaris was founded in 1988 and is headed by Kenyan 
born Peter Lindstrom and the Tanzanian Maasai and previous senior ranger of 
Tanzania National Parks, Steven Laiser (Hoopoe Safaris, n.d.).  
From the contract with Hoopoe Safaris, Olmolog village earned about 10 
million TSH (~8,800 USD
5
) annually (Sulle et al. 2011) to be shared among 676 
households (4,522 people) in 2009. That would be some 13 USD per household 
or about 2 USD per person. Besides, the company employed local Maasai, 
assisted the village in social services such as construction of two classrooms and 
two teacher houses. It also paid school fees to some students in the village, and 
continued with this also after stopping working in Olmolog. The company did 
not disclose their revenues earned. 
Gane & Marshall is a wildlife travel company with its head office in the UK 
that provides tailor-made holidays to several places in Tanzania as well as at 
wildlife destinations around the world. The company also has had some activities 
in the Enduimet area, but has backed out after the WMA was established. They 
put up a mobile tented camp in Tingatinga village, but is believed to consider the 
fees too high after the establishment of the WMA (CBO chairman interview, 
September 2009).  
Hence, these are some examples of how the introduction of WMAs and the 
centralization of the collection of fees from safari companies have put off some 
companies resulting in reduced tourism activities in some areas. The photo safari 
companies currently operating in Enduimet seem all to present themselves as 
conducting ecotourism in terms of being concerned about the environment as 
well as community development. They also state that the fees to be paid are very 
high compared to the revenues. They feel that the funds reaching the villages 
through the current centralized and non-transparent system are insufficient. The 
                                                 
5
  1 USD was equivalent to TSH 1,100 (2005); 1,200 (2006-2007); 1,170 (2008); 1,300 (2009); 1,400 
(2010). 
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companies pay their fees to the WD office in Arusha. There are several fees the 
companies ought to pay after every two weeks as indicated in Table 3. 
Furthermore, the payment of fees to the Wildlife Division in Arusha and the 
transfer of part of these funds back to Enduimet and further to each village 
appear as an inefficient arrangement. Several of our interviewees in villages as 
well as in the tourist companies have expressed views that confirmed an 
impression of inefficiency and high transaction costs. This arrangement also 
reduces the level of local benefits from tourism.  
As mentioned, some tourist companies argue that the fees they have to pay 
have reached a level that causes them to reduce their activities in the area. From 
one of the companies, for instance, we were told that due to high fees, their 
earnings in the area were only enough to pay the bills. Thus, they argued that 
they did not make any profits. When the companies had individual deals with 
villages before the establishment of the WMA, they used to pay 10 USD per 
tourist for game drives and 10 USD per tourist per bed-night. Under the fee 
structure of Enduimet WMA, the companies pay up to 50 USD per tourist as 
conservation fee, concession fee and bed-night fee, in addition to 5,000 USD that 
the Enduimet CBO charges as a security bond
6
. Another company told us that 
they thought the fees were too high for investors in WMAs that are just starting 
up their businesses. We also learned that some see these fees as fitting better the 
levels of income in the most visited areas such as Serengeti National Park. The 
relatively high level of fees may thereby reduce the potential for a sustainable 
tourist industry including tangible local benefits in an area such as Enduimet.  
The companies have to pay concession fees annually directly to Enduimet 
CBO. By March 2012 the Enduimet CBO had not as yet received any concession 
fees from the companies. From January 2012, the contracts between Enduimet 
CBO and investors were made official by the Ministry, and companies were 
required to sign and start paying to the Enduimet CBO. On May 8, 2012, a 
ceremony for the signing of contracts between investors (Kambi ya Tembo and 
Shu’mata Camp) and Enduimet CBO was organized by the WD. Representing 
Shu’mata Camp, Jörg Gabriel, however, declined to sign, due to what he 
perceived as a confusing process with lack of information ahead of the ceremony 
and a contract with several unclear points that had not been negotiated in advance 
and was presented only in English version. One key issue for Shu’mata Camp is 
security of the investments, which the owners did not feel that they had with the 
standard contract from the WD that was presented to them. Since Sinya owns the 
                                                 
6
  This is the security of the community-based organization in case the investor terminates the contract 
before its full term or damages the environment. 
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land, Shu’mata Camp also wanted to have a land lease with Sinya village and not 
with the community-based organisation on behalf of nine villages. 
The Wildlife Division in Arusha 
The Arusha office of the WD handles affairs dealing with hunting, photographic 
tourism, and CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Wild 
Fauna and Flora) in northern Tanzania. The Non-consumptive Tourism 
Regulations of 2007 regulate non-consumptive tourism outside national parks 
and game reserves. According to these regulations, tour operators should pay 
their fees directly to the WD office instead of to village councils. The 
justification presented by the government for these new regulations was to 
protect local people from being treated poorly and unfairly by tour operators, and 
to make sure all villagers benefit and not only an elite. But clearly, the new 
arrangement also works as a mechanism for the government to have a share of 
the revenue. The fees specified by the new regulations for non-consumptive 
tourism in WMAs are as indicated in Table 3. 
 
 Table 3 Non-consumptive wildlife utilization fees in Wildlife Management Area 
 
 Adult >18 years (USD)  5-17 years (USD) 
Game viewing per day   20   10 
Camping (established camp)   30  15 
Fly camp   20  10 
Night game drive  100 50 
Vehicle entry fee per day (in USD) 5-30 (depend on tare weight) 
Professional filming/ 
cinematography (in USD)  
100-200 (depend on number of days) 
Walking safari  50-100 (depend on number of people) 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania 2007 
 
As shown in Figure 2, Enduimet CBO is supposed to get 65% of the total 
income paid by safari companies to the WD, while 20% remains with the WD 
and 15% goes to Longido District Council. The WD in Arusha did not want to 
disclose to us how much they have received from the tourist companies in 
Enduimet. Instead, they only provided data on how much they have transferred to 
Enduimet CBO from photographic tourism. Safari companies started paying the 
WD office in Arusha from the second half of 2009 in response to the Non-
Consumptive Tourism Regulations of 2007. In 2010, the yearly payment from 
the WD office in Arusha to Enduimet CBO was to the amount of 45,941 USD 
(Table 4). Based on what Kambi ya Tembo and Shu’mata Camp paid to WD 
office in Arusha in 2010 (76,375 and 15,555 USD respectively, see Table 2), the 
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65% that Enduimet CBO was entitled to that year amounts to at least 59,753 
USD. As shown above, Makoa Farm Horseback Riding Safaris also paid the WD 
in the same year, without the WD channelling any money to the WMA. Hence, 
based on this simple calculation from one selected year, we see that the WD 
office transferred substantially less than the amount Enduimet CBO is entitled to 
receive. 
 
Table 4 Income to Enduimet WMA from photographic safaris  
 
2009   2010 
Month    Amount (USD) 
 
Month           Amount (USD) 
Jul –Aug. 15,210 
 
Jan-Febr 2,486 
Sept.-Oct. 1,573 
 
Mar.-Apr. 1,086 
Nov.-Dec. 17,852 
 
May-June 374 
   
Jul.-Aug. 24,307 
   
Sept-Oct 3,967 
   
Nov-Dec 13,722 
Total 34,635     45,941 
 Source: Wildlife Division in Arusha, August 2011 
The Wildlife Division’s main office in Dar es Salaam 
WD is one of the divisions under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
led by the Director of Wildlife. It is the main office that deals with wildlife 
outside national parks and in Ngorongoro Conservation Area. The division is 
stated to be ‘the leading light in the management of Tanzania's wildlife resources 
and their associated habitats for their sustained and equitable use for the benefit, 
welfare and enjoyment of the generations of citizens of Tanzania and the world 
heritage at large' (AWD, 2012). According to the WMA Regulations of 2005, the 
Director of Wildlife will facilitate the initiation process for the designation of 
WMAs, facilitate the gazettement of WMAs, oversee the performance of 
Authorized Associations (e.g. Community-Based Organisations), set and allocate 
animal quotas, approve prospective investors, designate tourist hunting blocks, 
issue hunting permits, provide support in the protection and utilization of natural 
resources, facilitate development activities, and determine the continuation of 
WMAs. In addition, the Director of Wildlife issues circulars indicating the 
benefit sharing arrangements in WMAs. This office and the one in Arusha are the 
only offices for the collection of revenues from wildlife tourism outside the 
national parks and Ngorongoro Conservation Area. The Arusha office collects 
tourism revenues for the northern part of the country, while the headquarters in 
Dar es Salaam collects revenues for the southern part of the country. The office is 
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the overseer of the conservation of all wildlife in the country other than national 
parks and Ngorongoro Conservation Area. The main sources of funding are from 
the Central Treasury, Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund (TWPF) and donor 
support. The funds are used for the management and protection of wildlife, 
salaries, transport and equipment (Mabugu and Mugoya 2001). 
The Ministry of Finance 
The Central Treasury receives 25% of sport hunting revenues from Wildlife 
Management Areas. It also receives its share from other protected areas (game 
reserves, game controlled areas) where hunting is conducted. This share is 
transferred to the treasury by the WD through the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Tourism. According to the WMA Guidelines of 2003, the Director of 
Wildlife should consult the Treasury and get any benefit sharing arrangements 
approved first before issuing circulars for benefit sharing in WMAs.  
The Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund 
This fund was established by Act of Parliament No. 21 of 1978. It receives 20% 
of safari tourism revenues and 25% of sport hunting revenues from WMAs. The 
fund is managed by a Board of Trustees comprised of the heads of various 
agencies and other persons (Mabugu and Mugoya 2001). The director of the fund 
declined to share any information with us about revenue flows passing through 
this office. 
The District Council of Longido 
The Longido District Council’s role is to provide technical advice to Enduimet 
CBO. The Council receives 15% of safari tourism income and 15% of sport 
hunting revenues. When villages had individual deals with safari companies, the 
District Council used to get the following revenue from these companies (Table 
5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
Table 5 Photographic revenue distributed to the Longido District Council and 
villages from July 2008 to March 2009 
From Lodge/Camp Year Month Income (USD) 
   
District Village 
Hoopoe Adventure Tours Ltd 
(Hemingway Camp) in Olmolog village 
2008 July-Dec    668  1,336 
Elerai Tented Lodge/Kambi ya Tembo 
    in Sinya village 
2008 Aug-Dec 6,774 13,548 
2009 Jan 1,129  2,258 
Makoa Farm in Tingatinga village 2009 March      80     160 
 
Source: Longido District 2009 
The management of revenues in Enduimet Wildlife Management 
Area 
The WMA Guidelines of 2003 state that: ‘the primary beneficiary of WMAs 
shall be the villager in the village(s) forming the Authorised Association (AA)’ 
(URT 2003: 32). The benefit sharing arrangements in a WMA include both 
financial resources, as well as employment opportunities. The WMA Regulations 
state that: ‘benefit sharing shall comply with circulars issued by the Government 
from time to time’ (URT 2002: 32, URT 2005: 32). According to the regulations, 
the shares received by WMAs should be 65% of what has been paid to the 
Wildlife Division of fees for safari tourism and 35% of what has been paid for 
sport hunting. Photographic and hunting revenues from Enduimet are collected 
by the WD in Arusha before funds are channelled back to Enduimet WMA.   
This revenue sharing set-up clearly lacks transparency. The CBO office in 
Enduimet is not able to access information about how much is paid by safari 
companies to the WD. Hence, they are not in a position to know whether 
Enduimet CBO actually gets what it is entitled to. In an interview with us, a WD 
official in Arusha responded to this issue by saying that ‘the CBO can check the 
data by using game scouts to inspect the tourist vehicles’ and that ‘they can 
benefit if they control the tourist statistics’ (WD representative, September 
2009). On hunting companies, the WD representative stated that ‘after we have 
received the information from hunting companies on type and number of animals 
hunted, and rates, we analyse how much should be allocated to the Central 
Treasury, the Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund, the CBO, and the District 
Council.’ Because analysis and revenue distribution to various actors are done by 
separate individuals at different ranks, the official stated that ‘I cannot give you 
the information of our analysis because what actually goes to villages sometimes 
does not match our analysis’ (WD representative, August 2011). 
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Table 6  Enduimet WMA income (photographic and hunting revenues) per year from 
2007 to 2011
7
 
Date Amount (USD) 
2007 11,729* 
2008 19,539 
2009 35,522 
2010 55,721 
2011  104,960 
(Source: Field data) 
*The income supported game scouts salaries for six months, meetings and office equipment. 
 
In 2011, it seems the income almost doubled compared to 2010. According to 
information from the administrator of Enduimet CBO, the reasons were that the 
less frequent companies paid almost half of the total revenue. For instance as it 
was stated earlier, the CBO received about 7,500 USD from Makoa Farm 
Horseback Riding Safaris through the WD. From the income the WMA received, 
the distribution at CBO level is supposed to be as follows: 15% is reinvested in 
conservation, 50% is divided between the member villages, 25% go to the 
management of the CBO and 10% is allocated where the CBO deems it needed 
(URT 2005: 32). The 10% of the Enduimet CBO share is allocated to support 
secondary school student fees of the children whose parents cannot manage to 
pay. The fund allocation seems to be done in a fair way with equal chances for all 
member villages. 
The revenues provided for each village 
The Enduimet WMA member villages are each supposed to get 3.6% of the 
income from photographic tourism fees (i.e., 32.5% totally shared by nine 
villages) and 1.94% (17.5% for nine villages) of sport hunting fees. As shown in 
Table 7, by August 2011, villages had received five payments. According to the 
information from the villages and Enduimet CBO, it seems that the villages had 
received the amounts they are entitled to from Enduimet CBO, except in 2007 
when the income to the CBO was used to cover game scout salaries, meetings 
and office equipment.  
Income received by some villages in Enduimet does not correspond to their 
tourism potential, amount of land contributed and conservation costs. Under the 
current benefit sharing arrangement some villages have increased their income, 
while other villages that previously had private deals with safari companies have 
                                                 
7
  For the whole year of 2010 until August 2011, the records of Enduimet CBO show that it received 
about 7,920 USD (12 million TSH) from Old Nyika Safaris hunting company. 
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lost out. Sinya village for example, through an individual tourism venture with 
Kambi ya Tembo, used to earn more than 30,000 USD per year. But currently the 
village receives about 1/12 of what they used to earn.  
 
 
Table 7 Income distribution by Enduimet CBO to villages from 2008-August 2011 
Date No. of villages Income per village in USD  
2008 8 1,966 
2009/2010 8 2,998 
2010 9 1,320  
24/1/2011  9 2,025 
1/8/2011 9 1,542 
Source: Field data,  
Note: on average a village has some 700 households. 
 
 
Revenue received by the villages has been used mainly to support social 
services such as school infrastructure, paying school staff, and water provision. 
For instance, Sinya village received 2,000,000 TSH (1,320 USD) for the first 
time under the WMA in 2010. It allocated 500,000 TSH (330 USD) to Enduimet 
CBO education fund (10 pupils from Sinya village are supported by this fund)
8
, 
and provided funds for renovation of two class rooms, payments to a watchman 
and a matron in the primary school, and payment to a nursery school teacher.  
What are the local costs of the Wildlife Management Area? 
The costs borne by communities in WMAs include opportunity costs, which are 
equal to the value of alternative use such as cultivation. Other costs are 
associated with restrictions on the kind and amount of resources that may be 
withdrawn from the area after creation of the Enduimet WMA. The protection of 
the area has caused wildlife numbers to grow leading to increased incidences of 
crop raiding, destruction of water taps and cattle troughs, livestock losses, losses 
of human lives as well as injuries and threats to human lives (see also Trench et 
al. 2009, Minwary 2009). On crop raiding one woman complained: ‘When we 
plant, our crops are eaten by wildlife. They (the CBO) stop us from killing the 
wild animals when they eat our crops, or kill our livestock. They have stopped us 
                                                 
8
  The 500,000 TSH (330 USD) from each village, together with the 10% (of 65% safari tourism and 
35% sport hunting) of the Enduimet CBO share, forms the Enduimet CBO education fund. Each 
village and the CBO contribute this amount whenever they receive their share.  
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from charcoal burning in the WMA area. How does the CBO expect us to 
survive?’9 (Interview no.21, September 2009). 
Destruction of water facilities result in people running out of water for many 
days as it is a long process to repair water pipelines. Sometimes people are also 
attacked by thirsty and hungry elephants. The presence of wildlife in the area has 
created fear that has restricted people’s freedom of movement at night as one 
man stated: ‘People have reduced the time to be out of their houses during the 
evening and night. They used to be outside their homes up to 10 PM. But now, 
when it is 6 PM people are indoors’ (Focus group, September 2009). Other 
indirect costs include guarding the crops at night, and sometimes people being 
injured by wildlife. For instance between July 2010 and June 2011 one woman 
was killed by an elephant and one injured by a lion in Lerangwa village, and from 
January through August 2009, in the Enduimet WMA, three men were attacked by 
elephants, and two by buffaloes. In addition, from January to August 2009 and July 
to October 2010 there were 298 livestock killed by predators (especially hyenas, 
but also leopards and lions) in Enduimet WMA (AWF 2010), and from March to 
August 2011 about 106 livestock were killed in Olmolog village alone (AWF 
2011)
10
. In the same period more than 365 livestock were killed and more than 
228 hectares of maize, beans, tomatoes and banana farms were damaged by 
wildlife (mainly elephants and elands) in Enduimet WMA (AWF 2011).  
Concerning the reaction of the government when wildlife kills people, in 
bitterness one woman stated that: ‘When elephants kill people in our village, the 
game scouts and district personnel can delay for three days. But when elephants 
are killed you will realize there is a government in Tanzania’ (Interview no.17, 
September 2009). Mitigation costs such as buying torch batteries, growing and/or 
buying chillies or other materials to keep away wildlife from farms and guarding 
the crops in the night cost villagers both in terms of money and time.
11
 
Regarding ‘compensation’, the new Wildlife Act of 2009 states that: The 
minister shall make regulations prescribing the payment of ‘consolation’ money 
to any person for injury sustained, death or destruction of his crops caused by 
dangerous animals, provided that in relation to destruction of crops, no payment 
shall be made in excess of five acres (URT 2009:52).With regard to this, the 
villagers claimed that they have never been consoled for any conservation costs 
they have incurred. 
                                                 
9
  In 2009 in Enduimet division, more than 2,100 acres were destroyed by wildlife (for farmers who 
reported). In one acre a farmer can harvest three bags of maize each bag can be sold 30 USD. In the 
village one sack of charcoal is sold 7-10 USD. 
10
  These livestock losses represent huge economic losses as the price of one cow is 130-200 USD, a goat 
13-30 USD, and a sheep 13-20 USD. 
11
  It was reported that elephants have already learned about chillies, they tend to pass under the poles, or 
use another route 
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Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have presented a case study of benefit sharing from safari 
tourism in Enduimet WMA. We have described the system of collection and 
distribution of tourism revenues from this Wildlife Management Area. The 
government, leading conservation NGOs, some donors and parts of the tourist 
industry present wildlife management and safari tourism in WMAs in Tanzania 
as a win-win where local people participate in conservation and accrue benefits 
from their conservation efforts, implying both environmental conservation and 
local development. This is in line with a definition of ecotourism as an activity 
combining the concern for the environment as well as for local communities. 
However, our research findings show instead that there are limited benefits that 
reach the villages after passing through a complicated and non-transparent 
system of benefit sharing. Inappropriate leakages as well as blatant corruption are 
possible in such a system and have previously been reported in the wildlife 
sector.  
Furthermore, the collection of fees from the safari business has, during the last 
few years, been taken away from the village level and centralized to be controlled 
by the Wildlife Division. In addition to providing more opportunities for state 
officials to appropriate the rent from safari tourism, this new system has also had 
other consequences. First, it has decreased the income considerably in villages 
that earlier had direct deals with safari companies, while at the same time 
spreading the income more thinly to more villages. Second, the fees to be paid by 
safari companies have increased substantially. This has led investors in a more 
peripheral area such as Enduimet to close down or scale down their activities. 
This might in the long run reduce the likelihood of stable and sustainable income 
from the tourism sector to the villages in Enduimet WMA.  
We have identified a lack of transparency within some tourist companies as 
well as in the Wildlife Division. Information provided by some tourist companies 
lacks for instance details about number of bed-nights and game drives. In 
addition, one of two hunting companies in Enduimet refused to share information 
with us. 
The WD also declined to provide information about how much it has received 
from different safari companies and how much it has distributed to the Tanzania 
Wildlife Protection Fund, the District Council and the Central Treasury. This 
lack of transparency makes it possible that revenues disappear on the way 
through the system. From the figures provided for Enduimet CBO in 2010, the 
CBO received considerably less than what it was entitled to. In addition, the 
system is not efficient, since the money flow involves several agencies in a 
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centralized chain of transactions including large transaction costs with a 
substantial share of benefits going to pay for administration in various ways.  
It is also clear that the current costs of wildlife conservation for the 
communities are higher than the revenues that these communities receive. 
Furthermore, there are few people who are employed in tourism in Enduimet, 
and it is most likely that these are not the same people as those affected by crop 
damages or livestock depredation. The villages with the highest costs from 
wildlife conservation (crop damages, livestock killings, and attacks on people) 
are not provided with larger shares of income from the WMAs.  
In practise, the case of Enduimet WMA indicates that WMAs have become a 
tool for wildlife conservation, and at the same time they have facilitated the WD 
to accrue more funds from wildlife outside national parks, Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area and game reserves. This is a form of accumulation by various 
actors that implies the extraction of revenues by changing community rights over 
land and resources, and thereby affecting the livelihoods of communities in 
negative ways. Our study of Enduimet WMA shows that the initial concept of 
rural benefits and development that was central to WMA initiatives are largely 
absent in this case. Concomitantly, we have to conclude that tourism in Enduimet 
WMA cannot be characterised as benefiting local communities. Instead, we have 
found that the WMA implies more hardship for local people and can be seen as a 
case of accumulation by dispossession. 
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Figure 1 Enduimet Wildlife Management Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Percentage required by Non-consumptive Wildlife Utilization Regulations (URT 2008), 
WMA Regulations 2002 (revised 2005). 
NT = Not Transparency 
NFT = Not Full Transparency, although some information 
FT = Full Transparency 
 
Figure 2 Flow chart of revenues from tourism in Enduimet Wildlife Management Area, with 
identifications of elements with lack of transparency 
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Introduction
During the last three decades, natural resource management 
policies have changed dramatically from a pure “preserva-
tionist model” or a “fences and fines” approach, to more 
decentralized approaches (Gibson & Marks, 1995; Hulme & 
Murphree, 2001; Songorwa, 1999). Participation and bene-
fit sharing has been a popular strategy designed to offset 
conservation costs and motivate local people to support con-
servation (Archabald & Naughton-Treves, 2001; Scherl et 
al., 2004) by aligning their behavior with conservation goals 
(Borrini-Feyerabend, Banuri, Farvar, Miller, & Philips, 
2002; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Hulme & Murphree, 2001; 
Scherl et al., 2004). Many national governments, develop-
ment partners, and conservation multinationals argue for 
participatory approaches (Inamdar, De Jode, Lindsay, & 
Cobb, 1996) as they engender win−win outcomes through 
environmental management and economic development 
(Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010).
Participatory approaches have been implemented for 
about three decades, however they seem to have yielded 
mixed results (Barrett, Lee, & McPeak, 2005; Gibson & 
Marks, 1995, Newmark & Hough, 2000; Wang, Lassoie, & 
Curtis, 2006). The extent to which these approaches secure 
local people’s support for conservation may depend on the 
degree of involvement and the scale of benefits accrued 
(Child, 2003). In addition, success will depend on the 
protected area goals, objectives, methods, and mission 
(Mannigel, 2008), and the ability of protected area “manag-
ers to reconcile biodiversity conservation goals with social 
and economic issues” (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012, p. 1).
In Tanzania, the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism (MNRT) adopted locally based and decentralized 
approaches to natural resources management from the late 
1980s, following the economic crisis of the late 1970s to the 
early 1980s and the resulting declining capacity of govern-
ment agencies (Nelson & Blomley, 2010). The intention was 
to involve local people in the management of natural 
resources and for them to influence management decisions 
while benefiting directly from conservation. The two sectors, 
forests and wildlife, underwent policy reform processes in 
the 1990s. They used various techniques and approaches 
with the intention of creating good relationships through 
influencing local people’s attitudes and perceptions, to 
engender support for biodiversity conservation (Hulme & 
Murphree, 2001; Newmark & Hough, 2000). Individual 
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studies from these sectors reveal that success so far has been 
limited (e.g., Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Brockington, 
2007; Holmes, 2003; Kideghesho, 2006; Vihemäki, 2005). 
There are few studies that have closely compared the perfor-
mance of these sectors in meeting participatory objectives 
(e.g., Nelson & Blomley, 2007, 2010), although these studies 
focus more on community-based forestry and community-
based wildlife management. Studies that compare both sec-
tors by focusing on national parks and forest plantations, 
especially when they affect the same people, are lacking in 
the academic literature.
This article investigates how participatory approaches 
used by the Kilimanjaro National Park (KNP) and the West 
Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation (WKFP) influence local com-
munities’ reactions toward the study areas. KNP is managed 
by the Tanzania National Park Authority (TANAPA), while 
WKFP (60.19 km2) is managed by the Tanzania Forest 
Services Agency (TFSA)—formerly the Forest and 
Beekeeping Division (FBD). The national park was signifi-
cantly expanded in 2005 after the inclusion of a forest reserve 
(1,078 km2) that had been managed by the FBD through 
Joint Forest Management (JFM). The inclusion of the forest 
reserve was associated with changes in institutions, the legal 
framework, distribution of powers, authority, resources, and 
changes in natural resource management agents. This transi-
tion reflected substantial changes in the relationships 
between people and the State, and between people and the 
park, in terms of natural resource access and rights.
The reason for selecting these two areas is that they have 
more or less the same location and therefore concern some 
of the same local people. Both areas experienced the para-
digm shift from fortress conservation to community conser-
vation (Hulme & Murphree, 2001). According to the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
classification, KNP is classified in category II (an area man-
aged mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation) and 
WKFP is not included in the IUCN category system. 
According to Dudley (2008), forests that are commercial, 
that is timber plantation of exotic species and as such, do not 
constitute a forest protected area. Exploring the performance 
of these two areas in terms of participatory approaches can 
shed light on how they can improve the relationship with 
adjacent local communities.
The park and forest plantation involve and benefit local 
people in very different ways. At KNP the withdrawal of 
natural resources is prohibited, however the park benefits 
local people through community development projects. For 
example, park management involves local people in extin-
guishing a fire during any incident of fire outbreak in the 
park. At WKFP the management allows local people to; 
collect some forest products, participate in the logging busi-
ness (for registered customers), provide casual labor for vari-
ous activities in the plantation, and engage in farming 
activities through the taungya1 system (commonly known as 
the shamba system in East Africa). As with KNP they are 
also involved in helping during fire incidents in the forest 
plantation. This article argues that the level of participation 
and benefits applicable to the livelihoods of local people 
affect the way local communities react toward the national 
park and the forest plantation.
The next section discusses the concept of “participation,” 
followed by a description of the study area, the methods of 
data collection and the data analysis. Then the findings are 
presented before moving on to the discussions and 
conclusions.
What Is “Participation”?
The term participation is well debated and discussed in 
development and conservation literature (e.g., Agarwal, 
2001; Cleaver, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Mohan & 
Stokke, 2000). The term has been used in many contexts and 
is understood in a variety of ways (e.g., Reed, 2008; Rowe, 
Marsh, & Frewer, 2004; Wilcox, 2003). In this study the term 
participation is defined following Hoben, Peters, and 
Rocheleau (1998) definition as a process through which dif-
ferent stakeholders influence, share, and keep control over 
development initiatives and over decisions and resources 
that affect them.
Local people’s participation in development and conser-
vation has enjoyed general acceptance among various actors 
in recent decades. Nevertheless, despite its acceptability, par-
ticipation in development continues to attract criticism (e.g., 
Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Diamond, Nkrumah, & Isaac, 2004; 
Hickey & Mohan, 2004). For example, some scholars who 
support the concept (e.g., Diamond et al., 2004; Mannigel, 
2008; Ribot, Chhatre, & Lankina, 2008) argue that participa-
tion can be used as a means (method) to promote more effi-
cient (effective, cheap) management or as an end to enhance 
equity and empowerment. Cooke and Kothari (2001), how-
ever, argue that not only is participation unable to facilitate 
meaningful social change it largely maintains existing power 
relations through masking this power behind the rhetoric and 
techniques of participation. Mohan and Stokke (2000) fur-
ther argue that participatory approaches tend to neglect local 
power relations and inequalities (as they consider local com-
munities as homogeneous entities), and underplay the role of 
broader political and economic forces.
There are several degrees of participation ranging along a 
continuum from nominal, passive, informing, giving options, 
active functional, interactive, and taking responsibility 
(Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Diamond et al., 2004; Mannigel, 
2008; Pimbert & Pretty, 1997). When put into consideration 
the logic of “acting together” or “taking part,” the extremes 
“nominal,” “passive,” and “taking over management respon-
sibility” are not considered particularly participatory. This is 
because at those levels, local people and institutions are only 
distantly involved in management and decision-making 
activities (Mannigel, 2008, p. 500). The same author argues 
that, in rural development and in nature conservation studies, 
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the activities on these three levels are commonly referred to 
as participatory.
In terms of natural resources management, participatory 
approaches assume that, if local communities participate in 
the management of natural resources and/or benefit they will 
be more likely to support conservation (McNeely, 1995; 
Wells & Brandon, 1992). However, several studies have crit-
icized participatory approaches in natural resources manage-
ment for failing to achieve their goals in terms of devolving 
decision-making powers to and/or benefiting local people 
while promoting conservation (e.g., Barrett, Brandon, 
Gibson, & Gjertsen, 2001; Nelson, 2010; Newmark & 
Hough, 2000; Sachedina, 2008; Songorwa, 1999).
The extent to which people participate in natural resources 
management depends on the approach used by conservation 
institutions, which largely is determined by the extent of 
power sharing, in this case, between the State and commu-
nity (E. Barrow & Murphree, 2001; Pimbert & Pretty, 1997). 
Weber (1919) defines a State as the “human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory.” The same author 
notes that the State may ascribe to other institutions or to 
individuals the right to use physical force only to the extent 
to which it permits such use. For example, power can be 
ascribed to natural resources institutions to regulate access 
and control of resources, or provide rules defining the distri-
bution of benefits. Thus, the State controls the activities of 
institutions and their members through legislation, policies, 
regulations, and strategies that encompass binding rules 
(Chazan, 1994).
With regard to State and local participation in natural 
resources management in Tanzania, the government2 through 
its parliament makes official decisions concerning natural 
resources management policies, and Acts that legalize the 
management of natural resources, and participation of differ-
ent stakeholders. Different institutions under the MNRT 
manage all renewable natural resources. For instance, wild-
life resources fall under three conservation institutions: 
TANAPA that manages national parks and has its own ordi-
nance and policy; Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority 
that manages Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) and has 
its own guideline; and Wildlife Division that manages wild-
life outside national parks and NCA and has its own policy 
and guidelines. All responsible institutions for wildlife man-
agement use the Wildlife Act of 2009. However, the TFSA 
manages the forest sector and has its own Act and policy. All 
these legal documents have aspects of how local people 
should participate and benefit from natural resources.
The common participatory approaches used by these 
institutions include protected area outreach program prac-
ticed by TANAPA, community-based natural resources man-
agement practiced by Wildlife Division and TFSA, and 
co-management regimes practiced by TFSA. Tumusiime and 
Vedeld (2012) argue that success of these participatory initia-
tives may depend on the extent of involvement, amount of 
benefits accrued, and distribution. Studies elsewhere reveal 
that benefit sharing initiatives face a number of challenges 
such as corruption, lack of transparency (Cooksey, 2011; 
Jansen, 2009; Nelson, 2010, 2012; Sachedina, 2008) rarely 
generate significant benefits or deliver sustainable alterna-
tive local livelihoods (Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau, 2006; 
Hackel, 1999). Additionally they are not always equitably 
shared within communities (West, Igoe, & Brockington, 
2006; Kiss, 2004) as illustrated in Uganda (Tumusiime & 
Vedeld, 2012), Tanzania (Kideghesho, 2006), Kenya 
(Norton-Griffiths & Said, 2010), and Madagascar (Ferraro, 
2002).
This article considers these issues in theory and in prac-
tice by exploring the case of KNP and WKFP.
Method
The Study Area
KNP is one of 15 parks in Tanzania managed by the TANAPA. 
The park was formerly known as Mount Kilimanjaro Forest 
and was protected by the German Colonial Government 
under the Forest Conservation Ordinance of 1904 (Kivumbi 
& Newmark, 1991). In 1940, it was gazetted as a forest 
reserve by the British Colonial Government under the Forest 
Ordinance of 1921 for water catchment and forest products. 
In 1941, the colonial government approved a half-mile forest 
strip (HMFS) of 0.8 km wide (area of 87.69 km2), as a buffer 
zone between the forest reserve and the more densely popu-
lated villages along the southern lower slopes of the moun-
tain. The motive was to provide local people with firewood, 
fodder, building poles, wood and non-wood products. This 
strip was managed by the local Chagga Council (Kivumbi & 
Newmark, 1991).
In 1973, the mountain above the tree line ~2700 m was 
reclassified as a national park, covering an area of 753.81 
km2. The remaining part of the forest reserve (1,078 km2) 
continued to be managed by the FBD without local participa-
tion. However their management was ineffective and led to 
continual deforestation. In response to this problem and fol-
lowing the decentralization policies in the 1990s, the New 
Forest Policy was formulated in 1998, which among other 
issues emphasized participatory management and decentral-
ization (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 1998). Thus, 
FBD established Community-based Forest Management in 
which communities are managers and owners of forests, and 
JFM in which local communities co-manage forest reserves 
with central and local government authorities (URT, 1998).
Subsequently, JFM was adopted in the Kilimanjaro Forest 
Reserve with local people participating in management and 
benefiting from the reserve (Tanzania Specialist Organization 
on Community Natural Resources and Biodiversity 
Conservation [TASONABI], 2001 ). However, in September 
2005, the forest reserve and some parts of the HMFS were 
annexed to the park after the survey report that revealed 
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major threats to Mount Kilimanjaro in the form of logging, 
fires, charcoal burning, shamba (farm) practices, livestock 
grazing, forest villages (squatters), and landslides 
(Lambrechts, Woodley, Hemp, Hemp, & Nnyiti, 2002, p. 5).
Currently, the park covers an area of 1831.81 km2 
(Kilimanjaro National Park Authority [KINAPA], 2006). 
The main activities allowed in the park are non-consumptive 
tourism, education, and research. Mount Kilimanjaro 
(5,963 m altitude) is one of the major attractions in the park. 
The park borders 90 villages, all of which are included in the 
park’s outreach program. The TANAPA outreach program 
also known as Community Conservation Services (CCS) 
was initiated in 1988 with the help from the African Wildlife 
Foundation. The aim was to build good relationships between 
parks and the local communities surrounding them. The CCS 
program is based on the motto “good neighborliness” 
(Goldstein, 2005; TANAPA, 1994). The 1994 National Parks 
Policy stresses that “the outreach program will be accompa-
nied by mechanisms to ensure that the benefits of conserva-
tion are shared with local communities in appropriate ways” 
(TANAPA, 1994). The CCS was adopted in KNP in 1994 
(KINAPA, 1995).
To the north and north-west of Kilimanjaro, beneath the 
natural forest and village land, there were forest plantations 
established in 1926 and 1954 respectively, during the colo-
nial period (for timber and poles production) and expanded 
after independence in 1961. The total area of plantations to 
the north-west of Kilimanjaro (WKFP) is 60.19 km2 (Ngaga, 
2011). Of the 60.19 km2, only 44.58 km2 is covered with 
trees (TASONABI, 2001). The remaining area consists of 
catchment forest areas, steep slopes, valley bottoms, hills 
and water sources (WKFP, 2008). WKFP was established 
through the taungya system to licensed cultivators. It is 
owned by the Government of Tanzania and managed by the 
TFSA.
To incorporate the participatory aspects in WKFP after 
the Forest Policy of 1998, the plantation management in col-
laboration with FBD explored JFM opportunities 
(TASONABI, 2001). However, interviews with forest plan-
tation management revealed that the mode of operation of 
the plantation did not support JFM. In addressing the partici-
patory issues, the management objectives of the plantation 
were modified to include: the production of non-wood prod-
ucts, which are harvested by local communities; local par-
ticipation in management; and benefiting from the plantation 
(TASONABI, 2001).
Mount Kilimanjaro is characterized by a bimodal rainfall 
pattern, with long rains from March to May, and short rains 
from October to December. The rainfall varies with altitude 
and ranges from 2,300 mm at lower altitudes (the forest belt) 
to less than 200 mm at the summit (The United Nations 
Environment Programme-World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre [UNEP-WCMC], 2009).
The Chagga are the largest ethnic group on the southern 
and eastern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. Ethnic groups, 
such as the Maasai, the Safa, the Pare, and other small groups 
are found on the western and northern parts of the mountain. 
The slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro are now occupied by more 
than one million people (Hemp, 2006). The annual popula-
tion growth rate for the Kilimanjaro region was 2.9% during 
the1988-2002 inter-censal period (Population Planning Unit, 
2005). Due to the high population density and land scarcity 
along the mountain slopes, zero-grazing is practiced by many 
people, which means that the forest is the main source of fod-
der for domestic animals.
This study was conducted in three villages, namely, 
Namwai, Engare Nairobi, and Matadi. They are located on 
the western side of Mount Kilimanjaro in the Siha Division. 
These villages (former squatters) were officially registered 
by the government in the 2000s. All the villages are adjacent 
to KNP and close to WKFP. They are included in the park’s 
neighborliness list. Some members of these villages were 
evicted from the natural forest in 2006 and from the forest 
plantation in 2007. The population of the three villages was 
23,411 in 2009. The main economic activities are small-scale 
farming, small-scale livestock keeping, small-scale business, 
timber/log business, casual labor in plantations, formal 
employment, and a few villagers assisting tourists as porters. 
Many villagers practice the taungya system in the forest 
plantation (Figure 1).
Data Collection and Analysis
Empirical data was collected during different periods 
between 2009 and 2012 (8 months of field work in total). 
Initially, the study sought to investigate the KNP outreach 
program and therefore first interviewees were purposefully 
selected such as village government leaders, villagers (males 
and females aged 18 years old and above), the park’s out-
reach warden, the park’s protection warden, and tourist por-
ters. The local people who were interviewed reported a 
negative relationship with the park and indicated the forest 
plantation as a good neighbor. This observation prompted to 
study theparticipatory approaches and benefit sharing 
schemes used by the KNP and WKFP. In the follow-up field-
work villagers, village government leaders, the forest planta-
tion manager, forest plantation staff, former forest reserve 
staff, and former village natural resources committee mem-
bers were purposefully selected and interviewed. The inter-
views were qualitative, semi-structured, prepared specifically 
for the interviewees, and conducted in Swahili, i.e. a lan-
guage understood by most of the people in the study area.
A total number of 68 people (37 men and 31 women) were 
interviewed in this study. The interview sessions lasted 
between 1 and 2 hr each. Saturation point was reached when 
consequent interviews revealed no new information regard-
ing the study topic. Interviews were supplemented with 
informal discussions with different people, participant obser-
vation, and focus group discussions with 6 to 10 people in 
each study village. In addition, the researcher attended the 
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village assembly at Engare Nairobi village, and reviewed rel-
evant literature and several studies conducted in the area. On 
this basis a lot was learned on how local communities are 
involved and benefit from each area.
Each interview began by informing the interviewees about 
the research project and seeking their consent to participate in 
the study. The participants were encouraged to express them-
selves freely, and were guaranteed anonymity and confidenti-
ality. A notebook was used to record information from the 
interviewees, and when permission was granted a tape 
recorder was used to record data, which was later transcribed. 
The collected data was analyzed by identifying themes and 
patterns, organizing them into coherent categories, and link-
ing them to the aims of the study. In addition, statements were 
written that could be supported by appropriate illustrative 
quotes from the interviews to explain each theme.
Results
The analysis of field data revealed five main themes: the pro-
cess of expansion of KNP, access to natural resources after 
inclusion of the forest reserve in the park, local people par-
ticipation in managing the KNP and WKFP, benefit sharing 
schemes, and the relationship between local communities, 
KNP and WKFP. A description and discussion of each theme 
is in the following sections and a comparison summary of the 
KNP and WKFP is presented in Table 1.
The Process of Expansion of the KNP
As elaborated in the “Method” section, the Kilimanjaro Forest 
Reserve and some parts of the HMFS were annexed to KNP in 
2005 after Lambrechts et al. (2002) revealed major threats to 
Mount Kilimanjaro. However, the analysis of field data reveals 
that KNP did not fully involve local people during the inclu-
sion of the forest reserve into the park. As one interviewee 
stated, “the park officials did not conduct any meeting with us; 
they passed in some households and took some individuals’ 
opinions and then considered these as the opinions of all vil-
lagers; something which is false” (Interview no. 7, 2011). The 
process was not clear about changes in user rights, restrictions 
on entry to the forest, and access to forest resources.
Figure 1. Overview map showing study villages, Kilimanjaro National Park, and the West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation.
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The park demarcated the area without the local people’s 
involvement, and unfortunately included portions of people’s 
farmland into the park boundaries. This intensified the con-
flict, which was later resolved by positioning some beacons 
in cooperation with villagers and district officials (Interview 
no. 7, 2011). The park did not consider the provision of a 
buffer zone where communities could harvest forest prod-
ucts (Interview no. 9, 2011). Furthermore, the park manage-
ment dissolved the village natural resources committee and 
decided to handle all matters of park management without 
the participation of local people (Interview no. 8, 2009). 
Whilst the process of expansion of the KNP annexed only the 
Kilimanjaro Forest Reserve, the WKFP continued to be man-
aged by FBD under the same objectives as before (Interview, 
Natural Resource Officer, 2012).
Access to Natural Resources After Inclusion of 
the Forest Reserve in the Park
After the forest reserve was annexed to KNP, entry or har-
vesting any natural products from the park without permis-
sion is considered to be illegal. The park is patrolled by park 
rangers. Some women who entered the park illegally 
reported being raped, sexually harassed, or had their prop-
erty confiscated. Likewise, men reported instances of being 
arrested, beaten, and prosecuted (Interview no. 12, 2011). 
Furthermore, restrictions have even been imposed on 
searching for lost children or livestock in the forest. 
The park staff demands that villagers must wait for them to 
come before entering the forest, and in most cases, their 
response is not timely (Interview no. 19, 2009). The lack of 
cooperation in handling illegal activities in the park seemed 
to tarnish the image of the villages and negatively affect 
their fund application for development projects as the park 
management demands that villages should abstain from ille-
gal activities. Villagers describe this system as “arrest and 
send” (kamata peleka; Interview nos. 20 & 21, 2009). Those 
who were caught in the forest were mainly: collectors of 
firewood, fodder, poles, and plants for traditional medicine; 
traditional hunters; farmers (cannabis); and timber splitters 
(Interview no. 22, 2009). However, the Park Rangers seemed 
to respect permits stamped by village governments and 
issued to plumbers working on irrigation canals (Interview 
no. 26, 2009).
Table 1. Summary of the park and the forest plantation’s participatory approaches.
KNP WKFP
Administration x TANAPA x TFSA (formerly managed by FBD)
Participatory approach x Outreach program–sharing up to 7.5% of 
park’s operational budget
x Participate in various activities in the 
plantation—Casual labor, farming 
opportunities, provision of logs for community 
projects, purchase logs (registered customers), 
in-kind benefits.
Criteria and procedures x Cumbersome and complex, bureaucratic, 
top-down, sometimes politically influenced
x Easy to follow, but sometimes affected by 
favoritism
Benefits x Only one of the study villages supported in 
2002/2003
x Access to forest products
x Payment from casual labor, farming 
opportunities (for food and cash); logging 
business, logs provision for development 
projects.
Participation in management x Fire extinguishing x Fire extinguishing,
x Planting trees, tending trees, various activities 
through casual labor
Costs of conservation x Crop raiding; no access to natural resources; 
punishment, harassment, death, rape, fines or 
court cases
x Crop raiding
Shortcomings x No communication; no decision-making 
power; top-down approach; no buffer zone; 
Minimal/no benefits,
x No decision making; top-down approach; 
favoritism
Relationship x Negative relationship—Hatred, resentment, 
illegal access of resources, referred to as an 
“enemy”
x Positive relationship—Referred to as a “savior”
Local people’s desirable condition x To have share of park revenues
x To have some extent of decision making over 
forest conservation
x Payment in case of fire if cannot harvest 
resources, and have buffer zone
x Be assisted to form groups and participate in 
benefit deals (logs)
x Benefit through income from sold trees
x Join hands in plantation management
Note. KNP = Kilimanjaro National Park; WKFP = West Kilimanjaro Forest Plantation; TANAPA = Tanzania National Park Authority; TFSA = Tanzania 
Forest Services Agency; FBD = Forest and Beekeeping Division.
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Based on restrictions imposed by the park, villagers 
reported that WKFP is the main hope for their livelihoods. 
One interviewee stated, “. . . without this forest plantation, 
people could not live here, they would have vacated. . .” 
(Interview no. 2, 2009). Villages and nearby towns depend 
on the plantation for their firewood needs. The local people 
are allowed to collect firewood during thinning and harvest-
ing periods. Fodder harvesting is also allowed, if it does not 
take place at water sources. Moreover, people purchase con-
struction poles, participate in the logging business (for regis-
tered customers), and are involved in farming opportunities 
in the plantation, and seasonal employment.
The Involvement of Local People in Managing the 
Park and the Plantation
At KNP local people are involved in park management 
through fire extinguishing exercises. However, they are not 
allowed to enter the park before the park rangers arrive. It is 
worth noting that fire extinguishing is on a voluntary basis; 
thus, no payment or incentive is given other than food. The 
villagers claimed that in such exercises they work as a team 
with park officials and, thereafter, the relationship ends 
(Interview no. 2, 2009; Interview no. 1, 2011). As the park 
rangers are paid for fire extinguishing duty the local people 
feel that they should also be paid, since they do not have any 
share in the forest (Interview no. 4, 2009). To emphasize the 
situation, the villagers claimed that the park recognizes them 
only in the event of catastrophes (Interview no. 4, 2009). 
Such a relationship has caused many people to turn away 
from cooperating with the park because they do not regard 
themselves as stakeholders in the management of the forest. 
The local people compare the current management of the for-
est reserve with the former management under the FBD, as 
one village leader asserted,
In those days, many people turned up to extinguish fire because 
they knew the reserve belonged to them, . . . but now we have to 
convince and force them because they are not paid and do not 
benefit from the park. (Interview no. 5, 2011)
At WKFP the situation is different. The plantation man-
agement has created awareness in the surrounding villages 
about conservation, fire control, and prevention measures. In 
cases of fire outbreaks the communities react quickly to 
extinguish the fire and do not demand payment (Interview 
WKFP, 2012). However, some interviewees revealed that the 
WKFP structure is rigid and they lack participation in deci-
sion making. The following section describes the benefit 
sharing schemes used by KNP and WKFP.
Benefit Sharing Schemes
Criteria and procedures. The benefit sharing scheme of the 
CCS involves support for community-initiated projects 
(SCIP), conservation education, and income generating proj-
ects. SCIP was initiated in 1992 to support social projects of 
villages bordering or close to national parks (Goldstein, 
2005).
To obtain support from the park, KNP’s neighboring vil-
lages have to comply with a set of criteria. These criteria 
include: the village should be free from poaching; it should 
not have previously been supported by the park; conserva-
tion education has been provided; the village is in close prox-
imity to the park; and the project should be of importance to 
the community (Nyeme & Nilsen, 2010). However, the inter-
views revealed that most of the studied villages lack aware-
ness about the criteria used for selecting projects for support. 
The main criterion known by villagers was “proximity to the 
park,” which they defined as having a “patch of natural for-
est” bordering the park. There was generally a lack of aware-
ness on park matters because the park has not conducted any 
meeting in the study villages.
Apart from the criteria, there are established procedures 
to follow that include holding a village assembly to select a 
project, submitting minutes of the meeting, and presenting 
an application letter outlining the reason for the request, the 
amount requested, project description, drawings and cost 
estimates, while being able to meet about 30% of the project 
costs (Nyeme & Nilsen, 2010). The district authorities must 
be involved in these procedures, and the SCIP committee 
should approve the project before it is forwarded to national 
parks headquarters to be considered for funding. Before proj-
ect implementation a memorandum of understanding has to 
be signed between the community, the park and district 
authorities (Nyeme & Nilsen, 2010). The interviews revealed 
that some of these procedures are known by village govern-
ment, however they are rarely followed because they are 
bureaucratic and top-down. In most cases district level offi-
cials initiate the procedures rather than the communities in 
need. For instance, applications for construction of water 
intake and a water storage tank in Matadi village, as well as 
a secondary school library in Namwai village, were initially 
negotiated between the District Commissioner and KNP 
before the villages were involved. Other procedures were not 
followed (Interview nos. 27, 28, & 50, 2009). Moreover 
KNP has only one Park Outreach Warden who has a large 
workload in visiting 90 villages and consequently has insuf-
ficient time to assist villagers with any SCIP applications.
At WKFP the criteria for benefiting includes closeness to 
the plantation, and the criteria for the allocation of taungya 
plots include: health-related aspects (e.g. long periods of 
sickness, HIV/AIDS affected persons), age-related factors 
(e.g. elderly people), orphans, widows, poor people, planta-
tion staff, and casual laborers who work in the plantation.3 
The local people in need of plots register their names with 
the respective hamlet leaders. In some instances HIV/AIDs 
affected persons, disabled and widows go directly to the 
plantation management to seek further attention. No fee is 
required to acquire a plot (cf. Dean, 2011).
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As in the case of KNP, at WKFP the process also has some 
weaknesses. The interview responses revealed some aspects 
of favoritism in the process of plot allocation. First, the vil-
lage leadership registered the names of villagers according to 
the set criteria, however the plots were allocated to other per-
sons. Even though plantation management sometimes cross 
checked the process the problem remained in some villages, 
as one widow lamented:
I have been to plantation headquarters and in our village 
government office for more than 4 times applying for a plot. I 
was given a promise but during the plot allocation exercise, my 
name was not in the list . . . I am tired; I have lost hope. (Interview 
no. 42, 2012)
Second, some villagers reported that the management in 
the forest plantation favors relatives, friends, or influential 
people in the community during the allocation of plots; and 
some staff engage in corruption by allocating plots to them-
selves where they later sell the user rights,rent out, or give to 
relatives or friends.
Benefit sharing. KNP does not share monetary benefits with 
local communities. Instead it benefits local communities 
through SCIP. During implementation of these projects the 
park contributes up to 70% of the project costs and the com-
munity contributes the remaining 30%. Although KNP is not 
the most visited national park in Tanzania, it ranks number 
one in terms of generating revenue. It generates about 38% 
of the total revenue of Tanzania National Parks, followed by 
the Serengeti National Park (33%; Kessy, n.d.).This is 
because tourists stay in the park longer (while climbing 
Mount Kilimanjaro) than those visiting the other national 
parks in the northern tourist circuit. Tourists spend money on 
accommodation, transport, food, and souvenirs. The infor-
mation from the Tourism Department shows that from 2002 
to 2008 KNP generated about 102.1M US$ (about 17M US$ 
per year).
The revenues collected from KNP and other parks go to 
the National Park's headquarters where the “park’s opera-
tional budget” is allocated. Only 7.5% of the budget goes 
to communities for SCIP. From its inception in 1994 to 
2011 (17 years) the KNP’s CCS Department has spent 
only about 1.6M US$ to support 39 out of 90 villages 
neighboring the park. The types of social projects sup-
ported include: construction of public schools and pur-
chase of furniture; construction of cattle troughs, cattle 
dips, water tanks, bridges, dispensaries and staff houses; 
making energy saving stoves; establishing tree nurseries; 
beekeeping projects and women’s sewing projects. The 
information from National Parks headquarters shows that 
in 2007 they earned 56.3M US$, of which only about 1M 
US$ (1.8%) was allocated to 15 national parks for out-
reach program activities (TANAPA, 2007, cited in 
Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, 2008).
In the study villages only Matadi village was supported in 
2002/2003 to construct a water intake and storage tank worth 
approximately 13,571 US$. In 2008 the village applied for 
support to complete a student hostel project, however it was 
not considered by the CCS Department (Interview no. 34, 
2009). According to the CCS Warden, the department does 
not prioritize projects that had already started claiming that 
'they do not know their quality'. The village leadership 
reported that the outreach department did not take any initia-
tive to evaluate whether the building project was worthy of 
support. Similarly, Namwai village applied for support to 
construct a secondary school library. However, the applica-
tion was unsuccessful as the park claimed that it faced finan-
cial constraints (Interview CCS Warden, 2011). From the 
time of application in 2009 to August 2011, the communities 
had not been informed about the park’s decision on their 
applications. This was a second attempt for Namwai village 
who had applied in 2005/2006 for support to construct a dis-
pensary also without success (Interview no. 28, 2009). Some 
interviewees stated that they have lost hope in requesting 
help from the park.
The analysis of revenue sharing data from the CCS 
Department from 1994 to 2011 shows that Moshi Rural 
District had received the most funds (556,940 US$), fol-
lowed closely by Moshi Urban District (455,453 US$). 
Although Moshi Urban District does not border the park or 
directly bear the costs of conservation, it had received more 
funds than other districts that do directly bear the costs of 
conservation. A good example is Rombo District who had 
received about half (272,727 US$) of what Moshi Urban 
District had received. In 2008/2009, Moshi Urban District 
received more than half (169,080 US$) of the total SCIP 
funds (321,781 US$) allocated for that year. Most of these 
funds (148,200 US$) supported a private catholic secondary 
school.
Nyeme and Nilsen (2010) point out another example in 
which 72% of SCIP funds in 2007/2008 were given to 
Mwanga District that does not border the park. This was 
made possible through the then MNRT Minister, who was 
also a Member of Parliament for that district (Nyeme & 
Nilsen, 2010). Not only does the deviation of revenues to 
other areas adversely affect the benefits for park neighbors, 
the revenue from the higher earning parks, such as KNP, sup-
ports lower earning parks. Furthermore, mishandling and 
mismanagement of revenues received by the National Park's 
headquarters also adversely affects benefit sharing schemes. 
For example, in 2009 the Opposition in Parliament sought a 
detailed explanation on the reported misuse of about 5.6M 
US$ by National Park's headquarters (Juma, 2009). In addi-
tion, after their 3-year term, the 12 Board of Trustee Directors 
each received a lump sum of money (Anonymous, 2006). 
Recent criticism of the National Parks headquarters has led 
the former Director General to resign.
At WKFP local communities benefit from the forest plan-
tation through forest products such as logs (for registered 
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customers), fodder, firewood, construction poles (during 
thinning), farming opportunities, and casual labor. Logs are 
sold to registered customers from the Kilimanjaro region, the 
Arusha region, and some as far away as Kenya. From 2010 
to 2012 the number of customers ranged from 35 to 37 
(11 customers in 2012 were from the study villages). The 
public institutions and the plantation’s neighbors purchase 
logs mainly for construction purposes. For instance, in 
2012/2013, 1,000 m3 of logs were sold to the plantation’s 
neighbors. From 2008/2009 to 2012/2013, the logs and poles 
products ranged between 14,000 and 21,000 m3.
The fee for softwood logs ranges from 1.7 to 32 US$/m3 
depending on diameter, length and species type. Softwood 
poles are sold at between 0.13 and 0.64 US$ depending on 
the diameter and length. This revenue belongs to the govern-
ment. Customers are also charged 7 US$/m3 for softwood 
logs for silvicultural activities and road maintenance in the 
plantation. This revenue is deposited into the Logging 
Miscellaneous Account, managed by the forest plantation.
The forest plantation does not sell logs to community 
groups because second and third pruning and tree felling 
activities are conducted by the customers themselves. Often, 
community groups deny responsibility when these activities 
are conducted improperly. Villages in need of logs for social 
development activities obtain them from the forest plantation 
after seeking permission from TFSA. For individual con-
struction purposes the villagers are expected to purchase tim-
ber from sawmills (Interview WKFP, 2012).
Villagers benefit through casual labor by participating in 
various activities that take place in the plantation. For exam-
ple, during the tree planting season people from the sur-
rounding villages, and from further afield, are involved. 
They are usually paid 2.5 US$/day and the exercise can take 
up to a month. The villagers also participate in security activ-
ities. There are 19 men and 1 woman from the neighboring 
villages of Matadi, Engare Nairobi, and Namwai who have 
been used as security guards in the plantation. Casual labor is 
also needed to water the seedlings planted in the nurseries. 
For this exercise the plantation management considers neigh-
boring villages because people are needed to work on a daily 
basis and whenever such labor is required. The local people, 
mainly men, are also involved in the construction and main-
tenance of plantation roads. In the years 2009/2010, 
2010/2011, and 2011/2012, the forest plantation manage-
ment paid 78,321, 73,030, and 77,919 US$ respectively to 
casual laborers for various activities in the forest plantation. 
Other benefits associated with the forest plantation include 
offering transport during sickness and burial ceremony when 
the need arises.
The forest plantation also provides farming plots to local 
people. The availability of plots depends on the extent of 
land available after tree harvesting. Plots vary in size from 
30 × 30 m, 30 × 40 m, 40 × 40 m, and 50 × 50 m. Those who 
cannot cultivate their plots and those in need of immediate 
money sell their plots to rich farmers, while some agree with 
others to cultivate the plots on their behalf sharing what is 
harvested between them. However, such arrangements are 
usually outside of plantation management control.
Small-scale farmers own one to two plots, while large-
scale farmers may own up to 20 plots. Small-scale farmers 
and persons who do not have plots are sometimes hired by 
large-scale farmers. The small-scale farmers manage to 
attend their own plots by setting aside time before or after 
working as casual laborers for the large-scale farmers. 
Farming is ongoing throughout the year with the main crops 
being potatoes, carrots and garden peas and the output from 
one plot varies from 5 to 20 sacks. Tree species determine the 
length of time a farmer can use the plot. For instance, in plots 
growing eucalyptus species a farmer could cultivate crops 
for 2 to 3 years. In plots with pines and cyprus species a 
farmer could cultivate for up to 4 years, while in less fertile 
areas the time could be extended up to 5 years.
Overall, the taungya system has benefited many people 
by providing food, cash and employment opportunities. As 
one man stated,“. . . through the taungya system many peo-
ple have become rich . . . large-scale farmers earn about 
28,000 US$ per one farming season”4 (Interview no. 15, 
October 2011). However, the local people do not have any 
security in terms of the land. In case of destruction of tree 
species, the right to use the land could be terminated and 
there is no assurance of plot allocation in the future after the 
first allocation expires (cf. Dean, 2011). Besides, most per-
sons interviewed expressed fear and insecurity about their 
livelihoods in the future. They are concerned that if planta-
tion management should change or the plantation is priva-
tized (accompanied by different policies) they may no longer 
have permission to use the land.
The Relationship Between Local Communities, 
the Park, and the Forest Plantation
It is beyond doubt that local people depend on KNP for their 
livelihood needs, as one interviewee stated, “We want to get 
our immediate needs like firewood and fodder first before 
development projects . . .” (Interview no. 31, 2011). The lack 
of alternatives for their livelihoods results in illegal with-
drawal of natural resources from the forest, as one inter-
viewee remarked:
. . . is it possible for a poor person to live next to the forest 
without a buffer zone and watch the forest without extraction of 
any resource? . . . it is obvious that extraction will occur illegally 
. . . (Interview no. 9, 2011)
Resentment and hatred toward the park have led people to 
enter the forest and withdraw natural resources, including 
green wood, as one interviewee stated,
They have taken the forest, no entry, no access to forest 
resources, and there is no buffer zone . . . it is a big problem . . . 
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the park has a difficult task to control us from withdrawing the 
forest products, and we have a job of watching them—when 
they leave we must harvest the resources . . . since we are not 
free to access the resources, we do things we were not doing 
when the forest was under FBD. (Interview no. 24, 2009)
The village government leader asserted,
 . . . We cannot convince villagers to stop illegal activities. We 
have to keep quiet because it is not our property. If villagers 
benefit from it, they become guards, but now the park restricts 
us from entering the forest . . . If someone enters with a saw, will 
you arrest such a person? The forest is the way it is today 
because we took good care of it. (Interview no. 18, 2011)
The costs of conservation, such as crop raiding and lack 
of compensation, also contribute to resentment toward the 
park, as one interviewee stated, “Wild animals destroy our 
crops so much. If you dare to say or complain they tell you, 
you are living in a wildlife corridor. We are not allowed to 
kill them or beat them” (Interview no. 18, 2010).
Furthermore, there is a lack of communication between 
the park and the people as one interviewee stated, “KNP 
works like military army ". . . there is no communication. We 
don’t know what is going on inside . . . ” (Interview no. 45, 
2011). These voices imply that the relationship between the 
park management and the local people is poor.
Management at WKFP reported that the relationship with 
local communities is good. Confirming this, many people 
interviewed stated that the forest plantation is a “savior” and 
a “true neighbor” who cares for their livelihood needs and 
the less privileged in the community. However, some inter-
viewees reported instances of favoritism from community 
and plantation management during the allocation of farming 
plots.
Comparison of the Park’s and the 
Forest Plantation’s Participatory 
Approaches
The results presented above illustrate the process of the 
expansion of KNP and its impacts on local people, and dif-
ferent strategies used by KNP and WKFP to involve and ben-
efit local people. However, the performance of the two areas 
is different despite the fact that they fall under the same min-
istry. In the following section, I elaborate on the underlying 
factors contributing to the differences.
Legal Framework
The performance of KNP and WKFP is partly affected by 
sectoral policies and legislation. The legal documents spec-
ify the manner in which local participation and benefit shar-
ing should occur in terms of natural resources management. 
However, this study found that the local participation and 
benefit sharing strategy used by KNP is more rhetoric than 
reality. In practice, the park operates closely under the 
“fences and fines” strategy. The park’s approach does not 
consider the needs of local people and, to a large extent, is a 
trade-off where tourism and conservation goals are met at the 
expense of local persons livelihood needs. At WKFP the per-
formance of the plantation clearly reflects a win–win situa-
tion where plantation goals, government benefits and local 
persons needs are met.
As previously stated, KNP is classified in category II by 
IUCN while WKFP does not fall under any IUCN category. 
While this may partly explain the difference in the extent of 
natural resource access by local people in each area, much is 
left to consider in terms of benefit sharing, participation in 
decision making, and management of the two areas. 
Therefore, these aspects are elaborated further below.
Benefit Sharing
Given the KNP’s high income levels one would expect more 
benefit sharing and well established relationships with local 
people. However, this study finds that several factors have 
shaped the benefit sharing scheme. Firstly, National Park's 
headquarters applies a set of criteria and procedures for SCIP 
application, which are bureaucratic, complex, and lacking 
transparency (cf. E. G. C. Barrow, Gichohi, & Infield, 2000). 
It is difficult for local communities to follow the required 
procedures and in most cases education or assistance is 
required, particularly for illiterate groups.
Secondly, the bulk of collected revenues from all national 
parks in Tanzania is remitted to National Park's headquarters. 
Headquarters channel the operational budget to national 
parks and only up to 7.5% of its operational budget is set 
aside for outreach programs to surrounding villages that bear 
the cost of conservation (see Goldstein, 2005). This system is 
different from other countries like Uganda and Kenya where 
revenue for local people is derived directly from tourists’ 
entry fees (e.g. Tumusiime & Vedeld, 2012).
Thirdly, external political influence affects benefit shar-
ing with funds being diverted to areas not directly affected by 
the park. Moreover, SCIP applications are sometimes influ-
enced by district level leaders for political gain and credit 
(Borgerhoff Mulder, Caro, & Msago, 2007).
Fourthly, the mismanagement and misuse of funds by 
National Park's headquarter officials adversely affects the 
benefits for local people and the amount of revenue left for 
park outreach programs. Inappropriate leakages and corrup-
tion in the wildlife sector have previously been reported 
(e.g., Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Benjaminsen & 
Svarstad, 2010; Cooksey, 2011; Jansen, 2009; Nelson, 2009, 
2010, 2012; Sachedina, 2008).
Contrary to the KNP benefit sharing scheme, WKFP has 
had a more positive impact on neighboring villages. Local 
communities benefit through; the logs business (for regis-
tered customers), collection of forest products, engaging in 
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income-producing casual labor activities, and the taungya 
system. The demand for (fertile) agricultural land has been 
met, to some extent, through the plantation’s taungya sys-
tem. The application criteria for taungya plots are much sim-
pler than the KNP’s criteria and guidelines for SCIP 
application. Since the inclusion of the forest into KNP, the 
need for forest products has been partly met by the forest 
plantation. However, the only type of employment offered is 
casual labor and casual laborers are paid very little. 
Communities have opted to accept low pay because they lack 
alternatives and working for the plantation increases their 
chance of obtaining farming plots. Unfortunately, the alloca-
tion of plots has been adversely affected by favoritism. 
Similar cases of favoritism in taungya system have also been 
reported in Ghana (Agyeman et al., 2003).
Participation in the Management of the Park and 
the Forest Plantation
KNP focuses strictly on its structure and has no consider-
ation to local persons contributions toward conservation. 
There is no local community member that plays an active 
role in park administration or temporary employment. The 
park considers local people only when there is a fire out-
break; thus, local people claim that they are used as “tools.” 
As a result few turn up to help with fire incidents while oth-
ers demand payment. KNP’s exclusion of local people from 
park management contributes to the negative relationship 
that exists between the park and the people. Paraskevopoulos, 
Korfiatis, and Pantis (2003) found that social exclusion neg-
atively affects conservation attitudes. WKFP does involve 
local people in plantation management through different 
activities, and has created positive interaction with sur-
rounding communities. In this case local people participate 
willingly to help with fire incidents. However, in both areas 
participation is used as a means to improve efficiency in 
production and/or conservation. Both areas operate on the 
lowest level of the “participation ladder,” although the par-
ticipation level of WKFP seems to be higher than that of 
KNP. Many of KNP failures/shortcomings coincide with 
other protective management studies elsewhere where focus 
is on structural barriers toward successful public participa-
tion (e.g., Lachapelle, McCool, & Patterson, 2003; Wilson, 
2003).
Participation in Decision Making
KNP and WKFP share a centralized structure in terms of 
decision making on matters pertaining to the management of 
natural resources and benefit sharing. It is difficult for com-
munities to influence or challenge the operation of the cen-
tral structure. The park management system does not allow 
space for local people’s opinions because of its top-down and 
paramilitary nature. This was revealed during the inclusion 
of the forest reserve into the park, as there was no awareness 
raising or sensitization about changes of user rights and 
hence the process took people by surprise (see Lerkelund, 
2011). In addition, only district leaders who make decisions 
have been involved in choosing development projects for 
support (cf. Borgerhoff Mulder et al., 2007; Durrant, 2004). 
There has not been any opportunity for villagers to contrib-
ute to the park’s planning and decision-making processes nor 
has there been dialogue with park staff to express their prob-
lems and seek solutions (cf. Anthony, 2007; E. G. C. Barrow 
et al., 2000). Moreover, most of the revenue collected has 
been retained by the National Park's headquarters and local 
people have no power or influence over its allocation.
In the case of WKFP, local persons have no power or share 
in the revenue collected from logs and poles sold, apart from 
payments received for casual labor (cf. Agyeman et al., 2003; 
Amoah, 2009). Additionally, they have no influence over the 
amount paid for casual labor, nor do they receive any incen-
tive for tending trees. The income from logs sold is remitted 
to the central government. Although local people in the forest 
plantation are viewed as beneficiaries, they are not involved 
in decision making over forest use (cf. Alden Wily, 2002). 
Gillingham and Lee (1999) point out that the lack of partici-
pation in decision making shapes local persons perceptions of 
protected areas and affects their relationships with govern-
ment conservation institutions and other stakeholders. 
Andrade and Rhodes (2012) found that local community par-
ticipation in the protected area decision-making process is 
significantly related to the level of compliance with protected 
area polices. Silori’s (2006) study in India found that lack of 
involvement of the local people in the decision-making pro-
cesses and in forest management groups were major causes of 
negative attitudes toward protected areas.
Communication and Awareness
There is generally a lack of communication between KNP 
and villagers. There has not been any awareness raising 
activities to increase public awareness and participation in 
conservation efforts. Local persons mainly experience the 
negative side of the relationship with the park through fines, 
imprisonment, and restrictions (cf. Durrant, 2004). This lack 
of communication and conservation awareness about the 
park’s objectives and mission may contribute to the negative 
relationship between the park and local persons. Holmes’s 
(2003) study in western Tanzania found that the number of 
visits of national parks personnel to the village was associ-
ated with positive attitudes. Fiallo and Jacobson’s (1995) 
study in Ecuador found that low level of awareness regarding 
conservation issues was associated with negative attitudes 
toward protected areas. Nevertheless, Heinen and Shrivastava 
(2009) found that higher level of awareness on regulations 
was associated with negative attitudes toward conservation. 
Contrary to KNP, the WKFP plantation staff visit villages 
and raise awareness about environmental issues and fire con-
trol measures.
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Some studies argue that the fear of law enforcement officials 
reduces anti-conservation behavior (e.g., Aipanjiguly & 
Jacobson, 2002). However, this study found that people are 
engaged in illegal withdrawal of resources from the park 
regardless of patrols by park rangers for the following rea-
sons: lack of, or very few benefits; denial of access to natural 
resources; lack of buffer zones to harvest natural resources; 
ill-treatment when found in the park; and lack of compensa-
tion for crop raiding. In addition, villagers referred to the 
park staff as “enemies” who do not care about their liveli-
hoods (cf. Anthony, 2007). Given the fact that land is a scarce 
resource in villages surrounding the park (see Hemp, 2006), 
dependence on the park's natural resources for livelihood 
needs is unavoidable. Silori’s (2006) study in India found 
that restricted access to forest resources for local persons 
livelihood needs resulted in negative attitudes among them 
toward the biosphere reserve. Similarly, Arjunan, Holmes, 
Puyravaud, and Davidar (2006) found that exclusion of peo-
ple from a forest to protect biodiversity often antagonizes 
local communities.
While local communities bear the costs of conservation 
they do not receive any tangible benefits to offset these costs 
(cf. Kideghesho, 2006). In addition, the target of benefits 
from the park is not immediate nor does it address felt needs. 
The scheme tends to focus on infrastructure, which remains 
the only testimony of support provided (Redford & Fearn, 
2007). Similar findings have been reported by Holmes (2003) 
in western Tanzania, revealing that individuals who perceived 
active extension services from national parks held more posi-
tive attitudes toward the park than those who did not.
At WKFP benefits obtained by the local people seem to 
affect the relationship positively. This is revealed through 
local persons responses in cases of fire outbreaks, during tree 
planting activities and their corresponding attitude toward 
plantation staff. In cases of fire outbreaks, their responses are 
quick and they do not demand payment. The community 
regards the forest plantation as a “savior” as far as their live-
lihoods are concerned. This is because the plantation is the 
main alternative for their livelihoods since the inclusion of 
the forest reserve into the park.
Why Do the Park and the Forest Plantation 
Perform Differently?
The findings and explanation given above show that KNP 
offers limited opportunities for local people to participate 
and benefit from natural resources, compared with WKFP. 
The difference observed is related to the legal framework 
reforms that took place in the 1990s following the country’s 
economic crisis in the 1980s and the loss of resources and 
declining capacity of the central government. Institutional 
changes in both sectors (forestry and wildlife) have contin-
ued since the 1990s, however they have not necessarily been 
in ways proposed or intended by local proponents of reforms 
and/or donors (Nelson & Blomley, 2010). The reforms have 
faced resistance due to the interests and incentives that politi-
cal elites, central agencies, and private commercial interests 
pose for expanding and/or maintaining control over land and 
natural resources (Nelson & Agrawal, 2008). Consequently, 
reforms were not carried out as intended because competing 
state and private commercial interests considered the 
resources “too valuable to allow ordinary citizens to own” 
(Alden Wily, 2008, p. 4).
According to Nelson and Blomley (2010), the economic 
crisis of the1980s prompted policy makers to implement 
wide-ranging policy changes that were more community-
based and decentralized. The process of policy formulation 
was dominated by international donors, NGOs, technical 
advisors, and government officials within the MNRT. The 
same authors argue that, in the forestry sector, donors man-
aged to leverage the process due to FBD’s lack of alternative 
sources of political power and financial capital. Nevertheless, 
in the wildlife sector, donors had very little influence due to 
the ability of policy makers to acquire rents from tourism 
that provided them with financial assets that enabled them to 
deflect reform pressure from donors (Nelson & Blomley, 
2010). Consequently, donors failed to bring about the reforms 
necessary for positive and direct impacts on rural livelihoods 
(Nelson & Blomley, 2010).
Although the two sectors are under the same ministry, the 
existing legal framework causes them to work in different 
directions indicating that the outputs might be different in 
terms of participation levels and benefits channeled to local 
communities. Blomley and Iddi (2009) conclude that the 
“legal uncertainty caused by the parallel and disconnected 
development of wildlife and forest policies and laws results 
in inefficiencies and wasted opportunities for poverty reduc-
tion and sustainable land [natural resources] management” 
(p. 18).
Conclusions and Recommendations
This article has presented findings on participatory 
approaches used by a national park and a forest plantation in 
Tanzania. How the park and plantation work and how they 
affect the relationship with local people and the resulting 
attitudes toward the study areas has been presented. 
Conservationists, government officials, and development 
partners have presented the notion of participatory approaches 
as a “win−win” strategy where conservation and local bene-
fits can be combined. Many conservation institutions have 
used this strategy to win local people’s support for conserva-
tion. However, this study shows that although some aspects 
of participatory approaches seem to be typical in KNP, it is 
evident that the park operates closely under the “fences and 
fines” strategy. This is contrary to the other case of WKFP 
where local people are involved and benefit through various 
activities in the forest plantation. In both cases, we have seen 
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that the extent of local participation and the amount of ben-
efits accrued seem to determine the communities’ relation-
ship with the study areas.
Many factors affect the level of participation and extent of 
benefits for local people, which can be summarized as fol-
lows. At KNP the factors include bureaucratic procedures for 
SCIP applications; lack of, or few benefits; lack of transpar-
ency; deviation of funds; lack of decision making; minimal/
passive participation; and lack of communication and aware-
ness. At WKFP, the factors include lack of decision making, 
too little payment for casual labor, corruption in allocating 
taungya plots, and lack of revenue sharing from logs sold. 
This article highlights that the differences observed between 
the park and forest plantation are related to sectoral legal 
reforms that occurred in the 1990s following the economic 
crisis of the 1980s.
Some issues were raised in the interviews (Table 1) that 
the management of the KNP and WKFP can consider to 
enhance positive relationships and thus reduce the costs of 
conservation. In the case of KNP local people desire regular 
positive communication with park staff, tangible benefits 
from the park’s tourism revenues, and some degree of deci-
sion making over park conservation issues. They also seek 
payment in case of fire, if they cannot harvest natural 
resources, and a buffer zone in which they can collect natural 
resources. At WKFP local people desire the plantation man-
agement to allow community groups to participate in logging 
business deals, to benefit in the form of income from logs and 
poles sold, and join hands in the plantation management.
The findings of this article show the failure of the park’s 
participatory approach to create good relationship with adja-
cent communities through local participation in management 
and benefit sharing, and the plantations’ efforts to build good 
relationship with adjacent local people. The findings also 
indicate that the extent of benefits received and the degree of 
participation used are associated with the negative/positive 
attitudes toward the study areas. This article concludes that 
for local people to support conservation efforts and resist 
illegal activities, the park should allow meaningful local par-
ticipation in park management and equitable sharing in the 
park's benefits.
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Notes
1. An agroforestry system in which short-term food crops are 
grown in the early years of timber plantations to satisfy the 
farmer’s quest for arable land, control weeds, reduce establish-
ment costs, generate early income, and stimulate the develop-
ment of woody perennial species (Agyeman et al., 2003).
2. Is a group of people presently elected and appointed to run, 
manage, and execute the State’s programs and policies, and 
their specific agencies and powers.
3. Is a motivation strategy, as large-scale farmers pay 11 to 17 
US$/day, while the plantation only pays 2.5 US$/day during 
tree planting exercises (1 US$ = 1,500 TZS, June 2011).
4. 20 plots × 20 sacks/plot = 400sacks. A sack contains 100 to 
120 kg, sold for about 0.7 US$/kg.
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Many  incidents  of elephant  killings  have  recently  taken  place  in  Tanzania  as  well as in other  African
countries.  Such  events  are  usually  presented  as  results  of the rising  global  demand  for ivory. As we  show
in  this  case  study,  however,  not  all violence  against  elephants  is  driven  by  the  ivory  trade.  This  article
presents  an  event  that  occurred  in  West  Kilimanjaro  in 2009  when  numerous  villagers  chased  a  herd
of  elephants  over  a cliff,  killing  six  of  them.  Using  a  ‘web  of  relations’  approach,  we  seek  to uncover  the
underlying  as  well  as  the  immediate  factors  that  led  to  this  incident.  A  severe  drought  sparked  off the  event
as  elephants  increasingly  raided crops  and  destroyed  water  pipes.  There  are  growing  elephant  and  human
populations  in  the  area,  which  must  be understood  in  the  context  of  land  use  changes.  Large  areas  have  in
various ways  been  turned  into  different  types  of  protected  areas  during  the  last  few  decades  as results  of
efforts by  conservation  NGOs  and  governmental  agencies.  In between  these  areas,  people  try to  sustain
a  living  on  the remaining  land,  while  encountering  increased  problems  with  wildlife.  Conservation  in
the  study  area  takes  place  without  local  communities  having  any  real  influence  on  decision-making.  This
leads to a feeling  of  being  marginalized  and  disempowered,  which  again  causes  resistance  to  conservation,
as  in  this  case.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Introduction
After two decades of increasing elephant populations in Tanza-
nia, a decline has recently been recorded in some areas (Niskanen,
2010; TAWIRI, 2010; Douglas-Hamilton and Poole, 2010). This
decline is due to a resurgence of elephant killings mainly associ-
ated with the growing illegal trade in ivory to supply the demand
for artefacts and alternative medicines in China and other East Asian
countries (Milliken and Sangalakula, 2009; Martin and Vigne, 2011;
CAI, 2012).
Some of the violence against elephants is, however, not driven
by the ivory trade. In this article, we use a ‘web of relations’
approach to analyse an incident that took place an evening in May
2009 on the western side of Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania. In this
particular incident, a large crowd of villagers surrounded a herd
of elephants and chased them, with the aid of torches, motorcy-
cles, fire, and noise, towards a cliff, killing six of them. This event
∗ Corresponding author at: Section for Development Studies, Department of Inter-
national Studies and Interpretation, Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied
Sciences (HiOA), Norway. Tel.: +47 93466998.
E-mail addresses: sayuni.mariki@nmbu.no (S.B. Mariki), hanne.svarstad@hioa.no
(H. Svarstad), t.a.benjaminsen@nmbu.no (T.A. Benjaminsen).
happened near the centre of Engare Nairobi village (Fig. 1). During
fieldwork in 2009–2011, we  also learned about several other inci-
dents in which elephants had been speared or found dead without
indications of ivory poaching.
While we  recognize that poaching for ivory constitutes a sig-
nificant driver for the on-going elephant killings in Africa, we
ask whether there are more of these cases that might be mis-
taken as ivory poaching, and which in reality are caused by a
resistance to conservation practice. One key distinction between
elephant killings for ivory or for resistance would, in addition
to what people state in interviews, be whether the tusks are
removed immediately or not. In poaching, the tusks will be quickly
removed after the killing in order not to attract attention. In Engare
Nairobi, numerous villagers were being photographed with the car-
casses the day after the killings (we are in possession of some of
these photographs), while the tusks were not removed. In addi-
tion, what separates poaching from resistance might also be what
Scott (1992) calls ‘hidden transcripts’, which refer to the narra-
tives that subaltern groups use to interpret their own experience
of domination or oppression. Furthermore, frustration among peo-
ple about the ways conservation takes place may also constitute
an important cause behind poaching, since poachers often seem
to be able to carry out their activities with the collusion of local
people.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.10.018
0264-8377/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Fig. 1. Map  locating Engare Nairobi and neighbouring villages, the two divisions of Siha Magharibi and Enduimet, and conservation areas and ranches.
Case studies of human–elephant conflicts in Africa often con-
clude that increases in human and/or elephant populations are the
main causes of these conflicts as elephants and people overlap in
their use of habitats and come into conflicts (e.g. Thouless, 1994;
Hoare, 1999; Hoare and du Toit, 1999; Naughton-Treves et al., 1999;
Walpole et al., 2003; Weladji and Tchamba, 2003; Osborn and Hill,
2005; Sitati et al., 2005; Graham, 2006; Walpole and Linkie, 2007;
Sitati and Tchamba, 2008; Warner, 2008; Karimi, 2009; Kikoti et al.,
2010; Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012). Some studies also point to
land-use changes as a driver of such conflicts (e.g. Campbell et al.,
2002; Noe, 2003; Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010). These land-use
changes result both from population dynamics and from the impact
of policies and governance. Other studies also focus on drought
leading to increased resource scarcity as a factor sparking off con-
flicts (e.g. Dapash, 2002; Zubair et al., 2005; Graham, 2006; Lee and
Graham, 2006; Warner, 2008; Lamarque et al., 2009).
Elephants require large tracts of land and consume large vol-
umes of forage (Kangwana, 1996; Kikoti, 2009). They may  spend
70–90% of their time foraging and can eat 100–300 kg of vege-
tation in a single day (Osborn, 2004). Thus, in their search for
pastures and water, they engage in extensive seasonal migrations
often including moving through farmland (Kangwana, 1996; Kikoti,
2009). Human–elephant conflicts can be defined as interactions
between humans and elephants where direct and indirect nega-
tive consequences, whether perceived or real, exist for one or both
parties (Decker et al., 2002; Zhang and Wang, 2003).
This article contributes to the understanding of these conflicts
with a detailed investigation of a case of elephant killings provid-
ing an insight into the interaction of a broad set of explanatory
factors. First, increases in both human and elephant populations
in West Kilimanjaro are essential components in the land-use
dynamics resulting in the conflicts. Second, large areas have, in var-
ious ways, been protected during the last few decades as a result
of the agency of actors external to the local communities. These
actors include the Wildlife Division and the Tanzania National Parks
(TANAPA) under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism,
wildlife-based tourism investors, and international conservation
organisations. Small-scale farmers and pastoralists try to sustain
a living on the land remaining in between the protected areas,
while encountering growing problems with wildlife. This has left
people with an increased feeling of being marginalized and disem-
powered and with limited possibilities to influence the situation
through democratic means. Thus, we argue that this case may  be
interpreted as an act of resistance by people who feel disempow-
ered and who  have limited access to representational channels to
voice their concerns. This situation is not unique in Eastern and
Southern Africa where powerful actors have worked for the estab-
lishment of protected areas and generally facilitated conditions to
increase wildlife. Thus, we suggest that an unknown number of the
other elephant killings in Africa that are referred to as ivory poach-
ing may  also result from a resistance to conservation. In addition,
it is also likely that resistance to conservation play a role recruiting
local community members into networks of ivory poaching.
In the following, we  first review literature on resistance to con-
servation before we  present the study area and the ‘web of relations’
approach used as part of our methodology. Thereafter, we  analyze
each of the possible factors, and establish the ways in which multi-
ple involved factors combine to explain why  the elephant killings
took place in this case. Finally, we discuss the role played by ele-
phant killings in addressing human–elephant conflicts in the study
area.
Resistance to conservation
There is a rich scholarly literature on different forms of resis-
tance to what is perceived as illegitimate or non-democratic
governance (e.g. Scott, 1985; Fegan, 1986; Ortner, 1995; O’Brien,
1996; Gupta, 2001; Watts, 2001). People who are dispossessed and
marginalized by conservation projects also tend to resist gover-
nance in various ways (Holmes, 2007). Cavanagh and Benjaminsen
(2015) identify four different forms of such resistance; nonviolent,
militant, discursive, and formal-legal. Illegal wildlife killings
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represent the militant form when they result from resistance,
which also this case study is an example of. Other examples of
such resistance to conservation have been given by for instance
Neumann (1992, 1998), Western (1994), Weladji and Tchamba
(2003) and Norgrove and Hulme (2006).
Some of these forms of resistance may  sometimes represent
what Scott (1985) calls ‘everyday resistance’ where relatively pow-
erless peasants seek to avoid oppressive regulations by using
techniques such as ‘foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage,
and so on’ (Scott, 1985, xvi). These ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott,
1985) normally need little planning or coordination. People make
use of implicit understandings and informal social networks and
avoid any direct confrontation with elites or government authori-
ties. Scott (1986) also notes that everyday forms of resistance are
almost invisible, but such resistance has still been far more preva-
lent in history than overt rebellions.
Thus, local people use various overt and covert ‘resistance
methods to challenge the hegemony of conservation imposed
by protected areas authorities’ (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006, p.
1100). In addition to poaching and the killing of wildlife, these
methods may  include destroying government property, illegal
extraction of resources, spreading false information (Shafer, 1999),
destroying resources (Harkness, 2000), threatened or actual vio-
lence against conservation staff (Neumann, 1998; Benjaminsen,
2000; Brockington, 2004; Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Robbins
et al., 2006), illegally using protected area land (Li, 2007; Cavanagh
and Benjaminsen, 2015), destroying protected area infrastruc-
ture (Meyerson, 1998) and collaboration with poachers (Western,
1994). As we will demonstrate, the case discussed here may be seen
as both an example of overt and covert resistance. The violence
against the elephants was direct and explicit with people posing
for their photos to be taken on top of the carcasses. At the same
time, since this was a serious criminal offence, it was later during
fieldwork difficult to get people to admit to their direct involvement
in the event.
Acts of resistance to conservation are usually carried out by
marginalized people who suffer the costs of conservation and
who do not have the ability to circumvent the system through
bribing officials or accessing political power (Holmes, 2007). In
China, a case was described in which farmers destroyed their
collective forest by cutting down trees that they had previously
managed after the government incorporated the forest into a state
nature reserve (Harkness, 2000). Likewise, Li (2007) describes
how displaced villagers in Indonesia resisted conservation by ille-
gally settling down and cultivating land for their subsistence in
a protected area. A similar case is reported by Western (1994)
in Amboseli in Kenya, where the exclusion of Maasai from the
national park in the late 1970s led them to protest in the form
of continued grazing, increased collaboration with poachers, and
the killing of wildlife. In a similar vein, Neumann (1992) tells
about a case in Eastern Serengeti in Tanzania where Maasai vio-
lently protested against the proposed park boundaries (through
arson, the spearing of rhinos and threats to government officials).
In Guatemala, Meyerson (1998) also describes an incident where
local people took thirteen scientists hostage and set a biological
research station on the San Pedro River on fire after restrictions of
squatters’ settlements in the Laguna del Tigre National Park were
imposed.
Resistance to conservation in its various forms may  also be seen
as a response to what Nixon (2011) calls ‘slow violence’, which
stands in contrast to spectacular and instantaneous violence.
Slow violence is gradual and incremental and leads to a ‘delayed
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional
violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all’ (Nixon,
2011: 2). Dispossession caused by the establishment of areas for
environmental protection is one of the examples of slow violence
mentioned by Nixon.
Study area
Engare Nairobi is situated in the Siha Magharibi Division of the
Siha District in the Kilimanjaro Region, adjacent to the Enduimet
Division of the Longido District in the Arusha Region (see Fig. 1).
These two divisions form part of the West Kilimanjaro basin. The
population consists of pastoral and agro-pastoral Maasai and small-
scale farmers who  are of Wachagga, Wameru, Waarusha, Wasafa,
and other ethnicities. In the 1950s, British settlers established plan-
tations in the area.
The village of Engare Nairobi was only officially registered in
2007. By 2009, it had a population of approximately 9000. Between
Kilimanjaro National Park and Engare Nairobi and other villages,
there is a forest plantation run by the Tanzania Forest Services
Agency. A large part of the population in Engare Nairobi consists of
people who  were evicted from this forest plantation in 2007. Due
to the rapid growth of Engare Nairobi, village leaders told us that
they have requested the government to increase the village area
by adding land from a nearby plantation owned by the National
Agricultural and Food Corporation, but no action has been taken so
far.
The study area lies between 1230 m and 1600 m above sea level.
Most of the land consists of semi-arid savannah interspersed with
woodlands. There is a diversity of land uses, ranging from dry-
land pastures on the plains in the rain shadow of the mountain,
to small and large-scale agriculture on the lower mountain slopes.
Kilimanjaro National Park is located high up on the slope. Rainfall
is unpredictable, especially on the dry plains, with an annual aver-
age around 340 mm (Moss, 2001). In the agricultural areas on the
lower parts of the mountain slope, the average rainfall is 890 mm
(Rey and Das, 1996).
Research approach and methods
In order to better understand resistance to conservation and its
causes within a broader context, we  decided to take a ‘chains of
explanation’ approach as a methodological starting point. Blaikie
and Brookfield (1987) proposed this as a methodology for examin-
ing causes of environmental change:
‘(This approach) starts with the land managers and their direct
relations with the land (crop rotation, fuel wood use, stocking
densities, capital investment and so on). The next link concerns
their relations with each other, other land users, and groups
in the wider society who affect them in any way, which in turn
determines land management. The state and the world economy
constitute the last links in the chain.’ (Blaikie and Brookfield,
1987, p. 27)
As a further elaboration of this approach, Robbins (2004), in his
textbook on political ecology, has suggested to move from ‘chains’
to ‘networks’, arguing that the chains of explanation approach may
be conceived as a rigid ‘hierarchy of power’ that tends to neglect
the interactions between actors at various scales (pp. 210 and 212).
In a similar vein Rocheleau (2008: 724) proposes ‘webs of relation’
by arguing that
‘(t)he centre of gravity is moving from linear or simple verti-
cal hierarchies (chains of explanation) to complex assemblages,
webs of relation and “rooted networks”, with hierarchies
embedded and entangled in horizontal as well as vertical link-
ages.’
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Thus, political ecologists have tried to move away from focusing
on chains to a focus on networks and webs that provide a better
framework for explaining more complex interrelationships than
one-way influences from higher to lower geographical levels.
These ‘chains’ and ‘webs’ of analysis within political ecology
have similarities with and seem to be inspired by the ‘progressive
contextualization’ approach in cultural ecology proposed by Vayda
(1983). This approach holds that human–environment interactions
may  be explained by ‘placing them within progressively wider and
or denser contexts’ (Vayda, 1983: 265), and one can start
‘with the actions or interactions of individual living things and
can proceed to put these into contexts that make actions or
interactions intelligible by showing their place within com-
plexes of causes and effects’ (Vayda, 1983: 270).
Progressive contextualization has been further developed into
‘event ecology’ (Vayda and Walters, 1999). This is a causal historical
approach that explains environmental events or changes. Vayda
and Walters (1999: 169) argue that event ecology has to be carried
out by following two basic steps:
‘. . . begin research with focus on the environmental event that
one wants to explain and then work backward in time and out-
ward in space so as to construct chains of causes and effects
leading to those events and changes’.
Vayda and Walters (1999) criticize political ecology for assum-
ing that political factors always explain environmental change and,
hence, for being blind to how other (non-political) factors affect
environments. Political ecologists, on the other hand, argue that
progressive contextualization is inclined to result in ‘apolitical’
explanations that do not deal adequately with power and politics
(Robbins, 2004; Penna-Firme, 2013).
The task we set out for ourselves was to explain why villagers
killed the elephants. Thus, what were the factors that led villagers
to take such radical action? In order to answer this question, we
decided to start out by including a broad set of possible causes com-
prising both natural and social factors, while still keeping power
as a central concern and object of analysis. Hence, this is also a
contribution to demonstrate the application of a ‘web of relations’
approach to explain environmental events. After the presenta-
tion of the methods used, we describe the various elements in
what we found to constitute the web of relations in this case (see
Fig. 2).
Fieldwork was conducted during September to December 2009,
in March 2010, and in August and December 2011. The interviews
were carried out in different periods in order to explore new aspects
that came up during data analysis and to learn about the impact of
elephant killings. Snowball sampling was used to choose interview-
ees. The first individuals however, were purposively selected and
asked for further referrals in order to identify other people who
were considered as relevant for the study. The criterion we used
was whether people had information about the incident of ele-
phant killings and human–elephant/wildlife conflicts in general.
Data were collected on factors that led to the elephant killings,
general issues surrounding human–elephant/wildlife conflicts, and
the impacts of the elephant killings incident, protected areas,
wildlife and human populations and actors behind conservation
in West Kilimanjaro. We  started the interviews by informing the
participants about the research and acquiring their prior informed
consent. We  used an interview guide with the issues we wanted
to focus upon. In the first interviews, we sensed that people did
not feel free to express themselves, because they were not sure
about our intentions. Thus, we explicitly guaranteed anonymity
for all interviewees and encouraged them to express themselves
freely. In addition, the first author stayed in the study area for
a certain period during fieldwork in order to win local people’s
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Fig. 2. A web of relations.
trust and learn about the causes of elephant killings and prob-
lems related to wildlife conservation in the area. Nevertheless, most
interviewees were hesitant to admit participation in the elephant
killings, although in some parts of the interviews they could talk
about their resentment towards elephants as well as providing
detailed descriptions of what had happened during this particular
event.
In total, we conducted qualitative in-depth interviews with 58
villagers individually. Most interviews were conducted in Swahili
by the first author and lasted for one to 2 h. The sample size
was reached when new data were no longer adding new insights
to the research questions. Most interviews were recorded and
transcribed. In addition to in-depth interviews with local people,
government officials, NGO representatives and tourist companies,
we also held four focus group discussions with villagers. Further-
more, we  carried out interviews with key informants who were
chosen based on their ability to contribute with information and
reflections on the research topic. The aim was to seek knowl-
edgeable individuals who  could provide insightful information on
human–wildlife conflicts in the study area. We also made use of
participant observation by living with villagers for some weeks to
witness the roles that elephants play in people’s everyday lives.
Finally, we collected and reviewed relevant documents and other
studies.
The data collection and analysis were conducted as paral-
lel processes throughout the research. During data collection,
immediately thereafter, and while listening again to the recorded
interviews, we  noted down further ideas and potential elements of
an analysis. In transcribing the interviews, all pauses, repetitions
and verbal utterances were written down as detailed as possible
to avoid losing valuable information. We also worked through the
field notes and transcripts several times and elaborated codes and
an index, and we identified aspects on which we needed more
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knowledge, and at re-visits to the field, we concentrated on learning
more about these aspects.
Potential causes of the elephant killings
Why  did the villagers participate in the elephant killings? To
answer this question, it is crucial to understand the villagers’ own
interpretation of the situation. This issue will be addressed later.
First, we find it necessary to present all the elements that we think
contributed to this event.
Local burden of conservation
During fieldwork, we learned that elephants repeatedly raid
crops in the area. All people interviewed reported that crop raiding
was a major problem. Statistics that we collected from local gov-
ernment indicate that in 2009 a total of 901 acres were raided in
three villages (Engare Nairobi, Namwai and Matadi villages) in Siha
Magharibi Division, and 2222 acres in seven villages in Enduimet
Division. In some periods, many farmers spent much time guarding
their fields. The damage was, however, significant.
Elephants also cause problems at water points, and they some-
times destroy water pipes. Furthermore, many people fear attacks
of elephants on people and livestock. As demonstrated in Fig. 2,
we found that the cost of conservation born by local farmers con-
stitutes an important part of the background for the actions that
villagers took who chased the elephants towards and over the cliff.
The burden on local people’s livelihoods found in this area is in
consistence with some other studies in this as well as other areas
with elephant populations in Africa (e.g. Hoare, 1999; Naughton-
Treves et al., 1999; Tchamba, 1996; Parker and Osborn, 2001;
Dublin and Hoare, 2004; Osborn and Hill, 2005). Kikoti (2009)
describes how elephants would stay in the riparian forests along
the Engare Nairobi North River (also called the Simba River) dur-
ing daytime and raid local field crops at night. Furthermore, Trench
et al. (2009) state that some villagers, especially in the nearby Tin-
gatinga village, have given up farming because of elephant-related
problems.
Studies from other areas throughout Africa show that elephants
can be responsible for large-scale crop raiding and property dam-
age (e.g. Tchamba, 1996; Weladji and Tchamba, 2003). Muruthi
(2005) calculated that elephants in the Zambezi area of Zimbabwe
are responsible for up to three-quarters of all crop damage caused
by wildlife, while Smith and Kasiki (2000) documented that farmers
around Tsavo National Park in Kenya, have stopped farming crops
preferred by elephants, such as bananas and sugar cane. Gupta’s
(2013) study in Botswana shows that crop raiding by elephants has
caused some farmers to stop farming their large arable land and
instead grow vegetables and fruit in tiny backyard gardens. Osborn
and Hill (2005) state that in areas in Africa affected by crop dam-
age by elephants, and where people depend on farming, people’s
livelihoods are threatened and the standard of living is very low.
Drought
A severe drought in northern Tanzania and Kenya was a signif-
icant cause of the increased problems that villagers experienced
with elephants in the West Kilimanjaro basin in 2009. When pro-
tected areas are hit by drought, wildlife, including elephants, tends
to migrate to areas with human settlements and plantations in
search of water and green vegetation. Water sources, cattle troughs
and water taps, as well as crop fields constitute the main incentives
for elephants and other wildlife to move into farms (Thouless, 1994;
Smith and Kasiki, 2000).
A man  in Engare Nairobi described the local situation in 2009 in
this way:
‘Many people had plots along Engare Nairobi South River
. . ..Watering the plots was  very costly and hard, because there
was  little flow of water in the river and everyone was  fighting
for water. . . . Small plots along the river were more precious
than many acres somewhere else. People had hoped to harvest
some crops, but elephants used to come and destroy 2–3 acres
per day.’ (Interview no. 40, Nov. 2009)
During fieldwork, we learned that people tried to keep the
elephants away by guarding the fields throughout the night and
trying to scare them away with fire, noise and torches. We  also
observed people trying to prevent elephant raids by fencing, build-
ing hedges, and burning chili peppers. These methods are also
used in other countries with similar elephant problems (Zhang
and Wang, 2003; Weladji and Tchamba, 2003; Sitati and Walpole,
2006; Wang et al., 2006; Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012). Fencing
is reported in some studies (e.g. Weladji and Tchamba, 2003) with
limited effect in keeping elephants and other wildlife away. Other
studies (Tchamba, 1996; Smith and Kasiki, 2000) show that such
mitigation efforts may  provide a short-term solution in deterring
elephants from farms, but the animals may  become habituated to
these measures in the long run.
During the drought in 2009, elephants searching for water
destroyed various water facilities. We were told that such destruc-
tion also happened during the dry seasons in years of normal
weather. This damage is expensive and can deprive people of water
for days, as it takes significant time to repair pipelines. One morn-
ing, we met  people from Ngereyani village with donkeys carrying
large plastic containers to search for water. In the evening, we
learned that they had been approached by elephants that chased
the donkeys away. Both people and livestock in West Kilimanjaro
have, in fact, been killed and injured by elephants. For instance,
Tingatinga villagers claim that more than 75% of wildlife-related
human deaths are caused by elephants.
During fieldwork, villagers complained that they incurred sub-
stantial costs as result of damage caused by elephants, for which
they received no compensation from the government. The Wildlife
Act of 2009 states that ‘consolation’ payment is to be given in cases
of injury, death and destruction of crops caused by wild animals
(United Republic of Tanzania, 2009: 52). The regional government
document such costs, but during fieldwork we did not hear of any
such compensation being paid.
The drought was  caused by poor rains throughout 2008 and a
lack of long rains in April and May  2009 (Rusell, 2009; Western,
2009). According to Moss (2009), Maasai elders in Kenya claimed
the drought to be the most severe since 1961. Maasai elders that
we interviewed also told us that it was the worst drought for many
decades. Many rivers, dams, and swamps dried out and the few
remaining water sources became sites of human–wildlife conflicts.
News headlines stated that ‘Drought puts wildlife in danger in
Tanzania’ (Ihucha, 2009) and that ‘Devastating Drought Worsens
Human–Wildlife Conflict’ (Maina, 2009). Due to the drought, ele-
phants migrated towards human settlements and farms in search
of green grass and water. The presence of water sources such as
the Engare Nairobi River, along with cattle troughs, water taps and
fields were the main reasons for elephants and other wildlife to
move into farms. This contributed to a situation where elephants
raided crops and destroyed human water facilities to a greater
extent than usual.
Through fieldwork in 2009, we  experienced the intensity of the
drought, which caused various hardships for people, including the
damage caused by elephants. We observed that much wildlife as
well as livestock died and food aid became crucial for people. Rain-
fall data (Fig. 3) also show that the 2009 drought was severe.
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Fig. 3. Rainfall Fluctuations in West Kilimanjaro. Note: Years lacking rainfall data
for  more than five months are not included.
Source: Tanzania Meteorological Agency (2009).
Human population growth
Human–wildlife conflicts are often said to be caused by a growth
in human numbers, leading to competition with wildlife for food,
water and space (Mwamfupe, 1998; Hoare and du Toit, 1999;
Siex and Struhsaker, 1999; Hoare, 1999; Naughton-Treves et al.,
1999; Smith and Kasiki, 2000; Osborn and Hill, 2005; Sitati et al.,
2005; Karimi, 2009; Butt and Turner, 2012; Reid, 2012). In cases
where elephants cause problems for communities, human popula-
tion growth is repeatedly cited as an explanatory factor.
For instance Karimi (2009) state that: as the ‘human popula-
tion of Africa has grown, the wild areas needed to sustain elephant
populations have dwindled, putting the species, and therefore the
ecosystem impacted by them at risk’ (p.16). Furthermore, in Kenya,
Elephant Care International argues that:
‘The root cause of human–elephant conflict is the exploding
human population growth and resultant pressure on elephant
habitat. Habitat loss and degradation inevitably lead to con-
flict. As Kenya’s human population soars, elephant populations
will continue to be under greater pressure.’ (Elephant Care
International, undated)
In a similar vein, WWF  holds that:
‘As habitats contract and human populations expand, people
and elephants are increasingly coming into contact with each
other. Where farms border elephant habitat or cross elephant
migration corridors, damage to crops and villages can become
commonplace, providing a source of conflict which the ele-
phants invariably lose.’ (World Wildlife Fund, undated)
Looking at the population figures for the two divisions studied
in West Kilimanjaro, we find that the human population in the area
seems to have increased substantially since 2002. In 2002, the Siha
Magharibi and Enduimet divisions had 19,807 and 17,020 residents,
respectively (National Bureau of Statistics, 2002). In 2009, popu-
lation figures in these two  divisions had increased to 25,623 and
45,763. In addition to natural population increase, the establish-
ment of several new villages in 2007 (such as Miti Mirefu, Engare
Nairobi, Matadi and Namwai) may  have attracted other people to
migrate into the area. At the same time, there might also have been
considerable out-migrations of people who have moved to other
urban areas or they have moved to cities in line with the general
tendencies of urbanization.
Furthermore, we also learned during fieldwork that an esti-
mated 30,000 people who had lived in the forest were in 2006
and 2007 evicted from Engushai and Londros (see Fig. 1) (Ndagulla,
2009; Park Protection Warden interview, 2009). As their living
in the forest was seen as illegal, they were not included in the
population figures before they were evicted from the forest after
the extension of Kilimanjaro National Park in 2005. Most of these
people were moved to live in the nearby villages and only then
became part of official population numbers. Hence, population fig-
ures remain uncertain, but some villages, such as Engare Nairobi,
have grown substantially during the last decade, not the least due
to evictions caused by the extension of Kilimanjaro National Park.
The elephant population
Many of the interviewees in West Kilimanjaro said that the ele-
phant population had considerably increased during the last few
years. People in Engare Nairobi told us that they had never encoun-
tered elephants before 2009. One villager said: ‘I have stayed here
for more than 19 years, but I had never seen any elephants here
before this year. When we  saw the elephant dung, it was something
that surprised us.’(Interview no. 24, Nov. 2009).
Overall figures on the elephant population in Tanzania show
that since the ivory ban in 1989, elephant numbers have increased
from 55,000 to 136,753 in 2006; with Tanzania’s population repre-
senting 80% of all East African elephants (Blanc et al., 2007; TAWIRI,
2007). However, from 2006 to 2009 there was a decline to 109,000
in the country’s elephant population (United Republic of Tanzania,
2010; TAWIRI, 2010). The reasons are believed to be increased
ivory poaching – especially in the Selous-Mikumi ecosystem (CITES,
2010; United Republic of Tanzania, 2010) – due to rising demand for
ivory in some Asian countries (BBC, 2012; CAI, 2012); the migration
of elephants from Selous into the Niassa Game Reserve in Mozam-
bique, and data processing errors in the 2006 survey (CITES, 2010).
While the elephant population in Selous-Mikumi has decreased
in the last few years, the population in West Kilimanjaro seems to
have grown from an estimate of 150–400 in 2003 (Blanc et al., 2007)
to 600 in 2010 (Kikoti et al., 2010). This increase may  partly be a
result of conservation measures in West Kilimanjaro supported by
the African Wildlife Foundation and the Honey Guide Foundation.
An overall growth in numbers of elephants in West Kilimanjaro is
consistent with figures from the neighbouring Amboseli National
Park of an increase from 967 in 2007 to 1266 in 2010 (KWS/TAWIRI,
2010). The population of elephants in Kenya also increased from
22,036 in 2002 to 23,353 in 2006; while on the whole African con-
tinent, elephant numbers have increased from 402,067 in 2002 to
472,269 in 2007 according to Blanc et al. (2007). Furthermore, data
from Blanc et al. (2003) and Blanc et al. (2007) indicate an increase
of elephants in the Kilimanjaro National Park from 220 in 1990 to
793 in 2007.
As already mentioned, the destruction by elephants of crops and
water facilities is a result of human beings and elephants sharing
the same space. The population of elephants in West Kilimanjaro
seems to have increased substantially in recent years and, in periods
of severe drought elephants tend to cause damage to crops and
water pipelines.
Land restricted for conservation and wildlife tourism
The land use pattern in and around West Kilimanjaro con-
stitutes a crucial element in the web of relations regarding the
elephant killings. As Fig. 1 shows, large parts of West Kilimanjaro
today belong to both old and more recently established conserva-
tion areas. At the same time, people are left to make their living
in areas that are relatively limited and located in between these
conservation areas. The elephant population can thrive and grow
within the conservation areas in good years, while in times of
drought they ‘spill over’ into farmland. Fig. 1 includes land in West
Kilimanjaro that is used for large-scale commercial farming, which
also restricts the area available for small-scale farming and grazing.
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We present below each of the areas reserved for conservation and
tourism, starting with the establishment of national parks.
As shown in Fig. 1, there are three national parks in and close to
West Kilimanjaro. Ngurdoto Crater National Park was established
in 1960, and it became a predecessor to the present Arusha National
Park. After several expansions, Arusha National Park encompasses
552 km2 from 2006.
The Kilimanjaro National Park was inaugurated in 1973, with
an area of 753 km2, and it was expanded to 1831 km2 in 2005 by
the inclusion of the Kilimanjaro Forest Reserve (TANAPA, 2005).
All national parks in Tanzania are administered by the Tanzania
National Parks (TANAPA), which is a parastatal organization under
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Natural resource
use by local communities is not allowed in any of the national parks.
The mountain top of Kilimanjaro is a famous target for hikers, and
this tourism activity generates relatively large revenues. Due to the
2005 expansion, Engare Nairobi is located next to the park, but the
hiking tourism activity does not significantly benefit people in West
Kilimanjaro.
Across the border in Kenya, the Amboseli National Park was
established in 1974, covering an area of 392 km2. The Kitirua Con-
cession Area lies between the Tanzanian border and the western
part of Amboseli, covering 121.4 km2 and established in 2009 with
the help of the Kenya Wildlife Trust. According to Kenya Wildlife
Trust (2010), it was established in order to secure a habitat for
wildlife and enable Maasai communities to benefit from wildlife
tourism. There is a proposal to establish the Lemomo Concession
Area east of Kitirua, with a specific focus on the conservation of
wildlife (Kikoti, 2009).
The Longido Game Controlled Area covers 1700 km2and is man-
aged by the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources
and Tourism. It was created in 1946 by the colonial government as
an area for sport hunting (United Republic of Tanzania, 1998). The
Wildlife Act of 2009 requires people to acquire permits from the
Director of Wildlife for their livestock to graze in game controlled
areas. The Longido Game Controlled Area covers the entire Longido
District and is located almost entirely on village land.
Wildlife management areas (WMAs) are portions of village land
set aside for conservation, one of the intentions is to generate rev-
enues from tourism. The Enduimet WMA  was gazetted in 2007 and
covers 742 km2. So far, few tourism companies have engaged in
the area, and local revenues are small (Mariki et al., in press). This
WMA  was planned as a means to decrease meat poaching (Poole
and Reuling, 1997) and it was seen to be strategically located on the
wildlife migratory route between Kenya and Tanzania (Minwary,
2009).
In the 1950s, British settlers established a number of estates
in West Kilimanjaro that were set aside for large-scale farming
and livestock production. Timber plantations were also established
by the Forestry Division by clearing approximately 3775 ha in
the Kilimanjaro natural forest (Lamprey et al., 1991). After the
Arusha Declaration in 1967 that demanded placing ‘the means of
production. . . under the control and ownership of the peasants
and workers themselves through their government and cooper-
atives’ (Nyerere, 1967: 2b), the agricultural and livestock estates
were nationalized and run by parastatals such as the National Food
Cooperation and Tanzania Breweries Limited, that produced wheat
and other crops, and raised cattle.
During the 1990s, a wave of privatization impacted on the coun-
try, including West Kilimanjaro. A number of large properties have
been acquired by investors who have turned them into private con-
servation and tourism estates. A private investor in wildlife tourism
has leased three estates since 1994 (Endarakwai from 1994, Rafiki
from 2000, and Noala from 2007), combining them into one prop-
erty called the Endarakwai Ranch. There is a tourist lodge on the
property and the rest of the 44 km2 area is used for wildlife safaris.
The West Kilimanjaro Ranch covers an area of 303 km2. It was
operated by the National Ranching Company (NARCO) for livestock
production until 2007, when AWF  entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the company to establish integrated livestock-
wildlife development on the ranch (AWF, 2009). The AWF  was,
however, unable to lease the ranch in 2011, because of a disagree-
ment with the government. The ranch is currently on the list of
NARCO ranches to be privatized.
Furthermore, a wildlife corridor has been established in the area
and AWF  (through its Kilimanjaro Elephant Research and Conser-
vation Project) has proposed four more corridors (Kikoti, 2009). The
wildlife corridor Kitendeni was established in 2001 (and registered
in 2002) to connect elephant migrations between the Kilimanjaro
and Amboseli National Parks and the proposed Lemomo Concession
Area on the Kenyan side of the border (Kikoti, 2009; Kikoti et al.,
2010). Actors who supported the establishment of the corridor
include TANAPA, the Wildlife Division, Monduli District Council,
and AWF  (Kikoti et al., 2010). The proposal of new wildlife cor-
ridors was argued on the basis of elephant migratory routes and
dispersal areas revealed in studies where elephants were collared
and tracked (Kikoti, 2009). Some of the areas identified as elephant
routes overlap with local settlements. There have been widespread
rumours in Engare Nairobi that the government intends to dislocate
people to establish a wildlife corridor. In focus group interviews,
people voiced fears of being evicted referring to a study carried out
by AWF  through the Kilimanjaro Elephant Research and Conserva-
tion Project to assess the costs of relocating villagers.
Conditions presented thus far constitute drivers in the web of
relations that influenced the factors that eventually caused the act
of elephant killings. First, the establishment of conservation areas
makes West Kilimanjaro an area that elephants are attracted to
from nearby protected areas such as Arusha and Amboseli National
Parks. Thus, it is likely that the increasing number of elephants
in the area in recent years is partly due to these conservation
measures. As we  have seen above, the presence of more elephants
implies that there is likely to be more crop raiding and other prob-
lems for people, particularly in periods of severe drought, such as
that of 2009. Secondly, when conservation areas are established,
the available land and natural resources for small-scale farmers
and pastoralists becomes increasingly restricted.
Finally, villagers observe and interpret the changes in their area.
During interviews, focus groups and participant observation, we
learned that many people are frustrated and angry about the situa-
tion. The following is a typical remark: ‘We  are angry that investors
and conservationists are expanding wildlife protected areas in
order to enable wildlife to flourish and attract tourists, while we
are squeezed. They want wildlife to dominate at the expense of
people.’(Interview no. 8, Nov. 2009)
Likewise, another villager established a direct link between
conservation and the elephant killings: ‘Some of the people who
participated in elephant killings had plots along the river, while oth-
ers did not, but due to the hostility towards conservation, they also
followed the elephants and chased them towards the cliff’ (Focus
Group Interview, Dec. 2009).
Furthermore, many interviewees made connections between
the elephant problems and the private leasing of land for conser-
vation and safari tourism:
‘I can say that the white people like [anon.] are the ones bringing
this calamity. Wildlife used to stay in the parks like Ngorongoro
and Serengeti. These people have invested nearby our village
and attract wild animals that come to our settlements.’ (Inter-
view no. 6, Nov. 2009)
Moreover, villagers told us that they feared that land acquisi-
tions for a wildlife corridor through Engare Nairobi would force
them away from their present settlements and livelihoods. One
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man  expressed the following about the situation, which resulted
in the elephant killings:
‘We  were scared in 2009 of being dislocated from our village to
pave the way for wildlife. We  do not get any sleep as we think
anytime something might happen. It is hard to do development
activities. It is hard to get this fear out of our minds.’ (Interview
no. 3, Dec. 2009)
Actors behind land appropriations for conservation
Who  are the actors that influence conservation in and around
West Kilimanjaro? First, the Tanzanian parliament (Bunge) makes
official decisions on wildlife policies and acts that legalize the
establishment of various protected areas. There have been par-
liamentary elections since independence in 1961. From 1992,
Tanzania adopted a multiparty democracy and since 1995, mem-
bers of Bunge have been elected within a multi-party system.
Second, inputs to the policy-makers as well as implementation
and management are carried out by the Wildlife Division and
TANAPA. These are both under the Ministry of Natural Resources
and Tourism. There have been several corruption scandals in the
last few years in the natural resources and conservation sector,
in which civil servants and top politicians have made decisions
and allocated public resources to their private benefits (Sachedina,
2008; Jansen, 2009; Nelson, 2009, 2010; Cooksey, 2011; Mikali,
2011).
In recent years, the Wildlife Division has strengthened its own
power in conservation and land management (Benjaminsen et al.,
2013) and thereby weakened the power of village and district coun-
cils. The Wildlife Act of 2009 gave powers to the Director of Wildlife
to issue grazing permits in game controlled areas, such as Longido.
It states that ‘any person shall not, save with the written permission
of the Director previously sought and obtained, graze any livestock
in any game controlled area’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 2009:
26). Furthermore, the Wildlife Division has increased its powers
to control Wildlife Management Areas, while at the same time it
claims that these areas are managed by local communities. The
1998 Wildlife Policy allowed the creation of this new category of
conservation area (WMAs), stating that local communities will have
‘full mandate of managing and benefiting from their conservation
efforts’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 1998, 31). The WMAs  have
enabled the Wildlife Division to accrue funds from wildlife outside
national parks and game reserves. The state’s reconsolidation of its
power in wildlife management seems to work as a way for corrupt
government officials and the state treasury to capture resources
from village land (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; Benjaminsen
and Bryceson, 2012; Benjaminsen et al., 2013).
Furthermore, there are initiatives from the Tanzanian gov-
ernment to create a conducive investment environment (United
Republic of Tanzania, 1998). In the wildlife sector, the govern-
ment encourages the ‘establishment of zoos, game sanctuaries,
wildlife farms and ranches on private land and devolve(s) responsi-
bility to manage wildlife in those to private sector and individuals’
(United Republic of Tanzania 2007: 40). As noted by Igoe and
Brockington (2007: 432), this type of ‘neoliberalisation of nature’
re-regulates nature through commodification and commercial-
ization by partitioning the ‘resources and landscapes in ways
that control and often exclude local people’, while benefiting the
national and transnational elites. The Ndarakwai Ranch is an exam-
ple of this phenomenon. The establishment has contributed to land
use changes away from agriculture and livestock to wildlife-based
tourism.
However, conservation in Tanzania cannot be seen as a fea-
ture that is controlled only by actors in the government. There
are also international actors that play essential roles in propos-
ing, facilitating and funding conservation in this as well as in
other countries in the global South. AWF  belongs to a group
of non-governmental organizations from the global North that
has a powerful role in enhancing protected areas in the South
(Sachedina, 2008; Scholfield and Brockington, 2010). This large
non-governmental organisation was established in the USA  in 1961
to capacitate Africans to manage wildlife after the colonial wardens
had departed (Adams, 2004). In West Kilimanjaro, AWF  consti-
tutes the leading conservation NGO. In Africa, AWF  along with the
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)  and Conservation Interna-
tional, have identified different parts of the continent in which each
works to establish a series of conservation areas. They call these
areas ecoregions (WWF), hotspots (Conservation International),
and heartlands (AWF). In 1998, AWF  began its Heartland Program
(Adams, 2004) and West Kilimanjaro is located within the Kiliman-
jaro Heartland Area (KWS/TAWIRI, 2010). AWF  has been central in
the process of establishing and facilitating the Enduimet Wildlife
Management Area. The organization also made efforts to obtain the
West Kilimanjaro Ranch for conservation purposes. Moreover, AWF
has invested much effort in elephant research in the area to identify
and legitimate conservation measures, such as new wildlife corri-
dors. AWF  is also facilitating the Lake Natron Wildlife Management
Area in the Longido District.
Conservation organizations depend on their ability to raise
funds, and the main sources are usually development aid donors,
corporations and individual supporters. Since 1989, AWF  in Tanza-
nia has received most of its funds from USAID, but also some from
other international donors and individuals (Sachedina, 2008). WWF
has been focusing on infrastructure in the Enduimet Wildlife Man-
agement Area, also with financial assistance from USAID. The Honey
Guide Foundation works with game scouts to protect wildlife in
the Enduimet WMA,  receiving financial support from partners such
as the Big Life Foundation (Big Life Foundation, 2011), The Nature
Conservancy (The Nature Conservancy, 2012) and tourist donations
(Honey Guide Foundation, 2012).
Hence, these actors (parts of the Tanzanian Government, as well
as international conservationists, their donors and some actors in
safari tourism), despite having different objectives and strategies,
have succeeded in influencing conservation practice in West Kili-
manjaro. A less well-reported dimension is that villagers in West
Kilimanjaro do not seem to have had much influence in these
decisions. We  found that many villagers expressed a feeling of pow-
erlessness. They told us that they have tried to complain about the
situation, but do not feel that they are heard. One man  said: ‘The
government clearly shows that it values wildlife more than people.
Also investors value wildlife more than people.’(Interview no. 27,
Nov. 2009).
Another interviewee expressed the following:
‘In Tanzania, local people are not valued as much as foreign
investors. Government officials sometimes tell us not to disturb
investors, because they pay a lot of money to the government,
while we pay nothing. So, if the investors complain to the gov-
ernment we  will be dislocated.’(Interview no.31, Nov. 2009)
Hence, there are powerful actors behind the appropriation of
land for conservation both within the Tanzanian state as well
as among international conservation organizations. Small-scale
farmers and pastoralists, on the other hand, feel increasingly
marginalized and disempowered by these actors. As generally
pointed out by Scott (1985) and in relation to conservation by
Brockington (2004), such marginalization and increasing distance
to power may push local actors towards hidden acts of resistance.
As also noted by Brockington (2004), conservation may  be highly
successful despite such local hidden opposition. West Kilimanjaro
seems to be another example of this contradiction where stories
of successful win–win conservation continue to be told by pow-
erful national and international conservation actors, while local
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resistance to this conservation, including the killing of elephants,
is largely ignored.
Killing elephants as an act of resistance
In interviews, villagers emphasized their frustration due to the
difficult situation with the elephants and concomitantly their lack
of influence on the aforementioned land use changes. So, what
brought the villagers to see the act of killing elephants as a way
of dealing with the situation? In other words, what motivated the
elephant killings? On the basis of interviews with villagers in the
area, we here discuss three explanatory alternatives.
First, the death of the elephants could have been unintentional
by those who participated in the chase. In some interviews, villagers
tried to convince us that this was the case. One interviewee said:
‘We  did not kill the elephants. Farmers were chasing them out of
their farms unfortunately they fell into the pit.’(Interview no.51,
Nov.2009)
Killing elephants is a serious crime in Tanzania that can lead to
long prison sentences. It is therefore likely that the incident may  be
presented as an accident in order to prevent criminal charges. After
the elephants were chased over the cliff, some villagers, however,
stabbed a calf to death, which was hardly an accident. Furthermore,
a similar elephant killing took place nearby a year later when a
herd of elephants raided farmland planted by small-holders. People
then used spears and arrows to kill one of the elephants that had
lagged behind the herd. Finally, those interviewees who implied
that the elephants accidentally ran towards the cliff and fell over
described the incident as ‘a protest’ in other parts of the interviews.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the intention to kill the elephants was
not present among all of those involved.
Secondly, the killings may  be considered as an attempt to reduce
the elephant population and thereby be interpreted as a type of
informal (and illegal) form of wildlife management. This would be
in line with findings from Kenya where Maasai poisoned all lions
in Amboseli National Park in 1990, and speared 27 of 40 lions in
Nairobi National Park in 2003 (Lamarque et al., 2009: 33). A similar
incident in Kenya with elephants has also been reported (Moss,
2008).
However, we did not find support for such an explanation in
our study. When interviewees were asked explicitly about elephant
killings as a form of wildlife management, we were given answers
such as:
‘No, it would not be possible to reduce the number of elephants
that way, given the high number of elephants in the area.’ (Inter-
view no. 53, Dec. 2011)
Thirdly, the act of elephant killing could be seen as an act of
protest and a message to the government. One interviewee said
for instance, ‘It was a demonstration, so that the government is to
remember the people’ (Interview no.54, Dec. 2011). Another said:
‘We  became very furious and said let the government choose
either people or elephants. Our village is not a wildlife corridor’
(Interview no.13, Nov. 2009).
Likewise, the following view was expressed in a focus group
meeting:
‘We  saw that the government, investors, and the African Wildlife
Foundation did not listen to our worries and did not understand
our pains. We  therefore opted for this tactic [the killing of the
elephants] to end the annoyance of wildlife. This was  a way  to
send the message to the government that we  are tired.’ (Focus
Group meeting, Dec. 2009)
When people talked about what specifically motivated such a
demonstration, we received answers about various aspects, such as
the lack of effort by district authorities and others to install wardens
to deter crop-raiding elephants, lack of benefits from conservation,
lack of compensation for the damage and extra work burden caused
by elephants, protests against the intentions of conservationists
to impose a new elephant corridor and other conservation areas,
and annoyance at the other appropriations and leases of land with
restrictions on local use.
Concerning benefits sharing between different villages, an inter-
viewee from Engare Nairobi argued that ‘we don’t receive any
benefit from wildlife, either from the national park or from the
investor. The situation is much better for villages under Enduimet
Wildlife Management Area because they get some benefits from
wildlife, but we suffer so much, and we get nothing. . .’  (Interview
no. 48, Dec. 2009). Although Engare Nairobi village is under Kili-
manjaro National Park’s outreach programme, it has not benefitted
from park revenues since 1994 when the programme was initiated
(Mariki, 2013). The village suffers costs of conservation from dif-
ferent protected areas in the surroundings. Villages that are part
of Enduimet Wildlife Management Area have obtained some ben-
efits from wildlife through tourism revenues and employment in
the WMA  (Sulle et al., 2011). However, the benefits to the villages
are limited (Mariki et al., in press).
Villagers also told us about how they had tried in vain to
address the situation through other means. They contacted gov-
ernment officials as well as the media. The government was not,
according to several interviewees, taking any action on the ele-
phant situation before the elephant killings took place. One man
said: ‘When we were reporting crop raiding, injury, and property
destruction, no government official showed up. But when the ele-
phants were killed, various government bodies came very fast to
Engare Nairobi.’(Interview no. 30, Nov 2009)
In 2006, three years before the event, some villagers had raised
money to hire a TV journalist to report on their problems with
elephants. One man  in Engare Nairobi told us:
‘We  aimed to kill the elephants because they have disturbed
us for a long time through crop raiding, lack of sleep and other
costs. We  have complained to the government many times with
no avail. In 2006, we even contributed money and paid a journal-
ist to come and report about it. Instead of informing about what
was  troubling us, he reported good things about the investor on
how he helps the community through his tourism activities. We
were so angry. Therefore, the killing of elephants was  a way to
tell the government that we are tormented!’ (Interview no. 38,
Nov. 2009)
Tsai (2012, p. 2) argue that such noncompliance behaviours may
actually be intended to ‘communicate factual information about
local conditions and citizen needs to state authorities when they
lack easy access to formal channels . . . either because they are of
politically marginalized populations or because they live in a non-
democratic or transitional system’. Scott (1977) on the other hand
stresses that peasants are more likely to rebel against policies that
contravene the subsistence ethic of their ‘moral economy’. Resis-
tance might happen when people believe that responsible state
authorities have failed to incorporate their inputs into decision-
making (Tyler, 2006; Levi et al., 2009).
The elephant killings may  also be seen as an application of
the ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1985). The efforts to present
the death of the elephants in interviews as an accident, is in line
with this theory. The villagers’ collective decision of not exposing
the names of people responsible for elephant killings or claiming
responsibility can also be in line with this theory. Scott (1989,
p. 56) argues that ‘when the act of everyday resistance is meant
to be noticed – meant to send a signal – as in the case of arson
or sabotage, then the resisters take special care to conceal them-
selves, often behind a facade of public conformity’. In the study
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area, before the incident of elephant killings, the majority of local
people used to utilize covert weapons where they engaged with
hidden activities. They used poisonous arrows to kill elephants,
while others used a ‘silent killer method’, as one woman explained:
‘There are elephants killed one by one. In secret, people place
long sharp pointed objects like nails or sharp iron bars or
something similar on the elephant’s habitual paths. When the
elephants are pierced they get infections, and with time they
die’ (Interview no. 20, Nov. 2009).
Impact of the incident of elephant killings
To what extent have such elephant killings proved to be effec-
tive as a means of resistance? Some changes have taken place that
may, partly or to a greater extent, be attributed to these killings.
Both the Member of Parliament from the area and the District Com-
missioner arrived at Engare Nairobi soon after the event in order
to discuss with the village and ward representatives what action
should be taken. More conservation wardens have been seen in the
area since the killings, which may  have contributed to reducing
the elephant problems by helping to chase elephants from farms.
The plan by some conservationists to establish a wildlife corri-
dor through Engare Nairobi has also been postponed. Furthermore,
AWF  has not been able to continue leasing the West Kilimanjaro
Ranch as a wildlife sanctuary. Thus, as an act of resistance, the
case of the elephant killings might be seen as having achieved
some effect. However, during fieldwork two years after the event,
villagers continue to face problems with elephants and complain
about the lack of compensation for damages, as well as a lack of
influence on decision-making.
Conclusions
We  have in this article used a ‘web of relations’ approach to study
a particular conservation conflict. This framework includes both
social and natural factors and a particular focus on power relations
and the influences from various actors and processes at different
geographical levels.
The aim of the study was to explain why villagers killed six ele-
phants in West Kilimanjaro during an evening in May  2009. We
argue that this incident cannot be explained as a case of ivory
poaching. Nor can it be seen as merely a result of drought or
increased population pressure causing competition over scarce
resources.
While there seems to be a mix  of motives involved, we  conclude
that the immediate cause of this event was resistance by villagers
who have experienced increasing crop loss caused by elephants,
and who feel marginalized and disempowered by conservation
practices. Hence, this case can be seen as an example of the weapons
of the weak used as a response to the slow violence that villagers are
subjected to by conservation governance. The implicit aim of such
resistance is to send a message to the government, to influential
international conservation organizations and investors in tourism
in a situation in which villagers did not feel that they could reach
through with other means. The event was sparked by a general
frustration and feeling of powerlessness on the one side and an
opportunity that emerged on the other (a small herd of elephants
moved close to the village when many people happened to be gath-
ered there). The combination of these two factors may  explain why
this attack on the elephants happened at this particular place and
moment.
In addition, other factors that also played a role in the web of
relations behind this event were a growing elephant population,
the concentration of people in an area that more and more fre-
quently is visited by elephants, and the fact that there was a severe
drought in the area at the time of the event. We  argue, however,
that the main root cause that produced this act of resistance is
the way  that conservation is decided and implemented by exter-
nal actors and with limited concern for the burdens carried by
local communities. Actors that, in various ways, have contributed
to this situation are national governmental conservation agencies,
some foreign conservation groups and their branches in Tanzania,
some actors within the tourist industry and some international aid
donors.
In order to avoid such events in the future, we recommend the
implementation of land use plans that demarcate wildlife areas,
settlements and other land uses. Furthermore, local communities
should in practice, and not only in rhetoric, be involved and have
substantial influence in decision-making on matters pertaining to
land use and wildlife conservation, in their immediate environ-
ments. Finally, wildlife conservation also needs to take much more
seriously the challenge of benefit sharing with local communities
and compensation for wildlife damages.
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